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ABSTRACT 
Exploring Adolescent Inner Experience
by
Sarah A. Akhter
Dr. Russell T. Hurlburt, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor o f  Psychology 
University o f  Nevada, Las Vegas
Adolescence famously is known as a time o f storm and stress, hormones, and 
crises o f  identity, yet psychology knows remarkably little about adolescents’ actual inner 
experience. This study aimed to describe the actual phenomenology o f adolescent inner 
experience by using Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) with a sample o f  six 
adolescents aged 11-14 years. Each wore a random beeper in his/her natural everyday 
environments for five days. They observed the phenomenology o f their inner experience 
each time the beeper sounded and described that inner experience to the investigators in 
expositional interviews. We found substantial differences in the complexity o f inner 
experience across subjects, suggesting that adolescents may be in the process o f  
developing inner experience itself. We also found very infrequent experience o f emotion 
despite the fact that they had frequent emotional behavior, suggesting that (a) acting 
emotionally, (b) recognizing emotion in a third-person way, and (c) feeling emotion in a
111
first-person way may be three separate skills that are acquired at very different rates and 
times across development. That is, we speculated that adolescents’ stormy emotional 
behavior may reflect a lack of emotional experience, not chaotic emotional experience.
IV
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Textbooks on adolescence begin with publicly observable criteria for defining 
their subjects: age and puberty. Textbooks then break down their subject matter 
into seemingly separate, although presumably interacting, parts. There are 
chapters on theories o f adolescence, on cognitive development, moral 
development, sexual development, social relations, social deviance and pathology, 
and education and career options. Each chapter reviews research, which inevitably 
is quantitative. There are straight statistical presentations; ‘35% o f white subjects 
and 23% o f black subjects had never gone steady during the previous 3 years.’ 
There are correlational data: ‘Teachers’ grades were rather highly correlated with 
achievement test scores for disadvantaged students and black students, but only 
minimally correlated with achievement test scores for advantaged students and 
white students.’ And there are semi-experimental data: ‘2,062 subjects in grades 6 
through 12 rated themselves on a 7-point semantic differential scale. The self- 
concept ratings were factor analyzed and four factors emerged: (a) achievement- 
leadership, (b) congeniality-sociability, (c) adjustment, and (d) sex- 
appropriateness o f  the self-concept.’ Such findings provide food for thought about 
adolescent life. However, we are left to wonder ju st what these data point to in the 
actual lives o f  these people. (Eischer & Alapack, 1987, p. 105)
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This project explores the actual lived inner experience o f adolescents. Fischer and 
A lapack’s characterization (1987, quoted above) that psychological research has much to 
say about adolescents in general but very little to say about what their experience is really 
like, still holds today. One explanation for this state o f affairs is that psychology has not 
yet systematically applied to adolescents a methodology capable o f  sensitively accessing 
inner experience. The present study is an attempt to remedy that by exploring adolescent 
inner experience using Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES), a method specifically 
designed to capture and explicate the phenom enology o f inner experience with high 
fidelity.
To date, only one DES study o f  adolescent inner experience has been conducted. 
In this exploratory investigation, M onson (1989) collected random samples o f inner 
experience from five adolescent subjects. The following is one example o f a sample 
excerpted from M onson’s study;
[At sample #12, Wendy] was reading the book Five Little Peppers about a little 
girl who got a nail stuck through her foot just behind the toes. Wendy had just put 
the book down when the beep occurred. An image was present in her imagination 
at that moment, and was black and white and dark and fuzzy, a little out o f focus. 
The image was o f  a foot, side view with a dark spot on it just above the toes. The 
foot was located a bit above W endy’s eyes so that she had to look up to see it; 
Wendy did not notice the ankle or leg. She was o f the opinion that this image was 
in the process o f forming; that if  the beep had not interrupted her, this image 
would have become clear and in color. Furthermore, the dark spot on the foot in
the image would likely have become the nail that stuck through the foot in the 
story. (Monson, 1989, pp.87-88)
By collecting random samples o f inner experience such as this instance of 
W endy’s forming an image, Monson discovered detailed idiographic and 
phenomenological information about her subjects’ inner worlds, data that stand in stark 
contrast to the statistical, correlational, experimental knowledge about adolescents 
criticized by Fisher and Alapack (1987). M onson’s preliminary findings on adolescent 
inner experience shed new light on the “actual lives” o f teenagers.
The present study seeks to reopen the exploration o f adolescent inner experience 
using DES. Eighteen years have passed since M onson’s (1989) original investigation and, 
during that time, statistical, correlational, experimental research program s devoted to the 
study o f  adolescent experience have proliferated. Despite these efforts, there remains 
little knowledge o f the actual inner experience o f  adolescents. From our perspective, this 
shortcoming is a methodological issue: though the widely used methods o f  exploring 
adolescent experience provide new information about adolescents, none explore that 
experience at the level o f  fidelity necessary to build a detailed and accurate understanding 
o f the phenom ena o f  adolescent inner experience. This study is as much about sorting out 
differences in methodological approaches to studying inner experience as it is about 
learning about the inner experience o f adolescents. Therefore, the introduction and 
literature review has four parts. In the present introductory chapter, we will (a) discuss 
inner experience and introspection in general; and (b) discuss the DES method. In 
Chapter 2 we will (c) review the literature that has used methods in some ways similar to
DES to explore adolescent inner experience, and, finally, (d) compare and contrast those 
methods to DES.
Inner Experience and Introspection
Inner experience refers to any thought, perception, sensation, emotion, or any 
other inner phenomenon consciously apprehended by a person (Hurlburt & Heavey, 
2006). Our definition o f  inner experience does not include unconscious processes or 
those too miniscule to be detected consciously; instead, the “experience” o f inner 
experience implies that the experiencer is conscious o f his experience, whatever that may 
be. The excerpted sample from M onson’s study above is just one example o f inner 
experience. Wendy was in the midst o f forming an image o f a foot and that phenomenon 
was present in her conscious awareness; that is, she was able to apprehend it.
The quest to understand inner experience dates back to the birth o f  consciousness 
itself and is famously marked in the W estern tradition by Socrates’ exhortation to “Know 
Thyself.” Understanding inner experience has been and remains an explicit and 
fLindamental question driving the field o f psychology as well. Hurlburt and Heavey 
(2004) asserted, “awareness is worthy o f  scientific study, if  for no other reason than 
because [it] has long been held to be central to the scientific study o f  consciousness” (p. 
113).
Because inner experience is by nature private and subjective (i.e., it exists within, 
and can be directly known only to the person to whom it belongs), access to it requires 
some form o f introspection, self-reflection, or “looking within” to know. Without 
introspection, it would be impossible to access and describe inner experience. In Eastern
spiritual traditions such as Buddhism, Hindu and Kashmiri teachings, and Taoism, 
introspection is used as a means to achieve spiritual evolution. Through meditative and 
yogic practices, spiritual students come to direct observation and understanding— and 
often transformation— o f their inner experiences (Almaas, 2004). In the West, 
introspection is more a secular and externalized endeavor derived from a natural science 
approach to observation and description. Introspectors report their experiences to 
investigators in order to advance an objective scientific understanding o f the human 
being.
Early Western psychology attempted to create a systematic introspection 
(sometimes called “classical introspection” or “Introspection” with a capital I) and used 
this approach to understanding internal processes o f the human mind from the end o f the 
nineteenth to the beginning o f the twentieth century. By the second quarter o f the 
twentieth century, however, introspection had faced severe criticism and was essentially 
abandoned. It never regained its footing as a legitimate scientific method (Danziger, 
1980). Three factors contributed to the downfall o f introspection: conflict among 
researchers about how to do introspective research (methodological differences), debate 
among researchers about how to characterize findings (interpretive differences), and 
severe criticism o f introspection by rising behavioral researchers (Danziger, 1980). We 
briefly discuss these three factors here.
Differences in introspective methodologies can be traced back to the conflicting 
approaches o f Wilhelm W undt and William James (Lyons, 1986). W undt’s was a 
structuralist approach to introspection; he investigated tightly controlled, strictly 
manipulated “fundamental” aspects o f inner experience. W undt advocated “inner
perception,” a form o f introspection in which subjects were exposed to controlled stimuli 
and asked to observe and report only those specific features o f perception occurring in 
reaction to those stimuli. In contrast, Jam es’s approach was functional; he investigated 
those aspects o f inner experience that naturally and organically presented to 
consciousness. James practiced “self observation,” a freer, fluid, and spontaneous process 
that asked subjects to dip into the stream o f consciousness and report about found mental 
events.
As introspection evolved as a science, a major disagreement erupted among 
structuralists: two W undtian schools o f  introspection— the Titchenerians and 
investigators from W ürzburg— vehemently disagreed about how to interpret introspective 
findings (Hurlburt, 1993; M onson 1989). Specifically, this debate centered on the 
existence o f an element o f  consciousness called “imageless thought.” (The phenomenon 
behind imageless thought is known as unsymbolized thinking in the DES lexicon.) 
M onson and Hurlburt (1993; Monson 1989) conducted a detailed analysis o f  the 
imageless thought debate and found that Titchenerians and W ürzburg investigators had 
actually collected similar phenomenological descriptions o f imageless thought. W hat they 
could not resolve was whether or not it was possible to have a thought without an image. 
Both schools’ data showed that subjects experienced thought with no easily detectable 
image. But the Titchenerians still asserted that some form o f an image, even vanishingly 
faint, must lie at the heart o f every thought. According to this belief, images that 
accompany thought could be visual, kinesthetic, auditory or o f  some other sensory form, 
but the argument was that every single thought had to have an imaginai core o f some kind 
or another. The W ürzburg investigators, on the other hand, believed that it was possible
to have a thought that did not involve images at all. In a sense, the W ürzburg 
investigators stuck to the discovered phenomenon: if  on careful and repeated inspection 
using rigorous methodology subjects did not report an image at the core of some 
thoughts, then this was evidence that sometimes thoughts do not have imaginai cores. 
Thus the imageless thought debated was not rooted in a discrepancy in data but instead 
was based on a difference in theoretical positions. The controversy was a lengthy, heated, 
and ultimately deadly disagreement for introspection; largely as a result o f this standoff, 
introspection was dismissed by psychology (Hurlburt, 1993).
As introspection suffered due to internal strife, the rising field o f behaviorism 
simultaneously leveled attacks at introspection from the outside, which expedited and 
intensified its downfall. The behaviorists— including Skinner— were explicitly critical o f 
inner experience and introspection (Lyons, 1986), and in fact used the term 
“introspectionism” as an opposing contrast to their own “behaviorism ” approach 
(Danziger, 1980). Surprisingly, however, Skinner actually did believe in the vital 
importance o f inner experience to psychological understanding. His criticisms were 
squarely aimed at what he saw as three fundamental and inherent difficulties in exploring 
inner experience: (1) people are not skilled at talking about inner experience because the 
verbal community cannot easily shape that talk; (2) it is impossible to access one’s full 
inner experience; and (3) it is dangerous to extrapolate causation from the contents of 
inner experience, but the tendency to do so would be great (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2001).
Despite its rocky history in W estern psychology, Hurlburt and Heavey (2004) 
asserted that the study o f inner experience remains critically im portant and valuable to 
modern psychology. They suggested that past criticisms o f introspective methodologies
should be used constructively— that is, to strengthen the approach, not to destroy it: “The 
radical exclusion o f  introspection from scientific method throws the hahy out with 
bathwater” (p. 114). They concluded that exploring inner experience is neither “trivially 
easy” nor “im possible,” but that fruitful investigations o f inner experience require a 
rigorous methodology that avoids the traps and pitfalls o f prior attempts.
DES: A M ethod o f  Exploring Inner Experience
Hurlburt developed a thought-sampling method (later transformed into 
Descriptive Experience Sampling or DES) in 1973, in response to the need for a method 
capable o f accessing inner experience that did not suffer many o f the problems and 
inadequacies o f previous attempts at introspection. Perplexed by the dilemma o f how to 
do this, Hurlburt found inspiration in a “Fortune M agazine” article investigating how 
executives spend their time (W heeler & Reis, 1991). The article suggested that secretaries 
check in on their bosses at half hour intervals and log their bosses’ activities at those 
times over the course o f  a day. When aggregated, these data provided a clear and accurate 
picture o f what the executives actually spent their time doing. Though Hurlburt w asn’t 
particularly interested in how executives spend their time, he did think this “sampling” 
approach might be useful if  modified. He decided to try randomly sampling people in 
their natural environments to see if  this might be a viable introspective methodology.
Hurlburt wanted a method that would elicit “real,” “pure,” or “raw ” inner 
experience data. He created a beeper that cued subjects to “freeze” their cognitions at 
random moments and asked them to record, right then, the details o f  their samples. Fie
rigorously interviewed his subjects about those samples, going after clear descriptions o f 
experience rather than general descriptions or interpretations.
In his first published study using thought-sampling, Hurlburt and Sipprelle (1978) 
used the random beeper to collect samples o f inner experience from a single subject. 
“Donald” recorded his cognitions when cued by the beeper across two days, collecting 28 
samples. Hurlburt and Sipprelle found many o f his samples to involve feelings o f anger, 
irritation, and hostility toward his children, a finding that greatly surprised Donald 
himself. Prior to sampling, D onald’s self-perception was that he experienced only loving 
and positive feelings toward his children and, during the early stages o f sampling, he 
resisted Hurlburt and Sipprelle’s characterization that his experience involved frequent 
anger. However, he came to realize that he was, in fact, often experiencing anger toward 
his children despite his staunch self-image o f having only positive feelings toward his 
children. Apparently H urlburt’s thought-sampling method was able to uncover 
information about D onald’s inner experience about which not even Donald was aware.
Over time, Hurlburt refined the thought-sampling procedure and eventually 
named it Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES), but the core aspects o f the method—  
collecting samples using a random beeper in subjects’ natural environments— remained 
the same. The DES procedure to explore and describe idiographically the salient 
characteristics o f each subject’s inner experience was articulated by Hurlburt (1990). In 
that explicitly structured version o f DES, Hurlburt implemented six phases o f the 
idiographic analysis o f one subject’s experience: (1) prior to sampling, the subject was 
asked to write a brief account o f what she expected to find in her inner experience (to 
make explicit any presuppositions), (2) the sampling itself, which required the subject to
wear the beeper from morning until night, collecting as many as 30 samples per day, (3) 
writing the narrative descriptions o f each sample o f inner experience, (4) reviewing each 
sample o f inner experience and refining the narrative version to be an accurate account of 
the sampled experience, (5) comparing the narrative descriptions to the pre-sampling 
expectations (i.e., did the subject actually experience what she expected to experience?), 
and (6) conducting a follow-up period o f sampling and com paring those samples to the 
first set o f samples. These six steps embodied Hurlburt’s (1990) efforts to avoid 
contaminating the apprehension o f the subject’s raw inner experience.
The most recent descriptions o f  the DES method (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006; 
Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006) do not refer to those six steps because the method has evolved 
from its 1990 embodiment. Hurlburt (personal communication, N ovem ber, 2007) now 
holds that it is a mistake to ask subjects to perform step 1 because that step focuses 
subjects on what they expect to find, rather than their actual experience. Eliminating step 
1 necessitates eliminating step 5 as well. Step 6 is now incorporated into the “iterative” 
nature o f  DES (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006). Instead o f conducting one follow-up sampling 
and comparing that to the original sampling, the iterative procedure considers each 
sampling day in comparison to all the previous days. Thus iterativeness is a more organic 
or continuous embodiment o f the original step 6.
Thus, DES can be characterized as a random time sampling and qualitative 
interview methodology that enables the investigation o f the phenom ena and 
characteristics o f inner experience. It accesses and describes inner experience at a level of 
depth and accuracy not possible using other methodologies (Hurlburt, 1997), and it 
reliably yields high-fidelity information about the characteristics and features o f inner
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experience (Hurlburt & Heavey, 1999, 2002, 2006). DES “seeks simply to describe inner 
experience rather than quantify it based on the view that careful descriptions should be 
the foundation on which subsequent quantification should be built” (Hurlburt, 1997, p. 
946).
So how exactly does DES work? A DES subject is given a pocket-sized beeper 
programmed to sound at random intervals and is instructed to wear the beeper while 
going about usual daily activities in his/her natural environment. At the time o f each 
beep, the subject writes down (or records on tape) any thoughts, feelings, sensations, or 
any other awarenesses consciously present at the last undisturbed moment before the 
beep. Subjects collect between four and six samples during each sampling session and, 
within 24 hours, meet with a DES investigator for an “expositional interview.”
During the expositional interview, the investigator and subject work to distill the 
characteristics o f the subject’s phenomenological experience. This is done by guiding the 
subject to focus recall efforts precisely and specifically on retrieving the contents of 
awareness at “the last undisturbed m om ent” just prior to each beep; this is similar to 
being asked to describe the characteristics o f a photographic snapshot in time. The unit o f 
inner experience data collected is narrowly defined temporally by the beep and therefore 
the interview er’s task over the course o f the initial expositional interview is to train the 
subject to home in on the subject’s inner experience at the exact moment o f  the beep. The 
subject learns that the investigation is not about general narrative reporting o f a period o f 
time near the beep, but instead about reporting the contents o f experience at the specific 
moment o f the beep. Furthermore, the interviewer trains the subject to report only those 
characteristics o f experience that are overtly apparent and factually present in the
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subject’s awareness; assumptions and deductions about what was “probably” or “must 
have been” happening are dismissed. The first sampling day and interview are considered 
to be training exercises to help the subject become skilled at “capturing” the contents of 
awareness in a given moment and reporting only what was confidently and actually 
occurring.
Once a subject understands the task, she wears the beeper and reports for 
expositional interviews typically five times. This provides between 20 and 30 samples 
per subject, enough to reveal some o f a subject’s idiographic characteristics and patterns 
o f  inner experience. The “data” o f DES are phenomenologically based, detailed 
descriptions o f an individual’s inner experience. The goal o f  the method is to gain access 
to the inner world o f the individual, to examine the details o f experience with precision 
and accuracy, and to report that information with fidelity. In this way, DES provides a 
rich and truly idiographic glimpse into inner experience.
Though DES does not actively “search out” common characteristics in subjects, 
since the m ethod’s inception, common or frequently found characteristics o f inner 
experience have emerged across subjects. The five main characteristics consistently 
found across adult subjects are inner speech, unsymbolized thinking, images, feelings, 
and sensory awareness (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006). These characteristics refer to the form  
o f  experience, or how  experience is happening for an individual. For example, inner 
speech is “the experience o f speaking words in the person's own voice, with the same 
vocal characteristics (timbre; rate; inflection for commas, question marks, etc.; pauses; 
accents; stutters; etc.) as the person's own external speech, but with no external (real) 
noise. In its pure form, the experience o f inner speech  is identical to that o f  external
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speech except that the mouth does not move and no external production o f sound is 
produced” (Hurlburt & Heavey, 1999, p.2). This is in contrast to content, or the about 
what o f experience, which may be important but does not typically emerge as a salient 
characteristic o f  an individual’s inner experience.
In addition to discovering idiographic patterns o f inner experience within 
individual subjects, DES can also derive patterns and trends in inner experience across 
individuals w ithin groups (Hurlburt, 1990, 1993; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006). DES 
research has explored the inner experience o f psychologically normal and various 
clinically diagnosed psychiatric populations, including individuals with schizophrenia, 
depression, anxiety disorders, and eating disorders, and found distinctive similarities 
among characteristics o f  inner experience in persons drawn from the same clinical 
population.
DES findings sometimes contradict the findings and assumptions o f  extant 
research. For example, the general psychological literature describing the inner 
experience o f  bulimia suggests that bulimia is characterized by a lack o f body awareness 
and sensitivity. However, Jones-Forrester (2006) sampled the inner experience o f 
bulimics and found an abundance o f  body-based sensory awareness experiences across 
subjects. Furthermore, DES has been able to demonstrate links between inner experience 
and externally observable behavior (Hurlburt, Koch, & Heavey, 2002), as well as 
personality variables (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006).
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW  OF RELATED LITERATURE 
There are three categories o f  research approaches that share core methodological 
characteristics with DES and that have been applied to the study o f adolescents: time and 
event sampling (including the Experience Sampling M ethod and Ecological Momentary 
Assessment), think aloud paradigms/protocol analysis, and phenomenological 
approaches. These approaches are described below along with their respective 
adolescent-relevant literatures. Finally, DES is reviewed in contrast to these approaches.
Time and Event Sampling  
Experience Sampling M ethod (ESM)
The Experience Sampling M ethod (ESM) is the most prolific o f  the research 
paradigms discussed in this paper. Though some reviewers (Hektner & Csikszentmihalyi, 
2002; Hormuth, 1986) treat ESM as an umbrella term used to encompass all time 
sampling methods (including DES), this review takes a narrow er and more common view 
and defines ESM as the specific time sampling methodology developed by 
Csikszentmihalyi and colleagues at the University o f  Chicago in 1977 (see Larson & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1983). ESM grew out o f  the social psychological tradition, which 
views the individual as inseparable from context. Therefore, a core characteristic o f  ESM 
is ecological validity, or the collection o f data from persons while they are engaged in
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their everyday activities within their natural environments—  in situ  (Hormuth, 1986). 
ESM seeks to correlate people’s experiences with aspects o f their external situations, and 
to draw conclusions based on the frequency and intensity o f certain combinations. ESM 
is predominantly a quantitative methodology; its explicit aim is to collect and analyze 
data pertaining to: (1) internal and external aspects o f experience, (2) 
situational/contextual variables, and (3) relationships between experience and situation.
ESM subjects wear pagers programmed to emit signals on random time schedules 
during waking hours over the course o f a week. At the time o f  each signal, subjects 
complete (via paper-and-pencil or, more recently, using palmtop computers) a roughly 
40-item self-report questionnaire designed to describe immediate experience. The 
questionnaires, or Experience Sampling Forms (ESFs), can vary according to research 
objectives, but generally consist o f brief, open-ended questions about each subject’s 
location, activity, and company, as well as multiple choice items and Likert-type scales to 
ascertain aspects o f thought content; cognitive, emotional, and m otivational states; and 
perception o f current situation. Typically, a single subject completes 40-50 ESFs over the 
course o f  data collection; thus depending on the sample size, ESM studies can yield 
thousands o f data points. Data are coded and can be analyzed at the “beep-level” (data 
from a single ESF), the “person-level” (data from all o f one individual’s ESFs), and 
across groups o f  people (data from an entire sample, or across samples). This data 
structure allows researchers the flexibility “ ...to  focus analysis on situations, on persons, 
and on the interactions between situations and persons” (Hektner & Csikszentmihalyi, 
2002, p. 236).
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Early ESM studies investigated traditional social psychological topics, including 
interpersonal communication and relationships (see Hektner & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002); 
solitude (see Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1983); urban relocation (Hormuth, 1986), and 
mental disorders including schizophrenia, anxiety depression, multiple personality 
disorder, and bulimia (see deVries, 1992). More recent ESM studies have explored a 
wider range o f  psychological interest areas, such as happiness (Csikszentmihalyi & 
Hunter, 2003); antidepressant treatment (Barge-Schaapveld & Nicholson, 2002); risk 
perception in high-altitude rock climbing (Delle Fave, Bassi, & M assimini, 2003); 
cannabis use (Toumier, Sobara, Gindre, Swendson, & Verdoux, 2003); moods in the 
work setting (Miner, Glomb, & Hulin 2005); parenthood (Delle Fave & Massimini, 
2004); and emotions across cultures (Scollon, Diener, Oishi, & Biswas-Diener, 2004).
Since the m ethod’s inception, adolescence has been a core research focus o f ESM 
(Arnett, 2001; Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1984; Csikszentmihalyi, Rathunde, & 
Whalen, 1993; Larson & Richards, 1994a). The common assumption underlying this 
body o f research is that the socialization o f adolescents is a product o f how they spend 
their time. Furthermore, the shared goal o f these ESM investigations is to shed light on 
the developmental processes associated with socialization during this critical life stage. 
ESM adolescent studies examine daily activity patterns in conjunction with aspects o f 
affective experience and then analyze and interpret these data within the context o f 
developmental theories and hypotheses (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1978, 1984; 
Csikszentmihalyi, Larson, & Prescott, 1977; Kleiber, Larson, & Csikszentmihalyi, 1986; 
Larson, Csikszentmihalyi, & Freeman, 1984; Larson, Csikszentmihalyi, & Graef, 1980; 
Larson & Richards, 1989, 1994a). Thus, each ESM study is basic science in the sense
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that it yields novel “real-time” data on experiences, situations, and experience-by- 
situation interactions, but each investigation is also tbeoretically driven. ESM captures a 
completely original type o f data on adolescent experience, and bas the valuable ability to 
illuminate old theories in new ways.
Csikszentmibalyi and Larson are the pioneers o f ESM adolescent research. In one 
o f  the first ESM studies, they examined patterns o f daily activities and the affective 
experiences associated with those activities in a sample o f 25 adolescents aged 13 to 18 
years (Csikszentmibalyi, Larson, & Prescott, 1977). Based on the assumption that daily 
activity significantly influences attention, the aim o f this study was to explore bow 
attentional structures in adult personality might become established during adolescence as 
a result o f  daily activity. Researchers collected and analyzed 753 random time samples 
and found that their sample o f 25 teenagers engaged in the following activities (ordered 
here by frequency o f occurrence): talking with peers, talking with adults, watching TV, 
playing sports/games, eating, grooming, walking, work, reading, studying, class. O f 
these, playing games/sports and talking with peers provided the most positive affective 
experience, while watching TV and studying generated less positive affective experience. 
Because peer interaction was by far the most common venue for adolescent socialization, 
investigators concluded that peer interaction must have a significant impact on the 
development o f adult attentional patterns.
Next, Larson and Csikszentmibalyi (1978) focused on the experiential correlates 
o f time spent alone in adolescence. The central question here was w hether time alone was 
developmentally productive or if, instead, it would lead to patterns o f  isolation and 
loneliness. ESM samples revealed that adolescents spent roughly one third o f  their
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waking hours in solitude, the most frequent solitary activities heing free-floating 
thinking, listening to music/reading books, sleeping, and personal grooming. Results 
indicated that, although aloneness was experienced as not enjoyable, it was associated 
with lower alienation, a positive trait. Furthermore, adolescents who spent no time alone, 
and those who spent a significant amount o f time alone, were found to he the most 
alienated. Thus, researchers concluded that adolescents who spend an intermediate 
amount o f  time alone are least alienated and most likely to succeed at the developmental 
task o f  establishing autonomous identities.
Csikszentmibalyi and Larson (1984) designed a larger protocol in which they 
used ESM  to sample 75 randomly selected Chicago area high-sehool students. They 
stratified subjects on the basis o f  sex, grade, and socioeconomic status, and collected 
4,489 s e l f  reports over the course o f  the study. The self-reports were designed to capture 
data both on external aspects o f  subjects’ experience, including location, activity, and 
companionship, as well as on internal dimensions o f experience, such as mood, cognitive 
state, and motivation. Results revealed that this sample o f teenagers spent 41% o f their 
time at home, 32% at school, and 27% in public places (friends’ homes, work, store, etc.). 
Forty percent o f their time was devoted to leisure activities (socializing, watching TV), 
31% to doing maintenance activities (chores, eating, personal care), and 29% to 
productive activity (studying, classwork). Regarding companionship, the sample reported 
spending 29% o f their waking hours with friends, 27% alone, 23% with classmates, and 
19% with family. The data on subjective states showed that location had less o f an impact 
on adolescents’ internal experience than did activity and companionship. Adolescents 
were far more motivated to engage in leisure and maintenance activities than in
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productive activities, and they evidenced more positive affect when engaged in leisure 
pursuits. They were happiest to be with friends while engaged in leisure activities and 
least motivated to he with classmates while doing maintenance activities. Despite lower 
mood states, adolescents evidenced high levels o f concentration while engaged in 
productive activities alone.
Data from Csikszentmihalyi and Larson’s longitudinal protocol (1984) 
contributed to several additional substudies in which the data were analyzed to inform 
theoretical and special topic questions. For example, Larson, Csikszentmihalyi, and G raef 
(1980) explored the theoretical assumption that adolescents experience greater mood 
variahility than adults. They sampled 107 adults, aged 19 to 65 years, and compared the 
adult data to the adolescent data collected by Csikszentmihalyi and Larson (1984). 
Findings indicated that adolescent moods were more variable than adult moods, and that 
adolescents evidenced a wider range o f moods (higher highs and lower lows) and more 
rapid changes in moods (short-lived and changeable) than did adults.
Larson, Csikszentmihalyi, and Freeman (1984) also investigated the influence o f 
social and contextual factors on substance use and experience in teenagers. To do so, they 
focused on the 25 instances o f  alcohol use, 19 instances o f  m arijuana use, and 4 instances 
o f combined use reported in Csikszentmihalyi and Larson (1984). They discovered that 
teenagers consumed alcohol predominantly on weekend evenings at friends’ homes 
among large groups o f  people. In contrast, teenagers used marijuana in small groups or 
alone at many different times o f day, across all parts o f the week. W hereas alcohol was 
associated with more positive moods, marijuana use revealed a more complex pattern o f 
moods: teenagers reported more negative affect, less emotional variahility, but
19
simultaneously endorsed experiences o f high excitement and freedom. Investigators also 
noted that descriptions o f experience during marijuana use might have been characterized 
more positively in retrospect than was actually the case when experienced at the time o f 
use.
In an investigation into leisure time in adolescence, Kleiber, Larson, and 
Csikszentmihalyi (1986) explored different types o f  leisure activities and speculated 
about how these activities might contribute to adult development. They found that 
adolescents engage in two broad types o f leisure activities: (1) relaxed leisure, which 
included, socializing, watching TV, reading, and listening to music, and (2) “transitional 
activity” leisure, which included, engaging in sports, games, arts, and hobbies. 
Investigators argued that transitional activities contribute more to the development o f 
motivation and task engagement than do leisure activities, and that sports, games, 
artwork, and hobbies were valuable time spent for adolescents because they engender 
“the subjective experience o f leisure within a context o f effort and demand” (p .175), thus 
leading to the development o f  positive adult characteristics.
Following up on an earlier finding by Larson, Csikszentmihalyi, and Freeman 
(1984), Freeman, Csikszentmihalyi, and Larson (1986) investigated differences in ESM 
reports o f immediate experience and reports o f recalled experience in adolescents. 
Twenty-seven adolescents each com pleted two sets o f ESM, each set spaced two years 
apart. Investigators found almost no differences in subjects’ reports o f  immediate 
experience between the two years; moods appeared stable across time. However, an 
additional component o f the study involved asking adolescents at time two to describe 
their recalled affective states at time one (i.e., to retrospect about their moods two years
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earlier). Results revealed that teenagers retrospectively rated their moods significantly 
more positively than they had rated them at the time (that is, at time one). Instead o f 
foeusing solely on the magnitude o f the disparity between reports, investigators proposed 
an “Inteipretive Model o f Development” suggesting that teenagers’ inaeeurate 
inteipretations o f past experience might actually be a sign o f positive developmental 
funetioning. The disparity in mood appraisal at time two about time one was interpreted 
as a sign o f  developmental work in which teenagers were learning how to eontextualize 
their experiences into a larger personal narrative and worldview. Investigators further 
suggested that this developing perspeetive might help teenagers beeome better able to 
make realistie appraisals o f their moods based on aequired life experience and refleetion 
on that life experienee. Thus, teenagers’ reformulation o f perspeetive on their own 
experienees across time was seen by investigators to constitute major developmental 
work in adolescents (Freeman, Csikszentmihalyi, & Larson, 1986, p. 183).
In the largest ESM adoleseent protoeol to date, Reed Larson and Maryse Riehards 
(1989) sampled 483 fifth through ninth graders to investigate the transition into 
adoleseenee and the charaeteristies o f life space during this life stage. Participants were 
drawn from two suburban Chieago communities (one middle-elass, the other working- 
elass), belonged to stable families, and were predominantly white. The sample was 
stratified by grade and sex, whieh faeilitated eomparisons among life stages and between 
genders. Over a two-year period, 18,022 self-reports revealed adoleseents spent 75% of 
their waking hours engaged in one o f the following; sehoolwork, maintenanee, 
soeializing, media, and sport. Several investigators partieipated in this protoeol and 
simultaneously eondueted their own investigations into the teenagers’ experienees using
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the ESM data (Duekett, Raffaelli, & Riehards, 1989; Kirshnit, Ham, & Richards, 1989; 
Larson, Kuhey, & Colletti, 1989; Leone & Richards, 1989; Raffaelli & Duckett, 1989).
Leone and Richards (1989) investigated how well school-related aetivities prepare 
adolescents for adulthood. They examined the amount o f time teenagers spent doing 
sehoolwork, teenagers’ suhjeetive experienees o f doing sehoolwork, and whether or not 
they had com panionship while doing homework. Results indieated that the sample o f 
students spent 21.5 hours a week engaged in sehoolwork, with only six o f  those hours 
devoted to homework. Time spent doing homework correlated with bad moods, and 
elasswork was assoeiated with low levels o f attention. However, time spent doing 
homework was assoeiated with better aeademic achievement, partieularly if  the 
homework was done with parents. Overall, results suggested that sehoolwork was not 
intrinsically motivating, leading investigators to conelude that adolescents don’t learn to 
internalize work-related values from school-related tasks.
In a related investigation, Duekett, Raffaelli, and Riehards (1989) explored 
adolescents’ experienee o f  basic daily tasks, including personal and household 
maintenance aetivities, and hypothesized about how these tasks might shape soeial 
development. Tasks were found to be subjeet to sex typing. For example, girls engaged in 
grooming more often than did boys, and boys did more outside chores than did girls. 
Investigators proposed that sex differenees in adolescents’ experiences o f  daily tasks 
might lead to gender intensification and eventually to sex-role stereotyping.
Raffaelli and Duckett (1989) proposed “talk” to be one o f the most salient 
indieators o f  soeialization and explored adoleseents’ patterns o f  eommunieation with 
family and friends. They diseovered that talking was indeed a major activity for
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adolescents and that, overall, time spent talking increased with age. Time talking doubled 
for girls from fifth to ninth grade, with a similar, though smaller, increase in hoys’ time 
talking. Adolescents evidenced a significant increase in time spent talking with peers as 
age increased, while time spent talking with family remained constant across age. 
Investigators also found sex differences in the subjective experience o f  talk; in girls, as 
they became older, affect increased when talking with intimates (family and friends). As 
a result, researchers suggested that talk within close relationships has a heightened 
importance for girls over hoys.
In an attempt to explore how leisure time activities influence socialization in 
adolescents, Larson, Kubey, and Colletti (1989) and Kirshnit, Ham, and Richards (1989) 
investigated two contrasting leisure time choices: media use and sports, respectively. 
Larson, Kuhey, and Colletti (1989) found that adolescent media use was associated with 
relatively passive subjective states. Additionally, data indicated that a shift occurred 
across adolescence from TV watching with family to listening to music with friends. The 
decline in TV watching was attributed to less time spent with family, while the increase 
in music listening, especially in the company o f  peers, suggested a move toward 
independence from family. Kirshnit, Ham, and Richards (1989) found sports to he 
associated with positive affect, high motivation, and intense attention in adolescents. 
Investigators suggested that sports were highly constructive in terms o f  developing the 
ability to derive positive affect while doing hard work. Investigators also noticed a trend 
among teenagers: as they got older, they tended to drop out o f  sports, despite reports of 
high motivation and positive emotions while playing sports. On the basis o f the data 
collected, Kirshnit, Ham, and Richards proposed that sports attrition with age increase
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may be due to increasing self-judgments related to sporting ability, as well as a new age- 
specific need to allocate time in ways other than for immediate gratification.
Another segment o f ESM analyses focused specifically on exploring the 
assumption that adolescence is a time o f “stoim and stress,” characterized by increasing 
emotional lability and affective instability (Green, 1990; Larson & Ham, 1993). Though 
early ESM data appeared to support this idea (Diener, Sandvik, & Larson, 1985; Larson, 
Csikszentmihalyi, & Graef, 1980), subsequent findings revealed a more complex picture. 
For example, Larson and Lampman-Petratis (1989) compared the emotional states o f 
preadolescents to adolescents and did not find evidence o f  increased emotional variability 
with age. However, older participants did report more negative mood states than younger 
participants, indicating an overall shift toward more “had moods” with age. Larson, 
Richards, Raffaelli, Ham and Jewell (1990) investigated daily states and time use patterns 
associated with depression in adolescents. ESM reports revealed that teenagers’ 
subjective experiences o f  depression were characterized by low interest, lack o f energy, 
and more moodiness. Though both depressed and nondepressed youth reported doing the 
same types o f  daily activities, depressed teenagers— particularly males— tended to 
experience more social isolation than their nondepressed counterparts.
Larson and Asmussen (1991) explored adolescents’ negative emotional 
experiences and found that teenagers’ patterns o f emotional stress shifted significantly 
across age. Specifically, in preadolescents the locus o f  emotional trauma appeared to he 
related to concrete immediate experiences. Older adolescents, however, experienced 
more emotional stress in relation to abstract issues (i.e., feelings o f  others, possible future 
events). Investigators suggested that these differences might reflect cognitive changes in
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adolescents as described by developmental theorist Jean Piaget: “ [It] resembles a 
Piagetian shift I'rom a concrete, here-and-now world to a more abstract, hypothetical, and 
constructed reality” (p. 37).
Larson and Ham (1993) continued investigation into teenagers’ negative 
emotional experienees, this time speeifieally focusing on possible situational eorrelates. 
Older adoleseents experieneed more emotional distress than preadolescents and, not 
surprisingly, these high levels o f  distress were found to eorrelate with an inereased 
number o f negative/stressful life events.
Riehards and Larson (1993) investigated daily emotional experience in relation to 
pubertal development. For both sexes, the emotional state o f “heing in love” was strongly 
associated with pubertal development. Boys exhibited strong associations between 
pubertal status and emotional states: more physieally mature boys reported better moods, 
more foeus, and feeling “strong.” Limited assoeiations between emotional states and 
physieal maturity were found in girls, however, leading investigators to hypothesize that 
puberty might interact with other life events and transitions to induee elevated emotional 
states.
ESM researchers have also examined adoleseent experienee in relation to family 
(Larson and Riehards, 1994a). Larson and Riehards (1994h) explored the hypothesis that 
adolescents’ emotions are elosely interrelated with their parents’ emotions and found that, 
in faet, they are not. Fifty-five mother-father-adoleseent triads simultaneously earried 
ESM pagers for one week and were sampled at the same time as they went about their 
normal everyday routines (sometimes together in the same loeation, sometimes not). 
Overall, adolescents evideneed greater mood variability and m ood intensity than their
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parents, though modest correlations were found between parent and adolescent 
momentary affective states.
Richards and Duckett (1994) explored the effect o f  maternal employment on 
young adolescent daily experience. Contrary to popular belief, investigators found that 
maternal employment did not disrupt the daily life experience o f their children; in fact, 
young adolescents with working moms spent the same amount o f time with family, in 
class, with friends, and alone as did young adolescents with stay-at-home moms. 
Furthermore, youth with working moms reported more positive mood states and higher 
self-esteem than did their counterparts. They also spent more time with their fathers, and 
the time they did spend with their moms was experienced as “friendly”— that is, they felt 
positively toward and enjoyed the time spent with their mothers.
Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi (1993) explored the relationship between 
the subjective experienee o f  early family environment and the development o f creativity 
in adulthood. They found that creative persons emerged from one o f two early 
environments: difficult or exceptionally excellent. Conversely, good-enough 
environments appeared to lead to effective hut not necessarily creative adults, whereas 
traumatic childhoods were found to inhibit success entirely. The data underlying these 
eonelusions eame from a five-year longitudinal ESM study that sampled the ongoing 
daily experienees o f  200 “talented teenagers” (Csikszentmihalyi, Rathunde, & Whalen,
1993). In an attempt to uncover the elements o f adolescent experience that influence the 
development o f  talent, ereativity, and optimal functioning, the talented teenager data were 
compared to average teenager data eollected in an earlier study (Larson & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1984). Results revealed that talented teenagers often traded time spent
26
having fun, relaxing, and socializing for time spent praetieing their talent. Beeause 
talented teenagers ehose to postpone immediate fun in favor o f nurturing their talents, 
their moods suffered more than the average teenager. However, despite the fact that 
mood suffered in talented teenagers in general, when aetually engaged in their activity o f 
talent, these same teenagers reported optimal experienees (including feeling open, 
cheerful, strong, excited, un-self-eonscious, intrinsieally-motivated, suecessful and 
skillful) and feeling like they were working toward long-range goals. In line with these 
findings, Rathunde and Csikszentmihalyi (1993) found modes o f undivided interest 
(operationalized hy above average spontaneous interest eoupled with goal-direeted 
interest) to he associated with talent development in adoleseenee.
More recent ESM studies on optimal development in adolescence have examined 
differences across cultures. Csikszentmihalyi and Asakawa (1998) explored possible 
reasons for greater académie aehievement among Asian Ameriean adolescents as 
eompared to Caucasian American adolescents. ESM samples from 33 Asian Ameriean 
adolescents were eompared to samples from 33 Caueasian Ameriean adoleseents in the 
sixth, eighth, tenth and twelfth grades. Findings indicated that, although the two groups 
did not differ in the amount o f time spent studying, Asian Ameriean students reported 
more positive experienees, enjoyment, high motivational states, and pereeption o f the 
importance o f  what they were doing as eompared to their Caueasian Ameriean 
counterparts. In a related study (2000), the same investigators found that the physical 
presence o f others, particularly family members, affected Asian American adolescents 
more strongly and more positively than Caueasian Ameriean adoleseents, thus suggesting 
that internalization o f  eultural values via family may relate to aeademie exeellenee.
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In a review o f eross-cultiiral ESM studies on adoleseent leisure, Verma and 
Larson (2003) noted that adoleseents appear to engage in eommon leisure activities 
(active sports, musie, media use, and eomputer games) but that varying eultural values 
and praetiees influenee the experienees o f these aetivities in distinet ways. For example, 
Korean, Japanese, and Indian adoleseents spend many hours engaged in intense studying 
and sehoolwork to fulfill a eultural imperative to excel in academies. As a result, their 
leisure time involves more passive activities, whieh are experieneed as recuperation. In 
contrast, Ameriean adolescents’ leisure time is driven by the eultural ideal o f 
unstructured freedom, which promotes “finding onese lf’ over excelling in school. 
European adolescents report experienees o f  leisure time on both ends o f  the continuum; 
those involved in demanding aeademie eurriculums experienee leisure time as restorative 
while those under less pressure are inspired to engage in more challenging leisure 
aetivities.
In a study examining optimal experienee in Italian adoleseents, Bassi and Delle 
Fave (2004) looked at changes over time in adoleseent experienee. Specifically, they 
eompared quality o f  experience as charted by the ESM in two groups o f  60 adoleseents, 
aged 15 to 18, at two times, 1986 and 2000, to ascertain whether optimal experienee and 
related aetivities had changed with the times. Despite changes in the external 
environment and culture over two decades, results indieated that adoleseent experienee 
remained relatively stable over time.
Overall, ESM studies have provided a wealth o f information on where, how, with 
whom, and in what mood states adoleseents aetually spend their time. These studies have 
provided more than just a glimpse into the actual everyday lives o f  teenagers, they have
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provided a good long look. The most revolutionary characteristic o f ESM is its ecological 
validity, or its ability to obtain data on peoples’ experiences as they are living those 
experiences. For example, Csikszentmihalyi and Larson (1984) found that adolescents are 
happiest when engaged in leisure activities with friends. These findings were not 
obtained hy asking adolescents about happiness, leisure time, or friends in general; 
instead, this information was obtained by sampling actual moments o f  adolescent lives in 
a variety o f  situations including leisure activities, and asking about mood, activity, and 
companionship in those moments.
In addition to providing base-rate information on adolescent experience (i.e., 
mood), contexts (i.e., location), and the interaction between experience and contexts,
ESM studies have also made valuable contributions to the theoretical discourse about 
adolescence and child development. For example, as we saw above, one common 
assumption made by developmental theorists had been that youngsters with working 
mothers suffered from negative moods and had poor relationships with their mothers. 
However, when Richards and Duckett (1994) used ESM to explore the daily experience 
o f youth with working moms they found more positive mood states, more enjoyable time 
spent with moms, and higher self-esteem than in young adolescents with stay-at-home 
moms. Because these findings are ecologically valid, they take on a level o f power that 
cannot be achieved by methods that tap retrospective memory or general narrative self- 
report.
Ecological M om entary Assessm ent (EMA)
A  second time and event sampling approach that has been applied to studying 
aspects o f  adolescence is Ecological M omentary Assessment (EMA; Stone & Shiffman,
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1994; Stone, Shiffman, & DeVries, 1999; Smyth & Stone, 2003). EMA differs from ESM 
in that it is not exclusively a random  time sampling method; instead EMA sampling may 
occur at regular intervals or during specific events. EMA was developed in response to 
behavioral m edicine’s need to assess medieally related phenomenon in patients within the 
context o f their natural environments. Like ESM, it is designed to eapture “real” data by 
“maximizing eeologieal validity while avoiding retrospeetive reeall” (Stone & Shiffman, 
1994, p. 199). EMA might be used to investigate patients’ blood pressure variability, 
cortisol levels, pain perceptions, or prophylactic compliance. Thus, an important aspect 
o f EM A is “selecting a sampling scheme that will optimally eapture the phenomenon to 
be studied” (Stone & Shiffman, 1994, p.200). There are three basie EMA sampling 
schemes that ean be used depending on the goals o f  the research: (1) an event-contingent 
schedule, which requires patients to eomplete a brief-self report measure at the time the 
event o f  interest oceurs, after jogging, for example; (2) a time-contingent sehedule, which 
mandates participants to self-report at regular and/or designated time intervals, every 
hour for example; and (3) a signal-eontingent sehedule, which, like ESM, randomly cues 
patients to complete designated self-report measures.
EMA research on adolescents is nascent, and published studies investigating this 
population relate to biomedical, psychopathology, and public health issues (Axelson et 
al., 2003; Holden, Bearison, Rode, Kapiloff, & Rosenberg, 2000; M ermelstein, Hedeker, 
Flay, Shiffman, 2007; Simonieh et al., 2004).
Holden, Bearison, Rode, Kapiloff, & Rosenberg (2000) used EM A to investigate 
perceptions o f pain and feelings o f anxiety in a sample o f  hospitalized youth. In order to 
ascertain whether access to a private eomputer network enabling eommunieation among
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hospitalized children ameliorated anxiety and perceived pain, investigators eompared 
EMA self-reports from youth with access to the network to youth without access. 
Findings indieated that the group with access to the eomputer network experieneed 
significantly less pain intensity, pain aversiveness, and anxiety.
In a pilot study to assess the feasihility o f using EMA with youth, Axelson et al. 
(2003) collected EMA reports from 16 children and adolescents with affective disorders 
and five healthy youth to assess moods, thoughts, and behaviors over an 8-week period. 
Investigators concluded that EMA would he appropriate for use in complex studies o f 
neurohehavioral systems and the pathophysiology o f pediatric affective disorders.
In another pilot study, Simonieh et al. (2004) used palm-top technology to 
investigate EMA use in the assessment o f mood variation in female victims o f sexual 
ahuse. Using a sample o f  nine young women, investigators found palm-top EMA to he an 
effective means o f collecting mood data from this population.
In the largest yet EM A protocol involving adolescents, M ermelstein, Hedeker, 
Flay, Shiffman, (2007) examined cigarette smoking among adoleseents. Investigators 
collected EMA self-reports from 507 eighth and tenth grade students to determine 
contextual influences on smoking behavior. Investigators found that teenagers smoke 
most when watching TV or listening to musie, using other drugs and/or alcohol, or at 
parties. They rarely smoke when alone or with family members, and most often smoke 
when with other smokers. Investigators concluded that EMA was successful at providing 
rich data on teenage smoking both within subjects and across subjects.
Thus the few EMA studies that have been eondueted with adolescents provide 
eeologieally valid data on specific topics o f study.
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Think A loud Paradigms/Protocol Analysis
Since the 1970s, researchers have used a variety o f “think-aloud” procedures to 
investigate internal thought processes and mood states. As the name suggests, think aloud 
paradigms ask subjects verbally to report their ongoing inner processes while performing 
various tasks, thus granting access to aspects o f otherwise private inner experiences. 
Ericsson and Simon (1980; 1984/1993) examined think aloud approaches through the 
lens o f  cognitive and information-processing theories. They developed the term “protocol 
analysis” to describe rigorously executed think-aloud approaches that yield accurate, 
valid, and non-reaetive verbal reports o f  thought sequences (Crutcher, 1994). As defined 
by Ericsson and Simon, protocol analysis is the investigation o f “actual concurrent 
sequences o f thoughts [to] infer the underlying cognitive processes [of people]” (Ericsson 
& Simon, 1993, p. XV). An important characteristic o f  protocol analysis is its stringent 
foeus on internal thought processes exactly as they occur for a subjeet; the sole focus o f 
the method is the raw footage o f internal cognitive happenings. As such, during data 
collection, there is no soeial/eonversational dialogue between subjeet and investigator (as 
might occur in an interview format), nor any form o f introspective analysis/interpretation. 
A second core eharaeteristie o f protoeol analysis is that it occurs in “real time.” Ericsson 
and Simon proposed that strictly performed concurrent verbalization provides direct 
access to cognitive processes while eliminating retrospeetive bias, historically the most 
serious criticism leveled at self-report methods (Nisbett & W ilson, 1977).
Most think aloud/protocol analysis studies involving adoleseents derive from the 
fields o f  Education and Educational Psychology. Research in this arena specifically is 
concerned with understanding how students process information in order to improve
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pedagogical strategies. For example, Moore and Scevak (1997) used protocol analysis to 
examine the various ways in which students process text and visual aids (i.e., tables and 
diagrams) while reading. Within a sample o f 119 fifth through ninth graders, 
investigators found that students used several different methods o f reading, and that older 
students used a greater range o f reading strategies than did younger students. Results 
suggested that educators should be sensitive to different levels o f  strategy development 
among students, particularly across grades.
In an exploratory study on writing processes, 36 ninth graders wrote essays under 
think-aloud conditions to ascertain whether differences in cognitive activity while writing 
would be related to writing quality (Van Den Bergh & Rijlaarsdam, 2001). Results 
revealed a complex picture; cognitive activities varied across students as well as within 
students while writing, leading investigators to conclude that “the nature o f  the writing 
process is recursive and dynamic” (p.381). However, results also suggested that some 
patterns o f cognitive activity appeared to be more effective than others. For example, 
students who engaged in thinking about what and how they would write before actually 
writing produced better essays than those who wrote without thinking first, a finding with 
clear implications for how to teach writing.
M osborg (2002) investigated adolescents’ historical thinking using protocol 
analysis. Two groups o f high school history students, one group (N=5) from a 
conservative Christian school and the other (N=5) from a liberal college prep school, 
were asked to think aloud while reading newspaper articles about current affairs. Think 
aloud data revealed that most students used similar frameworks while engaged in 
everyday historical thinking; more specifically, both groups o f students drew upon a
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combination o f  their prior political eonviction/heliefs and what they knew about the 
relevant historical eras to interpret the newspaper articles. The groups differed, however, 
in their views about the articles based on their background narrative and school 
community milieu. As a result o f  these findings, Moshorg suggested that educators attend 
to the frameworks students use in everyday historical thinking, as these frameworks 
impact the way students see the world and engage in political discourse.
Vandergrift (2003) used a think aloud approach to explore listening strategies 
used hy junior-high students skilled in French as a second language. Thirty-six students 
listened to three French spoken text recordings and, at predetermined points, were asked 
to verbalize what they were thinking. Data revealed that all subjects used an “extensive 
variety o f listening strategies” (p.484), and that there were significant differenees in 
strategy between more skilled and less skilled listeners. For example, more skilled 
listeners used comprehension monitoring, a sophisticated metaeognitive strategy 
involving continual verification and correction o f comprehension (top-down processing), 
while less skilled listeners engaged in more direct translation (hottom-up processing) 
while listening. In light o f  these findings, Vandergrift suggested that less skilled listeners 
incorporate monitoring o f their comprehension as they listen so that they ean begin to 
build more advanced skills.
In an attempt to inform history instruction, Wolfe and Goldman (2005) used a 
think aloud paradigm to investigate how adoleseent students read and process multiple 
accounts o f an event. Forty-four sixth grade students read two conflicting historical 
accounts o f the fall o f  Rome and thought aloud after reading each sentence. Results 
indieated that the students in this study were able to make connections among
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information across multiple historical texts, though there was significant variation in how 
students achieved these connections.
Articulated Thoughts in Simulated Situations (ATSS)
Articulated Thoughts in Simulated Situations (ATSS; Davison, Robbins, & 
Johnson, 1983) is a protoeol analysis approach geared toward understanding peoples’ 
cognitive processes as they occur speeifieally in response to soeial stimuli. ATSS is 
designed to stimulate and then access the resulting ongoing stream o f thoughts and 
feelings triggered by exposure to a variety o f simulated yet naturalistic situations. 
Subjects listen to audiotapes describing “stimulus scenarios” designed to elicit responses 
such as soeial anxiety or hostile thoughts. As they listen, they im agine aetually heing 
involved in the scenarios and pay particular attention to their cognitions and emotions 
during task. Immediately after hearing each situation, subjects have 30 seconds to 
verhalize what they were thinking and feeling during the simulated situation. Typically, 
multiple stimulus situations are presented during one sitting. Responses are recorded, and 
the content is coded and analyzed according to relevant research goals. Consistent with 
other protoeol analysis procedures, ATSS is “as close to ‘on-line’ as possible” (Davison, 
Navarre, & Vogel, 1995, p .31), leaving little room for subjects to make retrospeetive 
errors.
There is only one published ATSS study on adoleseents (DiLiberto, Katz, 
Beauchamp, & Howells, 2002). In this investigation, researchers examined the cognitive 
activity o f  aggressive and nonaggressive male (N=41) and female (N=40) high school 
students (mean age= 16.22). Subjects listened to an audio recording o f an ambiguous 
encounter with an unknown peer that bumps into them in a hallway at school. While
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listening, the adolescent subjects were asked to respond aloud as if  they were actually in 
the situation. Responses were recorded verbatim, and subsequently coded for analysis. 
Results indicated that males expressed more aggressive intent than did females, although 
there were no gender differences in anger expression or hostile attributions.
The central methodological aim o f think aloud/protocol analysis paradigms is to 
access cognitive processing as it occurs, to uncover the fine details o f mental processes. 
For example, the goal o f  the M oore and Scevak (1997) study was to examine variations 
in cognitive processes while reading in a sample o f adolescents. The target o f interest was 
the process o f  reading. Thus think aloud/protocol analysis aspires to a level o f  detailed 
examination that surpasses other methods that seek to understand experience. For 
example, ESM  might randomly sample a subject and ask via palm device. Are you 
reading right now? The subject either answers Yes or No. From this we might learn how 
often a subject reads or even how he feels when he reads (if we ask), but we will not learn 
the phenomenological details o f his reading process. ESM level questions are too gross to 
be able to derive that kind o f detail about experience.
Additionally, protoeol analysis is ecologically valid to a certain degree. Although 
typically the setting is experimental, subjects aetually engage in the activity under study 
at the time o f study. For example, in the Moore and Scevak (1997) protoeol, subjects 
were aetually reading during the protoeol— subjects were not asked to report on their 
experienee o f reading sometime after reading. By adhering to the in-the-moment study o f 
reading processes, investigators were able to uncover differenees in reading processes.
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Phenomenological Approaches
The phenomenological-psychology approach to investigating inner experience is 
the third and final methodological category reviewed here. Phenomenological psychology 
grew out of the phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl, who was interested in 
examining “the most essential structures o f consciousness— that is, phenomena— such as 
intentionality, temporality, spatiality, corporeality, perception, cognition, and 
intersubjeetivity ...” (von Eekartsberg, 1998, p. 5). In order to explore these phenomena 
and their structures systematically, Husserl advanced a two-part process of explicating 
experienee and then deriving the essential charaeteristies of experienee. The first part of 
the process involved the application of the phenomenological reduction, a method of 
refleetion characterized by the bracketing of presuppositions. The second part o f the 
process involved application o f the eidetic reduction, or using free imaginative variation 
in order to discover the core charaeteristies o f  the phenomenon under investigation.
These two parts o f  H usserl’s process are described below.
First, to assume the phenomenological attitude, or to bracket presuppositions, 
means to let go of/put out o f  play/hold in abeyance any prior held beliefs, notions, 
attitudes, judgm ents, interpretations, and assoeiations about a given phenomenon while it 
is under investigation (Giorgi, 1987). By doing so, the phenom enon under investigation 
ean be more fully and clearly apprehended exactly as it manifests. The goal in assuming 
the phenomenological attitude is not to forget everything one ever knew or learned, but 
rather to observe the phenomenon under investigation with fresh eyes and openness to 
seeing what is aetually there. Husserl posited that when a phenomenon is observed in
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such a manner, the essence o f the phenomenon, which may have heen previously 
occluded, is now available for apprehension.
Phenomenological psychologists aspire to bracket presuppositions primarily in the 
investigation o f  psychological processes. Thus, when studying how people learn, Giorgi 
(1987) bracketed his presuppositions about the process o f learning so that he could 
objectively observe his subject’s experiences o f learning; that is, he suspended the trying 
to interpret what they were saying along the lines o f his own experience or his own 
“knowledge” about how learning occurs.
However, bracketing presuppositions can be applied to clinical psychotherapy as 
well. For example, a therapist may begin a session with a presupposition in play that her 
client needs to continue processing an unfinished topic from the prior session. Beeause 
the therapist makes such an assumption, that is, beeause she is operating based on an 
activated presupposition, she will direct the session in a way that angles discussion 
toward the old topic. By doing so, she is likely to overlook the fact that the client on this 
day needs to discuss a completely different topic. In this case, the therapist’s 
presupposition is driving her ability to apprehend reality in the moment. Had the therapist 
bracketed her presupposition about the session topic, she may have been much better 
attuned to the actual and objective needs o f  her client in session.
The bracketing o f  presuppositions is never a perfect process. It would be 
impossible to bracket all presuppositions about a particular phenom enon or topic or 
person, and it would he equally impossible to quantify an investigator’s ability to bracket 
presuppositions. Nonetheless, it is a core methodological feature o f  phenomenological- 
psychology investigations conducted today (Giorgi 1987; Kvale 1991).
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The second part o f H usserl’s phenomenological two-part process is known as the 
eidetic reduction, which is an attempt to arrive at the pure essence, to distill the 
fundamental/objective/universal/essential characteristics from the superfluous or non- 
essential aspects o f the phenomenon. To apply the eidetic reduction, Husserl proposed the 
technique offree  imaginative variation (von Eekartsberg 1998). A common example 
used to explain how free imaginative variation works asks one to consider an apple (von 
Eekartsberg 1998). Apples exist in many colors, most commonly, red, green, and yellow. 
I f  we use free imaginative variation to think o f an apple in a completely different color, 
say purple, it still retains the fundamental and essential qualities o f an apple in our 
understanding. Thus color can be ruled out as being a fundamentally essential aspect o f 
an apple— we have effectively used free imaginative variation to get one step closer to 
understanding the most essential, basie, and universal understanding o f  an apple possible. 
Next we might consider shape; in our world, some apples are large and some apples are 
small, some are perfectly round and others are somewhat deformed. However, if  we 
apply free imaginative variation to the shape o f an apple and imagine an apple as a long 
thin wafer, we run into a problem; an apple loses its essential identity as an apple if  we 
vary the shape dramatically. Thus shape is somewhat o f a fundamentally essential 
eharaeteristie o f apple. Husserl believed that by applying free imaginative variation 
systematically to objects and phenomena, one could come to the purest, most reduced 
essential understanding o f  the object or phenomenon under investigation.
Phenomenological psychologists rely less heavily on using free imaginative 
variation to achieve eidetic reduction than do phenomenological philosophers. However, 
the underlying principle that phenomena can reveal indivisible and essential
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characteristics is a cornerstone o f phenomenological-psychology investigations. As we 
will see below, Alapak (1991) conducted a phenomenologieal investigation o f adoleseent 
first love, the central aim o f which was to discover the most fundamental and essential 
aspects o f  that experience.
In addition to the bracketing o f  presuppositions and the goal o f  eidetic reduction, 
there is a third eharaeteristie o f phenomenological investigation, whieh Husserl referred 
to as taking the life world  perspective. Phenomenologists define life-world as the taken- 
for-granted hackdrop/context/underlying ground o f  reality/universe within which humans 
live and experienee hut are not necessarily aware o f and thus take for granted (Ashworth, 
2003; von Eekartsberg, 1998). In the language o f modem psychology, life-world 
perspeetive could he understood as a form o f eeologieal validity, in some ways parallel to 
the Experience Sampling M ethod’s tenet that experienee is inseparable from 
environment.
An important eharaeteristie o f  phenomenologieal approaches is that they 
explicitly take into account the existence o f this life-world context and the faet o f  human 
em beddedness within it. By seeking a life-world perspeetive, phenomenologieal 
investigations are most often o f lived experienees, that is, experiences that subjects are 
actually engaged in. For example, Petitmengin (2006) wanted to explore a subject’s inner 
experienee o f  thinking o f  an elephant. To do this, Petitmengin instructed her subject to, 
“think o f  an elephant.” She then asked detailed questions o f  her subject about her 
ongoing experience o f  thinking o f  an elephant. Petitmengin asked her subject to “think o f 
an elephant” numerous times during the interview so as to refresh her subject’s lived 
experience o f  thinking o f an elephant in the moment. In line with the phenomenological
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tradition, Petitm engin’s strategy was aimed at exploring her subjeet’s lived experienee ot 
thinking o f an elephant— her subject’s actual experience in the moment— whieh is very 
different from asking her subject to retrospect or provide a general speculation about her 
thinking-about-an-elephant process.
The ultimate goal o f phenomenological investigation, then, is to understand the 
essences o f phenom ena o f experienee as they interact with/speak to/reveal the taken-for- 
granted context o f the life-world itself, beeause the core assumption is that the 
phenomena and life-world are inseparable. Therefore the grand aim o f phenomenological 
investigations is not simply to explicate individual phenomena, but also to arrive at an 
essential understanding o f  the life-world itself.
There has been some application o f the phenomenologieal-psyehology approach 
to the study o f  adoleseent experienee (Alapaek, 1984, 1991; Alapaek & Fisher, 1987; 
Cross & Stewart 1995). In an early phenomenologieal-psyehology investigation into 
adoleseent experienee, Alapaek (1984) examined adoleseent first love and derived the 
following essential characteristics o f the first love relationship: absoluteness, uniqueness, 
perfection, togetherness, idealism, innocence, communication, emotional connection, 
reciprocal involvement, orientation to a future, and consistency with one’s roots.
More recently, Alapaek (1991) phenomenologieally explored the adolescent first 
kiss to reveal a rich and detailed set o f  experienees explicating the anticipation o f the first 
kiss, moments leading up to the first kiss, the kiss itself, the moment o f  disengagement, 
and the aftermath o f  the first kiss. Alapaek was surprised to find that his subjects’ 
experiences o f  their first kisses often did not include an experiential component o f  the 
actual kiss itself. Instead, “other themes” appeared to eclipse the experience o f the kiss
41
itself, including; preoccupation with the performing self (worries o f ‘bad’ breath), 
prominence o f bodily sensations (parched lips, butterflies, rubbery knees), and 
hyperawareness o f context (“It was as though the physical space between us was alive” 
(p.56).
The phenomenological method has been applied to the investigation o f the life- 
world o f  gifted students. Cross and Stewart (1995) conducted phenomenological 
interviews with 24 gifted adolescents in rural high schools to understand the experience 
o f being a gifted student in a rural setting. Interviews lasting 40 to 90 minutes were 
conducted, recorded, and transcribed, and the resultant data were analyzed for significant 
statements, thematic units, and major themes. Results indicated that major themes 
characterizing rural school experience for gifted students clustered around 
community/family, personal development, and time. These themes involved complex, 
varied, and detailed aspects o f subjects’ experiences; for example, gifted students in rural 
settings described the complexities o f being “visible” to peers, teachers, and families.
Although the phenomenologieal-psyehology approach has not been exhaustively 
applied to the study o f adolescents, it contributes to the present study in two main ways. 
First, these investigations provide evidence that adolescents can participate in detailed 
investigations o f their own lived experience. Second, the phenomenological approach to 
investigating psychological phenomena via bracketing presuppositions, seeking to 
understand the essential eharaeteristies o f phenomena, and exploring lived experiences, 
yields data that are rich, detailed, and idiographie. Phenomenologieal-psyehology 
investigations are deeply human-eentered and seek to reveal that which is most personal: 
lived inner experience.
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Comparing D ES to Other Methods
We have reviewed the methods and contributions o f four ways o f exploring the 
actual lives and experiences o f adolescence— DES, experience sampling methods, think 
aloud paradigms, and phenomenological approaches— unique ways o f exploring human 
experience. The present study uses DES, so we now briefly review the fundamental 
eharaeteristies o f experience sampling methods, think aloud paradigms, and 
phenomenological approaches, and show how DES may be able to provide access to 
aspects o f adolescent experience that have remained hidden.
Experience sampling methods (i.e., ESM and EMA) use beepers to sample 
subject’s experiences, either randomly or at set times, as they go about their daily lives in 
their natural environments. When sampled, subjects fill out questionnaires which ask 
about location, activity, mood, or other broad factors. By doing so, experience sampling 
methods provide broad eharaeterizations o f how, where, and with whom people spend 
their time, as well as on how they feel and what they think while in those situations. 
These methods avoid the pitfalls o f  retrospection by examining experience in the 
moment.
Think aloud/protoeol analysis paradigms seek to understand the details o f internal 
cognitive and emotional processes as they occur. These paradigms apply strict 
investigatory rules (for example, not allowing subjects to discuss anything other than 
their ongoing experience o f  the process under investigation) so that the fine details o f 
internal processes can be accessed and understood. Like experience sampling methods, 
think aloud paradigms do not engage in retrospection; all investigation is conducted on 
subjects’ processes as they occur in the moment. Furthermore, subjects’ reports are
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recorded verbatim so that details are not missed. Unlike the broad characterizations o f the 
experience sampling method, think aloud characterizations are detailed.
Phenomenological approaches to investigating experience use qualitative 
interviews to derive characterizations o f lived experiences. Investigators attempt to 
bracket presuppositions and seek to understand the essential characteristics o f 
psychological phenomena. Furthermore, characterizations derived from 
phenomenological studies are detailed. Flowever, since the goal o f  phenomenological 
investigation is to understand essential aspects o f  phenomena, the eharaeterizations 
represent the details found to be common across subjects.
DES shares with these three approaches the overarching goal o f  accurately 
accessing experience, but DES specifically is designed to access, explore, and describe 
inner experience. In order to do so, DES incorporates the core traits o f  each o f  these 
methodologies but also differs from these methods in important ways, which are 
described below.
DES is a proponent o f ecological validity, or understanding people within their 
natural contexts. Like experience sampling methods, DES uses a beeper to sample 
subjects in their natural environments. Flowever, unlike some experience sampling 
methods (EMA, for instance) DES always adheres to random sampling to avoid biases. 
Additionally, because DES is interested in exploring the detailed characteristics o f inner 
experience, it does not use standardized questionnaires with subjects, as do experience 
sampling methods. Instead, DES derives its data through an expositional interview in 
which subjects explicate the characteristics o f their inner experience at given moments. 
Thus experience sampling data differ drastically from DES data; experience sampling
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protocols are questionnaire based, and thus not much different than the typical general 
and often inaccurate self-report data (i.e., “Right now, I ’m feeling,” A. Sad, B. Happy, C. 
Angry, D. Frightened).
DES is similar to think aloud methods in its interest in the details o f people’s 
actual inner experience. DES shares with think aloud methods the use o f  verbal narrative 
as the primary source o f  data from subjects, and DES adheres to strict rules in its 
interviewing procedure to ensure high fidelity and accurate information from subjects. 
However, DBS differs from think aloud paradigms in that DBS samples single moments, 
whereas think aloud paradigms explore whole/entire events (i.e., what it’s like to multiply 
24*36). Second, DBS uses random sampling in subjects’ natural environment, whereas 
think aloud paradigms occur in the laboratory under controlled experimental conditions. 
And third, DBS explores inner experience, which includes thoughts, feelings, sensations 
or any other inner experience a subject is aware of, whereas think aloud paradigms 
concentrate on cognitive and some emotional processes.
DBS is significantly influenced by phenomenological thinking and practice; in 
fact, the method can be characterized as a phenomenological approach. Both DBS and 
phenomenological investigations use in-depth qualitative interviews to access the 
eharaeteristies o f subjects’ experiences exactly as those experiences occur. DBS also 
takes to heart the practice o f bracketing presuppositions while investigating phenomena. 
However, DBS differs from phenomenological approaches in three ways. First, DBS 
explores randomly sampled experiences whereas phenomenological approaches explore a 
theme or a topic (learning, apples, or thinking about elephants, for example). Second, 
DBS defines the exploration temporally (i.e., moment o f  the beep) whereas
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phenomenological investigations do not. Third, DES limits its exploration to the 
phenomenon only, whereas phenomenological approaches try to derive the “essence” o f  a 
phenomenon. DES aims to explore the actual phenomena o f inner experience at random 
moments, whereas phenomenological psychology aims to derive the essential factors 
comprising a general phenomenon based on common experiences across people.
As mentioned in the introduction, only one DES study has been devoted to the 
study o f  adolescent inner experience (Monson, 1989). Monson used DES to sample the 
inner experience o f five adolescents between the ages o f 12 and 14. H er sample varied 
widely with respect to learning ability: her four female subjects included a gifted student, 
a below-average student, a slow learner, and an above average student, and her one male 
subject was a learning disabled student.
With respect to differences in learning abilities among her subjects, Monson 
found that her gifted student subject revealed greater differentiation in her inner 
experience, and was able to report her inner experience with greater clarity than her slow- 
leam er subject. In her analysis o f this found difference, M onson (1989) stated:
Questions that cannot be answered, but that one must wonder about as more 
young people are studied are: Is intelligence related to the more differentiated 
perception o f sensory processes? Is high intelligence related to the actual 
production o f more differentiated processes? That is, does W endy [the gifted 
student] actually have more going on in her inner experience and is accurately 
reporting it whereas Anita [slow learning student] has less going on and is 
accurately reporting that? Or perhaps the difference between the two subjects lies 
in the ability to describe inner experience, a language ability that may not
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necessarily be related to intelligenee at all. As was noted above, this question 
eannot be answered because we are contrasting only individuals, not large groups 
o f subjects, (p. 199)
Overall, Monson found that her sample o f adolescents experienced the same 
eharaeteristies o f  inner experience as those reported by adults during DES, namely inner 
speech, inner seeing, sensory awareness, unsymbolized thinking, and feelings. However, 
M onson did observe a peculiarity regarding visual imagery in her adolescent subjects as 
compared to prior reports o f imagery from adult DES subjects. Specifically, M onson’s 
subjects often reported being in a process o f  imaging or forming images at the moment o f 
the beep, rather than simply experiencing fully formed images, as was commonly the 
ease with adults. As a result, M onson suggested that “the forming and fading o f images 
may be a developmental process” (p.204) and advocated further research on this topic.
Though other methods o f exploring experience have yielded valuable data on 
aspects o f  adolescent experience, they have not specifically explored the characteristics 
o f  adolescents’ inner experience. Thus the present study aims to use DES to investigate 
adolescent inner experience in a second attempt at basic science research into this 
population.
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CHAPTER 3
METHOD
Subjects
Six adolescents between the ages o f 11 and 14 years old participated in the 
present study. Three subjects were female, aged 11, 12 and 13, and three subjects were 
male, aged 12, 13, and 14. Four subjects were Caucasian, one female subject was half 
Caucasian and half African American, and one female subject was Latina. All six 
subjects were recruited via word-of-mouth; four subjects hailed from one o f  the 
investigator’s neighborhoods, one subject was a colleague’s niece, and one subject was 
another colleague’s younger brother. Subjects were recruited and participated in the 
present study one at a time, beginning in late 2006 and ending in early 2007. Five 
subjects participated during the spring semester o f their school year, and one subject 
participated during her summer break. As all subjects were minors, parents or legal 
guardians were fully informed about the study and eosigned the informed consent 
paperwork.
Overview
Each subject met with two DES investigators, the author o f  this study and her 
advisor, approximately six times in a setting convenient to the subject. The purpose o f the 
first m eeting was to explain the DES procedure to the subject and her parents/guardians.
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to complete informed consent/assent paperwork, and to answer questions pertaining to 
the study. The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth meetings were one hour expositional 
interviews in which the DES investigators interviewed the subject about her samples.
Five subjects elected to come to the DES lab located on the UNLV campus, and one 
subject agreed to have DES investigators travel to her home for meetings. All subjects 
consented to having expositional interview meetings video recorded. Five subjects 
completed sampling within one month and one subject completed sampling over a period 
o f two months.
M eeting 1: Orientation 
During the first meeting, investigators introduced the DES procedure to the 
subject and her parents/guardians, and then explained the operation o f the DES beeper 
and trained the subject in its proper use. The subject’s main task was to collect random 
samples o f her inner experience and then to discuss those samples with the investigators. 
To aid in the collection o f samples, the subject would wear a random beeper while going 
about regular daily activities in her natural environments. The beeper was a shirt-poeket 
sized apparatus with an on/off/volume dial, a reset button, and an earphone jack. A 
beeper was issued to the subject with an earphone that attached to the beeper with a wire, 
similar to the way a headset plugs into a cell phone. The subject would wear the beeper 
and collect her samples within 24 hours o f the upcoming expositional interview to have 
“fresh beeps” for that interview. W hen the beeper sounded, the subject was to jo t down in 
a small spiral-bound notebook (provided by investigators) whatever she was aware o f at 
that moment. That awareness m ight be some form o f thinking, feeling, or sensing, or
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anything else the subjeet was eonseiously aware o f within or around herself at the 
moment o f the beep. The subjeet’s sampling notes eould be o f anything in any format that 
would aid the subjeet in discussing her samples o f inner experience during the 
expositional interview. These notes were purely for the subjeet’s use and knowledge and 
therefore were regarded as the subjeet’s private property; investigators would not collect 
the notes at any point in the study.
Additionally, the investigators explained exactly what was meant by “the moment 
o f the beep.” The subjeet’s task would be to capture her inner experience as it was 
oeeuri'ing the microsecond before the beep interrupted her. This was an important 
concept to convey, as the purpose o f the study was to explore the subjeet’s naturally 
unfolding inner experience, not the subjeet’s inner experience in reaction to the beep. 
Therefore the beep was best viewed as a cueing tool to help the subjeet collect random 
samples o f her inner experience, not as a manipulator o f her inner experience. The subjeet 
was informed that that explanation should be regarded as only the first, rough 
approximation to the moment-of-the-beep concept, as prior experience has shown that 
subjects require iterative practice in the application o f this concept.
Each sampling day, the subjeet was to collect five samples, which would require 
wearing the beeper for about three hours. W ithin 24 hours o f collecting samples, the 
subject would meet for one hour with DES investigators to discuss those samples. This 
process o f collecting samples and meeting to discuss them would happen five times, on 
five different days. Altogether, across five occasions, the subject and investigators would 
explore approximately 25 sampled inner experiences together (see Hurlburt & Heavey, 
2006, for details o f this procedure).
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Finally, informed parental consent and youth assent paperwork was completed, a 
beeper was issued to the subjeet, and investigators answered any remaining questions 
about the DES procedure. A time and date for the first expositional interview was set and 
the orientation meeting was adjourned.
M eetings 2-6: Expositional Interviews 
Meetings two through six were one hour “expositional interviews” in which the 
subject and the two investigators discussed the subjeet’s recently collected samples of 
inner experience. These expositional interviews, at heart, were conversations in the 
service o f discovering the phenomenology o f the subject’s inner experience during her 
sampled moments. The expositional interviews have no set format, but the general 
procedure was this: The subjeet consulted her notes and talked about the beeped 
experience. That talk was typically an unstructured combination o f (a) reports about 
background and/or context o f  the experience, (b) reports about the situation (where she 
was, who was there, etc.), (c) reports about the activity (what she was doing, etc.), (d) 
reports about the experience that oeeurred before the beep, (e) reports about the 
experience that oeeurred after the moment o f the beep, and (f) reports about the 
experience that was ongoing at the mom ent o f the beep. Furthermore, all these reports 
were a combination o f  faithful accounts and distorted/misleading/overlooking/ineomplete 
accounts. The task o f  the investigator was to help the subjeet zero in on the faithful 
accounting o f  (D and to filter away all the other talk. That was a gradual process that we 
have called iterative, taking place over several expositional interviews, so that as the
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sequence o f sampling/interviewing progresses, the talk became more and more purely 
faithful (f).
Expositional Interview I (Meeting 2)
The first expositional interview was expected to be a challenging meeting for the 
subjeet and the investigators, and the subjeet was informed to anticipate difficulties.
There are typically three kinds o f challenges.
The first kind o f  challenge is about what counts as inner experience. Subjects 
typically are not skillful at identifying their own inner experience, and they don’t have a 
good understanding o f  what might count within the investigators’ definition o f inner 
experience, and therefore need continuing, ongoing practice and support.
The first interview therefore involved asking the subjeet to report about 
something that she is not very skilled at doing: eapturing/notieing/apprehending her inner 
experience. The investigators asked for a level o f  detail that most subjects found initially 
surprising. The investigators understood that, and expected to hear remarks such as, “I 
didn’t know you were going to ask me about that,” that being the phenomenological 
details o f  their inner experience. The investigators’ task was to be supportive o f the 
subjeet’s (mostly failed) attempts during the struggle to identify her inner experience and 
at the same time repeatedly to continue to redirect the subject tow ard their inner 
experience. The subject was reassured that most subjects find the first day difficult in this 
way; that some subjects (but not all) find that things become easier on subsequent 
sampling and interview days as their skills improve.
The subjeet was assured that this method o f training is somewhat “trial-by-fire” in 
the sense that the investigators had declined, at the outset, to tell the subjects what they
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were to look for, but now the subjects are being asked to describe that in detail. Subjects 
were told that that might not seem fair, but that that is the only way to allow subjects to 
encounter their own inner experience for themselves, as they immediately apprehend it. 
Otherwise, the investigators might have influenced the subject to look for aspects o f 
experience that the subject herself does not experience. That is, the investigators 
explained to the subjeet, in nontechnical terms, that the bracketing o f presuppositions 
requires that the investigation begins slowing, haltingly, frustratingly, tentatively; and 
that while that might be somewhat unpleasant, it is typically transient as both subjeet and 
investigators become more skilled at the discourse about the subjeet’s experience.
The second challenge typical o f  the first expositional interview has to do with 
language. Together, the subjeet and the investigators have to begin the struggle to 
establish a community language that is both attuned to and expressive o f  the subject’s 
inner experience, and that both subjeet and investigator really understand. Therefore, 
each subjeet was encouraged to struggle to find the right words; the investigators 
struggled to ensure that they did not take for granted that they understood what the 
subjeet was saying by questioning and clarifying all the details o f the subject’s language. 
That consistent attention to detail helped the subjeet clarify this language, which 
eventually became incorporated into the lexicon o f the trialeetie.
Finally, the third challenge during the first expositional interview is staying 
faithful to the phenomena o f  inner experience. The investigators modeled the bracketing 
o f  presuppositions (that is, they expressed interest solely in the phenom ena and no 
interest in narrative or interpretations) while the subject dealt with the discomfort o f 
having many things she said about her samples be bracketed out because they were not
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descriptions o f the phenomena themselves. Thus the investigators consistently worked to 
maintain a focus on the subject’s inner experience without indulging the subject’s 
tendencies to speak in generalities, to make deductions about what her experience “must 
have been like,” or to make causational inferences (“because o f  X ”).
Thus, during the first expositional interview, the investigators trained the subject 
to encounter her inner experience by asking detailed questions about the subjeet’s inner 
experience, even when the subject could not answer those questions. The investigators 
resisted any urges to “rescue” the subject from her discomfort, thus allowing the subject 
to learn to apprehend her own inner experience. By struggling through the first 
expositional interview, the subjeet achieved an experientially based understanding o f how 
to apprehend her own inner experience, how to talk about that experience, and how to 
stay faithful to that experience. Those are skills that need to be practiced, but the first 
steps have been taken.
Expositional Interviews 2-5 (Meetings 3-6)
By the second expositional interview the subject was typically markedly 
improved at identifying and discussing her inner experience at a finer level o f detail and 
with greater certainty than during the first expositional interview. The investigators 
continued, as in the first expositional interview, to work to redirect the subjeet to her 
experience at the moment o f  the beep, but the amount o f that effort generally lessened as 
the subjeet acquired the capacity to redirect herself. Also, building on the seeds planted 
during the first expositional interview, a language specific to the subjeet’s inner 
experience began to grow organically over the course o f the interviews. This language 
was emergent along with the subjeet’s inner experience, and that language was
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continually mirrored and refined in the interviews. As a general rule, we adopted the 
vocabulary, terminology, and manner that was natural to the subjeet, although often that 
became refined as discussion o f fine points evolved.
Thus the second through fifth expositional interviews were much smoother than 
the first expositional interview. At this stage o f the process, the challenges shifted from 
establishing ground rules and implementing new skills to exploring the fine-grained 
details, nuances, and exaetly-as-it-was-for-her o f the subjeet’s sampled inner experience. 
The main continuing challenge during expositional interviews two through five was 
bracketing presuppositions and staying faithful to the phenomena under investigation. 
Both the subjeet and the investigators worked arduously to bracket presuppositions 
during this phase. The temptations to interpret, to import, to assume, are subtle, and the 
tendency to “think you know w hat’s going on” is insidious, particularly after you “get to 
know” a subjeet and develop a relationship with her. The presence o f two investigators, 
both o f whom were quite different people with different interests, and so on, but with a 
common aim o f faithful apprehension/description, aided the bracketing, as did the review 
o f video between interviews.
D ebriefing
A fter the final expositional interview, each subjeet was given a chance to ask any 
questions she had about the present study or DES. M ost subjects reported that they had 
found the experience interesting. After debriefing, subjects were presented with a $30 gift 
card.
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Data
The aim here was to collect randomly sampled, raw experiences and then see 
what those sampled experiences had to tell us about the characteristics o f adolescent 
inner experience. (See Appendix A for “raw data” o f all samples across subjects). 
Collecting the Data
The primary unit o f data collected in this study is what we refer to as “a sample o f 
inner experience.” To review, each time a subject in our study was randomly “beeped,” 
she jotted down notes in a notebook about her inner experience at that moment. During 
the expositional interview, investigators asked the subject detailed questions about her 
inner experience at each moment, one at a time, in chronological order. In this section we 
describe how we handled this data.
During expositional interviews, both investigators took careful notes about the 
specific characteristics, details, idiosyncrasies, and nuances o f the subjeet’s lived inner 
experience at each sample. After the interview, the subject’s inner experience at each 
sample was then described in written narrative form incorporating the particular language 
that had emerged during the expositional interviews to describe the subject’s inner 
experience (for example, one subject described thoughts as “passing through” his head; 
that language was used in the written descriptions, as it perfectly expressed his 
experience o f the phenomenon). The object o f  these descriptions was to capture as 
faithfully as possible and with as high fidelity as possible the inner experience that was 
ongoing at each beep. The interview video recordings were consulted about details o f the 
discussion in the preparation o f these written descriptions; these written narratives were 
written typically with a few days o f each interview and before the next interview took
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place. At the time these descriptions were written, the investigators had no way of 
knowing what, if  any, details o f the experience would be deemed important in the 
subsequent extraction o f salient eharaeteristies; therefore, the descriptions sought to 
capture as faithfully as possible everything that might later be deemed salient.
Apprehension o f  Salient Characteristics— Idiographie
After a subject completed the sampling process and each sample o f inner 
experience had been explored and understood to the best o f  the subject’s and the 
investigators abilities, the investigators considered all o f the subject’s samples o f inner 
experience together as a whole to see what salient patterns, forms, and phenomena 
emerged across samples. Again, the central data were the experiences themselves, only 
now viewed collectively.
We implemented the following core characteristics o f  DES in an attempt to cleave 
our idiographie analysis faithfully to subjects’ inner experiences:
(1) We explored one subject’s samples o f  inner experience at a time, independent 
o f  any other subjeet’s inner experience, past, present, or future.
(2) W e assumed the phenomenological attitude and bracketed all presuppositions 
about the subjeet in particular and inner experience in general, regardless o f  whether 
those presuppositions came from personal characteristics o f  the subject (her 
neighborhood, friends, manner o f  dress, parentage, etc.), personal characteristics o f the 
investigators, characteristics o f adolescents that are “com monly understood” (raging 
hormones, etc.), characteristics reported in the literature, or presuppositions that came 
from any other source. Additionally, the randomness o f  the samples o f  inner experience
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under investigation aided in the bracketing o f presuppositions in that neither the subjeet 
nor the investigators had any eontrol/ehoiee/influenee over which moments o f inner 
experience to investigate. The data examined in this study were simply random moments 
o f inner experience, chosen by the beeper without regard for the presuppositions o f either 
the subjeet o f the investigators.
(3) Both independently and together, the two investigators immersed themselves 
in all o f the particular subjeet’s samples o f experience. That immersion was aided by the 
written descriptions o f  the subjeet’s individual samples o f  inner experience (which were 
written to be as faithful as possible to the original experiences), but was explicitly not 
about the written descriptions. The written descriptions aimed us back at the original 
experiences, helped us to recall the original experiences, but the original experiences 
themselves were understood to be the proper basic data o f the investigation. For example, 
if immersion in all samples raised a question about sample #12, something that was not 
immediately apparent in the written description o f  #12, then we returned to the video 
recording o f sample #12 to clarify.
(4) During this immersion, investigators embarked on a delicate yet 
fundamentally critical aspect o f the idiographie undertaking: the apprehension o f  salient 
characteristics. We characterize this part o f  the method as delicate because it required a 
seemingly paradoxical combination o f  fierce bracketing o f presuppositions and refined 
perception. That is, we tried to glimpse the subject’s experiences from the inside, beneath 
the veils o f self-presentation, self-management, self-deception, and self-control, 
undistorted by our own predispositions, self-protectionism, greed, desire. W e tried to 
wrap our arms around all o f the subjeet’s sampled inner experiences and lightly hold
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them all at onee, to see the forms and patterns unique to the subject’s private experience. 
We tried to grasp those forms and patterns o f manifestation as they idiosyneratically 
eharacterize o f the subject’s experience— that’s what we eall the idiographie view.
Thus, the apprehension o f salient characteristics involved, (a) immersion in all o f 
the subject’s samples o f inner experience, (b) fiercely bracketing all presuppositions 
about what we might or should see, (c) applying our very best observational and pattern 
recognition skills to the collection o f phenomena, which lead to (d) the apprehension of 
characteristics, patterns, trends, and idiosyncrasies in the subjeet’s inner experience.
Some o f the apprehended salient characteristics were familiar to us, for example, the 
phenom ena o f inner speech or sensory awareness, which are frequently found phenomena 
o f inner experience. It should be noted, however, that we were not explicitly looking for 
frequently found phenomena, as that would be conducting our analysis based on the 
presupposition that we should  find those phenomena. Instead, our attitude was, if those 
particular phenomena arose, we should recognize them for what they are. On the other 
hand, many o f the apprehended salient characteristics that emerged across the subject’s 
samples o f  inner experience were frequent at all. Our job simply and straightforwardly 
was to apprehend those phenomena.
There was no formula for this task, but at the same time it was not unconstrained. 
It was rather like Lewis and C lark’s investigating uncharted territory: certain features 
stood out (mountains, rivers, native peoples, wildlife) and got chronicled. Had Smith and 
Jones investigated the same territory at the same time as Lewis and Clark, they would 
doubtless have reported many o f the same features, but not all: Smith and Jones’ 
sensitivities are different from Lewis and C lark’s, and therefore would be interested in
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somewhat different things. However, both teams would have ehronieled the main features 
o f the rivers, the mountains, and the natives. The same logie applies to our apprehension 
o f salient eharaeteristies. We attempted to be open to any kind o f eharaeteristie, and to 
apprehend and then write about those that emerged as salient. Furthermore, we worked 
hard at ensuring that those saliences were indeed eharaeteristie o f  the subjects’ 
experience and were not exported from our own predilections— that is, we worked hard at 
bracketing our own and our subjects’ presuppositions.
In a sense, all o f the pains taken to implement the DES method lead us to this act 
o f apprehending what is there to be seen about a person’s experience. W e took great 
pains to train the subject to use the beeper to “capture” random samples o f her inner 
experience. Next, we worked with our subjeet to develop the language needed to be able 
to describe and discuss her inner experience with fidelity (and accuracy). We worked 
hard in the expositional interviews to understand/apprehend/glean every possible detail 
about the subjeet’s actual lived inner experience during those sampled moments, and then 
we worked hard to write faithful descriptions o f those inner experience samples. Finally, 
we worked to behold all o f the subjeet’s samples o f inner experience at onee, and, 
because o f our hard work and discipline throughout the process, we are able to glimpse 
the forms and patterns o f the subjeet’s inner experience. This glimpse is what we eall the 
apprehension o f  salient characteristics and it allows us a deeper view o f how the subjeet 
actually experiences.
(5) As part o f  this immersion, the experiences were also coded, where 
appropriate, according to the DES eodebook developed by Hurlburt and Heavey (1999). 
Like the written descriptions themselves, these codings were m eant to aim us at the
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original experiences, and were not meant to be the end result o f the study. However, the 
codings were useful tools in that they helped to us see broad patterns and trends across 
samples.
(6) Once these salient characteristics were identified within a subjeet, we wrote an 
idiographie description o f that subject’s experiences. This description was passed back 
and forth between investigators, each o f whom edited, until a satisfactory description was 
obtained. On occasion, this writing process would bump us back to earlier steps to rethink 
the salient characteristic(s) and our descriptions o f these characteristics (requiring us to 
return to all 25 samples and ensure that the new revision still fit); furthermore, on 
occasion it required returning to the original video recordings to ensure that the salient 
characteristic descriptions faithfully represented the original experiences, as best as we 
could tell.
Apprehension o f  Salient Characteristics—Across Subjects
Finally, after all subjects had completed sampling, all samples o f inner experience 
across all subjects were examined collectively for across-subject analysis. This procedure 
had approximately the same aspirations as were described above, but the aim here was to 
apprehend the salient characteristics and patterns that.emerged across all subjects’ 
samples.
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CHAPTER 4
ROADMAP TO RESULTS 
This chapter explains how the results o f this study are organized and presented 
throughout the remainder o f this thesis. As described in detail in M ethods (Chapter 3), 
DES considers its data on two levels: (1) idiographically, or per individual subject, and
(2) collectively, or across all subjects. Mirroring these two levels o f analysis, Chapters 5 
through 10 are idiographie descriptions o f each individual subject’s inner experience as 
discovered by DES, and Chapter 11 describes the patterns and salient characteristics of 
inner experience discovered across all six subjects. We outline the structure o f  these 
chapters here.
Idiographie Chapters 
The aim o f idiographie analysis is to come to understand as thoroughly as 
possible the characteristics o f one particular subject’s inner experience. DES performs an 
idiographie analysis by considering all o f an individual subject’s samples o f inner 
experience and then describing the salient characteristics and patterns that emerge across 
those samples.
Six adolescent subjects participated in the present study and therefore the 
investigators conducted six separate idiographie analyses, which are presented in 
Chapters 5 through 10. Each chapter is devoted to idiographie analysis o f a single
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subject: Chapter 5 features FM, a 12 year-old Caucasian male; Chapter 6 features RD, a 
13 year-old Caucasian male; Chapter 7 features BC, a 12 year-old Caucasian female; 
Chapter 8 features AV, an 11 year-old Latina female; Chapter 9 features JT, a 14 year-old 
Caucasian male; and Chapter 10 features JW, a 13 year-old Caucasian and African 
American female. The chapters are presented chronologically; that is, FM (Chapter 5) 
was the first subject to participate in this study, RD (Chapter 6) was the second, and so 
on.
Each idiographie chapter begins with a summary o f the subjeet’s discovered 
salient characteristics and then opens up into a detailed exposition o f those salient 
characteristics and other idiosyncratic aspects o f inner experience discovered within the 
subjeet’s samples. The chapters are divided into sections based on the particular salient 
eharaeteristies that emerged across the subject’s samples. For example, in FM ’s Chapter 
5, the sections are: sensory awareness, inner speech, unsymbolized thinking, worded 
thinking, feelings, inner seeing, organizing perceptual stimuli, and meta-awareness. The 
presence o f each section reflects the presence o f that particular characteristic in FM ’s 
inner experience; furthermore, the most salient, or frequently occurring, characteristics 
are discussed first and the less salient characteristics are discussed last. The section in 
FM ’s Chapter 5 will be different from the sections in RD ’s Chapter 6, as FM ’s inner 
experience is different from R D ’s inner experience. Thus the chapters are structured 
similarly, but not identically.
Additionally, each idiographie chapter ends with a table delineating the frequency 
o f characteristics o f inner experience discovered across the subject’s samples. These 
tables are meant to serve as heuristic visual aids only and should not be regarded as the
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centra] results o f this study. The central results are the subjeet’s inner experiences 
themselves. The narrative descriptions are faithful attempts to translate those lived 
experiences into words, and the idiographie narratives attempt to “lift” and illuminate the 
salient characteristics and patterns o f inner experience. Thus the frequency counts are the 
grossest representation o f our data in that the richness o f lived inner experience has been 
reduced to categories and then into simple numbers. With that caveat in mind, however, 
the frequency counts are useful in that they enable an “at-a-glance” understanding o f the 
broad tendencies across a subject’s inner experience. The tables illustrate two aspects of 
frequency; the number o f  samples in which a eharaeteristie occurs (there may be two or 
more different characteristics per sample), and the number o f  instances o f a eharaeteristie 
(there may be two or more instances o f one eharaeteristie in a sample).
Across Subjects Chapter
After the idiographie analyses, DES investigators conducted a collective analysis 
in which all samples o f inner experience across all subjects were considered. The 
collective analysis procedure is similar to the idiographie analysis procedure in that the 
aim is to apprehend the salient characteristics and patterns o f inner experience, only this 
time across all subjects.
In the present study, six adolescent subjects collected a total o f  161 samples of 
inner experience (including samples from first sampling days). Chapter 11 presents and 
discusses the salient eharaeteristies that emerged across these samples in five main 
sections. The first section considers the results across subjects in terms o f  the five main 
eharaeteristies o f  inner experience in order o f  frequency. The second section discusses
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other frequently occurring characteristics, while the third section discusses less frequently 
oecurring eharaeteristies discovered across all subjects. The fourth section addresses 
variations in the complexity o f inner experience across subjects, and the fifth section is a 
discussion o f nascent inner experience. The chapter concludes with a discussion o f the 
limitations o f this study and directions for future research.
The across subjects results and discussion chapter also features a table delineating 
the frequency o f  characteristics across subjects. This table, like the tables featured in the 
idiographie chapters, is meant to serve as a visual aid only. As the reader will discover, 
the most striking findings in the present study cannot be reduced to mere frequency 
counts.
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CHAPTER 5 
“FM ”
FM was a 12 year-old male who sampled with us in Decem ber 2006. He collected 
29 samples over five separate days and participated in an expositional interview within 
24 hours o f each sampling day. Sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring 
eharaeteristie discovered in FM ’s inner experience; it oeeurred in 12 samples, or in 41% 
o f his 29 samples. Additionally, inner speech oeeurred in seven o f  his samples (24%), 
unsymbolized thinking occurred in six samples (21%), feelings occurred in two samples 
(7%), and inner seeing (aka images) oeeurred in two samples (7%). In three samples 
(10%), FM experienced his attention being pulled away from one experience toward 
listening to a sound (e.g., background conversation, teacher talking, TV). He also 
experienced worded thinking in one sample (3%) and meta-awareness in one sample 
(3%).
Idiographie Description o f  F M ’s Inner Experience
Sensory Awareness
Sensory awareness occurred most frequently across F M ’s samples. In 12 o f 29 
samples, or 41% o f the time, FM was attending to sensory aspects o f his experience, 
including color, form, sound, and physical sensation. For exam ple, at beep 3.5 FM had 
been looking up at a string o f Christmas bulbs on the ceiling, noticing the different
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colors. At the moment o f the beep he was looking at one specific red bulb, noticing that it 
appeared shinier than the other bulbs. He was drawn to its redness and shininess, but was 
unable to say whether he was more drawn to the redness or the shininess; he was drawn 
to both in that moment. F M ’s inner experience was purely sensory in that he was 
engrossed in the sensory aspects (redness and shininess) o f the bulb and not aware o f 
anything else at that moment.
FM was paying attention to color in more than half o f his sensory awareness 
experiences; seven o f his 12 sensory awareness samples featured color awareness. For 
example, at Beep 4.3 he was staring at a little green light on the pow er button o f his DVD 
player, specifically noticing its yellowish-green color. FM was clear that the color, not 
another sensory aspect such as the glowingness or tiny size o f  the light, was capturing his 
awareness at that moment. Similarly, at beep 4.5 FM was eating cereal, noticing the 
bright lemon-yellowness o f  the Pops in his bowl. Nearly all o f his attention was on the 
lemon yellow color, while a smaller portion o f his awareness was on his saying to him self 
in his head with surprise, “Wow, they’re yellow!” Another example occurred at Beep 5.3: 
FM was looking at his phone, specifically staring at the blue color on part o f the phone. 
Most o f his attention was focused on the blue color but he was thinking in words to 
himself, matter-of-factly, “The edge o f  my phone is blue.”
FM ’s sensory awareness experiences sometimes involved attention to form. On 
one occasion, at the moment o f  Beep 4.2, FM was noticing his little brother’s cowlick, 
specifically the circulam ess o f it. On another occasion, at beep 4.6, FM  was aware o f  a 
blend o f color and form. He was looking at a tuft o f fur on his cat’s chin. At the moment 
o f the beep he was focused mainly on the whiteness, but somehow he was also noticing
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the goatee-like shape o f the tuft. This sensory awareness “blend” also seemed to occur at 
beep 3.5 described above in which FM was noticing both the redness and the shininess of 
the red Christmas bulb.
FM experienced body-based sensory awareness in four o f the 12 sensory 
awareness samples. For example, at beep 2.3 he was aware o f the soft step o f his right 
foot on the ground as he walked to class. At beep 4.4 FM had a headache and he 
experienced the pain, describing metaphorically as the sound o f  a fire alarm ringing in his 
head. At the same time FM was holding his head, feeling the sensation on the pads o f his 
fingertips as they pressed into his temples. Here FM experienced two distinct body-based 
sensory awareness experiences at the same time: first, he felt directly the quality o f the 
pain in his head (like a fire alarm), and second, he felt the sensation on his fingertips as 
they pressed into his temples.
Inner Speech
FM experienced inner speech in seven o f his 29 samples (24%). He was skilled at 
identifying his exact innerly spoken word(s) at the moment o f the beep, and he could 
mimic the tone o f  his inner speaking. The content o f  FM ’s inner speech always was a 
type o f commentary related to what he was doing or experiencing at the moment. For 
example, at beep 2.4 FM softly muttered to him self in his head, “Wow, this is boring” as 
the teacher droned on about positive and negative numbers. At beep 3.6 FM said to 
him self in his head with relief, “Phew!” after finishing a moving job  with his brother. At 
beep 4.5 FM commented to him self in his head with surprise, “W ow, they’re yellow!” 
while looking at the bright yellow color o f  his cereal. At beep 4.6 FM said to him self in 
his head with endearment, “Aw, he’s so cute,” while looking at his cat. And at 5.3 FM
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said to him self in his head matter-of-factly, “The edge o f my phone is blue.” Overall, 
FM ’s inner speech was clear and straightforward.
Unsymholized Thinking
Unsym bolized thinking occurred in six o f FM ’s 29 samples (21%). For example, 
at beep 1.1 he was thinking something like. W hat should I get to eat?, but the thought was 
not symbolically represented in any way. At beeps 1.4 and 1.6 FM was wondering when 
the beeper would sound, but his wondering was not in words, images, or represented in 
any other symbolic form. At beep 2.2 FM experienced an unsymbolized thought process 
about reaching around the back o f the computer to turn it on so that he could play a game, 
but the thought was not pictured and did not involve words. At beep 2.3 FM  was thinking 
about having to get to class, but he did not experience any words or images along with 
that thought process. And at beep 2.6 FM was thinking to him self that he had been 
planning to play football but that the DES meeting he was attending instead was more 
important. Again, this thought was clear but it did not involve words, images, or any 
other form o f symbolic representation. Notably, all o f FM ’s instances o f unsymbolized 
thinking occurred within his first two sampling days. M ost adult DES subjects take a few 
days to be able to identify and talk about unsymbolized thinking; it is a difficult form o f 
inner experience to apprehend because the experience is not symbolically represented. 
Because FM did not experience unsymbolized thinking in his later samples, we have 
reason to suspect that these early samples may not have captured instances o f 
unsymbolized thinking but instead instances o f FM not clearly apprehending his inner 
experience. Other interpretations are possible.
69
Worded Thinking
Worded thinking, which is similar in some ways to inner speech and 
unsymbolized thinking, occurred once (3%) across FM ’s samples. At beep 3.1 he was 
eating cereal with his little brother. A, when A spilled some o f his milk and cereal. As 
FM reached for a napkin for A, he thought to himself, “A needs to clean up that mess.” 
FM ’s thought involved those exact words, and all o f those words were simultaneously 
present in his inner experience, yet the words were not innerly spoken, heard, or seen. 
Feelings
Feelings were infrequent across FM ’s samples; two o f  his samples (7%) involved 
feeling experiences but only one o f  these (Beep 3.3) was a true feeling experience. At 
Beep 3.3 FM was at his m om ’s house, looking around at how she had set things up.
(FM ’s mom and dad had just separated and his mother had moved into a new house, 
which FM was visiting for the first time.) At the moment o f  the beep FM was saying to 
him self out loud in a lowered, almost breathless, voice, “I need to go talk to my Mom,” 
and at the same time was feeling sad. The sad feeling was somehow known to be located 
in his mind, but he could say no more about it.
FM ’s second feeling experience occurred at beep 1.2. Although not a true feeling, 
like the one in beep 3.3 above, F M ’s inner experience at beep 1.2 was feeling-related. FM 
was in his room watching the TV show, American Dad. On the show, Roger, an alien, 
squirted reproductive fluid into the potato salad as a mayonnaise substitute.
Unknowingly, the American D ad  family ate the potato salad, and FM found this funny.
At the moment o f  beep 1.2 FM was completely absorbed in the TV show while somehow
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reacting to the show ’s humor. He was not directly feeling funny-ness/laughter/joy/belly 
heat/etc., but he was experiencing some ongoing humor in reaction to the funny show.
Both samples involving feeling revealed FM ’s commitment to reporting his inner 
experience with fidelity, no matter how difficult the subject matter. He bravely discussed 
his experience o f  sadness regarding his parents’ recent separation, and he also risked 
discussing possibly embarrassing subject matter (reproductive fluid) with the 
interviewers.
Inner Seeing
FM ’s inner experience involved inner seeing (aka images), though only twice 
(7%) across all samples. Both image experiences were vivid and detailed. First, at Beep 
1.6 FM was picturing the car accident his teacher was describing. In his head, he saw a 
white car stopped at a stoplight with a van just about to hit it from behind. It was a 
moving image and FM could see several cross traffic cars going through the intersection 
as if  viewed from the back. FM didn’t know the color o f his teacher’s car, or what kind o f 
vehicle had hit her, but in his inner seeing o f  the accident those details were clear: she 
was driving a white car and a van hit her from behind.
FM ’s second inner seeing experience, which occurred at beep 3.4, was markedly 
different from the moving image o f  his teacher’s car accident in that it involved an image 
o f  a word. W ord images are fairly uncommon forms o f inner experiences across subjects. 
In this instance, F M ’s older brother had just said out loud, “L et’s go eat.” At the moment 
o f the beep FM  saw “eat” printed in big, bold, lower case orange letters against a black 
background. He saw “eat” clearly, straight on, from the front. W hen first describing this 
sample, FM reported that his mind was “stuck on the word eat.” W hen asked what he
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meant by “stuck on,” FM described the lowercase, bold, orange lettering against a black 
background and as he did so, his face erupted in a series o f small yet impossible-to-hold 
back smiles, which we interpreted to indicate that he was now actually telling us what 
was in his experience— that “stuck on” had been a rather broad, general description; the 
seeing the image was the direct, actually occurring-at-the-moment-of-the-beep 
experience. The qualitative difference in his demeanor/expression between his initial 
description o f his experience (“ ...m y mind was stuck on the word ‘eat’. . .”) and his 
telling us o f  the exact details o f  his experience (“ .. .1 saw the words in le tters.. .they were 
orange.. .”) was striking; in the former he was passively delivering information to us but 
in the latter he seemed to be enlivened from the inside out, connected to his experience, 
open, joyful, and clear. We take this qualitative difference in his reporting to mean that 
FM was telling us about his actual inner experience— and liking it.
Organizing Perceptual Stimuli
Five o f  FM ’s samples may illustrate FM facing an inner experience 
developmental challenge; organizing perceptual stimuli. W hile it is common for adults to 
have more than one form o f inner experience in a sampled moment, it is not common for 
adults to describe those simultaneous inner experiences as interfering or competing with 
one another. Three (3%) o f FM ’s samples involved his attention being pulled away from 
one inner experience toward hearing/listening in/trying to make out a sound— essentially 
one inner experience competing with another unrelated inner experience. For example, at 
beep 1.5 FM  was in the act o f taking some papers from his teacher but at the same time 
he could hear kids talking in the background and he was trying to make out what they 
were saying. He later deduced that the kids were wondering what he had in his ear (the
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earpiece to the DES beeper). At beep 1.6 FM ’s teacher was talking about her recent car 
accident. At the moment o f the beep FM was trying to pay attention to what she was 
saying, but his image o f the car accident was forefront in his inner experience, inhibiting 
his ability to listen to what the teacher was saying. And at beep 2.5 FM was in his 6"^  
period class watching The Grinch. At the moment o f the beep he was watching and 
listening to the movie, but he also heard the sound o f  the guy next to him playing with a 
skateboard. FM experienced the sound o f the skateboard pulling his attention away from 
the film. FM may experience his attention being “pulled away” by sound as a result o f 
not yet being able to organize his inner experience, or focus on one theme in his inner 
experience.
Two other samples feature FM having two simultaneous but distinct inner 
experiences: At beep 4.6. FM was finishing innerly saying, “Aw, h e’s so cute” and 
simultaneously beginning a sensory awareness experience o f staring at the white goatee­
like tuft o f fur on his cat’s chin. Similarly, at beep 5.2 FM experienced two overlapping 
and unrelated sensory awareness experiences: he heard the person he was talking to say 
the sound “-ey” (as in “money”) and also, in the background, he heard the “clunk, clunk” 
sound o f the car’s driver changing gears.
Discussion
FM was a motivated and diligent subject. He was eager to participate in DES 
from the moment he heard about the study and he organized the initial meeting between 
investigators and his father to discuss his participation. He kept track o f his expositional 
interview appointments himself, and was always prepared for those interviews with fresh
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samples. F M ’s initiative and discipline was noteworthy not only for his age (12 years old) 
but also in light o f  his family/home situation. FM ’s parents were separating at the time of 
his sampling and his home life was in disairay. He appeared to be enduring a lot o f stress, 
but he was stoic about his personal life and he remained unwavering in his commitment 
to the study. We speculate that DES may have given FM a break from the stresses o f his 
home life. Although he did not explicitly express that, he did express his delight in 
discovering his sensory awareness, which he thought was “very cool.”
Table 1
N um ber o f samples = 29
Characteristic Frequency^ Total instances*’
Feelings 2(7% ) 2(7% )
Inner Seeing 2(7% ) 2(7% )
Inner Speech 7 (24%) 7 (24%)
Just Doing/W atehing/Talking 2(7% ) 2(7% )
Listening Process 3 (10%) 3 (10%)
Meta Awareness 1 (3%) 1 (3%)
Perceptual Awareness 3 (10%) 3 (10%)
Sensory Awareness 12 (41%) 14 (48%)
Speaking Aloud to Self 1 (3%) 1 (3%)
Unsymbolized Thinking 6(21% ) 6(21% )
Worded Thinking 1 (3%) 1 (3%)
Total characteristics^ 
Characteristics per sample^
38
1.31
40
1.38
‘‘ Number of samples in which characteristic occurs (there may be two or more different 
characteristics per sample)
Number of instances of a characteristic (there may be two or more instances of one 
characteristic in a sample)
Total characteristics excludes the DES category “just doing” (just doing is not actually a 
“characteristic” of inner experience, so it is not included in the total characteristics count) 
Characteristics per sample is calculated by dividing total characteristics (excluding just doing) 
by the number of samples, which yields a statistic describing the average 
richness/fullness/complexity of FM’s inner experience across samples.
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CHAPTER 6
“RD ”
RD was a 13 year-old male who sampled in Decem ber 2006. During this time he 
collected 34 samples over six separate days and participated in an expositional inteiwiew 
after each sampling day. R D ’s inner experience is best characterized as “thinking.” As 
shown in Table 2, 23 o f  his 34 samples (68%) involved inner speech and nine samples 
(27%) involved unsymbolized thinking, for a total o f 32 samples (94%) that involved the 
experience o f thinking. In 17 o f 32 thinking samples (53% o f his thinking samples), RD 
used idiosyncratic terminology to describe his inner speech and unsymbolized thoughts, 
including descriptors such as “solid,” “light,” “passing through,” and “coming up”; we 
will discuss those terms below. RD also experienced perceptual awareness in 12 o f his 34 
samples (35%), sensory awareness in two o f his samples (6%), and meta-awareness in 
two samples (6%). RD experienced feeling in only two samples (6%), but eight o f  his 
samples (24%) involved tangential feeling (for example, inner speech in an angry tone).
Idiographic Description o f  R D ’s Inner Experience
Inner Speech
Inner speech was R D ’s dominant form o f inner experience. Twenty-three o f 34 
samples (68%) involved his commenting, expressing, wondering, or otherwise 
experiencing the thinking o f some particular thought to h im self inside his head using
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specific words in his own voice. In 11 o f these 23 inner speech samples (48%), inner 
speech was the sole form o f R D ’s inner experience. In the other 12 o f these 23 samples 
(52%), inner speech occurred along with another eharaeteristie o f inner experience, but 
even within these samples, inner speech was the dominant form o f his experience.
R D ’s inner speech was crystal clear and readily apparent to him— he knew 
exactly what he was saying as well as exactly how he was saying it to himself. For 
example, at beep 2.4 RD was saying to himself, very slowly, the cadence dripping with 
mind-numbing boredom, “W hat —  should —  I —  do?” As RD continued to improve 
at the sampling task, his awareness o f the eharaeteristies o f his inner speech became more 
and more refined. For example, when describing beep 4.1 RD conveyed very fine details 
o f his musing to him self in his head, “I wonder what this tastes like?” He said these 
words a little dramatically, with a slight accent on the word “taste;” his inner speaking 
sounded stylized and melodic, yet was low and quiet, definitely spoken to himself, for 
himself.
Unsymbolized Thinking
In addition to inner speech, RD frequently experienced another type o f thinking: 
unsymbolized thinking. In nine o f  34 samples (27%), RD was thinking a specific thought 
but that thought was not represented in words, images, or any other type o f symbols.
Beep 3.6 illustrates one o f  R D ’s pure unsymbolized thoughts: His friend was dancing and 
RD was thinking a wordless thought that conveyed something like. What on earth is she 
doing? No words were spoken, heard, pictured, or otherwise known, yet the thought itself 
was clear. Similarly, at beep 6.4 RD was thinking a definite thought: The Saints c a n ’t 
win, dude. They c a n ’t. RD recognized that it was a disappointing thought (he badly
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wanted the Eagles to win), but despite knowing this, the thought was not represented 
symbolically to him in any way. In each o f these samples, RD was very clear that his 
thoughts conveyed specific meanings but that his experience o f  each o f  these thoughts 
was distinctly different from his thoughts involving words (i.e., thinking experiences 
involving inner speech).
Idiosyncratic Thinking Terminology
In 17 o f  R D ’s 32 “thinking” samples (that is, 53% o f his inner speech and 
unsymbolized thoughts together), he used idiosyncratic terminology to describe his 
experiences. Specifically, RD ’s terminology described two distinct yet related 
eharaeteristies o f his thinking experiences; density and movement. In the sections that 
follow we first discuss R D ’s descriptions o f  thought density (his terms were “solid,” 
“medium,” and “light”). RD characterized all 17 o f  these thinking samples in terms o f 
density. Next we discuss his descriptions o f thought movement (his terms were “passing 
through” and “coming up”). He characterized eight o f these 17 thinking samples as 
moving in some way. Finally, we discuss R D ’s descriptions o f how thought density and 
thought movement are related in his thinking experiences.
RD characterized 17 of his thinking samples in terms o f  density, that is as “solid,” 
“medium,” or “light.” According to RD, a solid thought captured 100% of his attention 
and concentration, and seemed to be located deep within his head. W hen having a solid 
thought, RD was so deeply focused within him self that, he said, a person would have to 
physically grab and shake him to get his attention. RD described three instances o f solid 
thoughts in total.
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One example oeeurred at beep 2.1: RD was in the act o f bowling, in the windup 
(arm swinging backward) before the release o f the ball. At the mom ent o f the beep he 
was deeply focused on one solid thought: 1 have to get a strike. Though the meaning of 
his thought was unambiguously clear to him, the thought was not com posed o f specific 
words; its m eaning could have been rendered hy 1 gotta get a stike, or 1 need a strike, or 
please let me get a strike', thus this was an unsymbolized thought. RD characterized this 
thought as solid because he was locked into this thinking to the exclusion o f  all other 
possibilities. He was completely absorbed in it, and it occupied his entire awareness in a 
thorough, steady, extended in time way. Nothing else could penetrate his awareness at 
that moment.
At the other end o f the spectrum, a light thought involved little if  any o f  R D ’s 
attention, focus, and concentration. A light thought could be absolutely apparent to RD, 
but it did not require him to be deeply focused or to become im penetrable to external 
stimuli. Additionally, RD experienced light thoughts on the outer surface o f  his mind as 
opposed to deep within his head. He experienced eight light thoughts in total. For 
example at beep 2.2, RD was doing a trick on his skateboard and experiencing a light 
unsymbolized thought: I  gotta land this trick; please, let me land this trick. The thought 
was close to the surface o f  his mind and while thinking it RD rem ained quite permeable 
to external stimuli.
RD also had five medium thoughts and one light-medium thought. He deemed 
these thoughts “m edium ” apparently because he experienced them as being somewhere 
between “solid” and “light.” For example, at beep 3.2 RD was angrily saying to him self 
in his head, “Stupid eat, get away!” RD explained that this was a medium thought
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because while it was not a focused, concentrated thought, it was substantially more than a 
light and fleeting thought. He was partially absorbed in the thought. Similarly, at beep 4.3 
RD was wondering to himself, H ow do I  look? He described his experience as a medium 
thought, because it was lighter than “solid” but solider than “light.”
In eight samples, RD described the movement o f his thoughts: they moved 
through his head in different ways, either “passing through” (5) or “coming up” (3). 
According to RD, thoughts that passed through started somewhere outside his head, 
floated though his head (often from left to right), and then passed out o f  his head. For 
example, at beep 4.4 RD was quietly exclaiming to him self in his head, “Oh crap, that 
really does smell!” The thought just passed through, not requiring a lot o f concentration. 
Furthermore, the thought did not lodge in his head to be focused on, or attended to for 
any longer than the one to two seconds it took to pass through.
On the other hand, RD experienced a thought as “coming up” when it originated 
deep within his head and moved forward toward the surface o f his head. For example, at 
beep 6.5 RD was thinking to himself, 21 to 20. It was an unsymbolized thought that came 
up from the depths o f his mind toward the surface. At the moment o f the beep, the 
thought was closer to the surface, but still coming up from the inside toward the outside.
It appeared that the density o f R D ’s thoughts (“solid,” “m edium ,” and “light”) 
was related to the movement o f  his thoughts (“passing through” or “coming up”). RD 
believed (as a self-characterization that was corroborated by samples) that “coming up” 
thoughts originated deep within his head and were originally experienced to be solid. 
(Recall that when RD was engaged in a solid thought he was deeply focused, almost 
entranced, and it would be hard to get through to him.) As that solid thought came up, it
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became increasingly lighter. The coming up process seemed to take a second or two. 
Furthermore, RD believed he could “grab” the thought anywhere along this coming up 
process and suspend the becoming-lighter o f the thought; the longer he waited to grab it, 
the lighter it would have become. Beep 5.3 illustrated this grabbing o f a “coming up” 
thought: RD was saying to him self in his head, in a quiet yet surprised voice, “Wow, 
those are nice shoes.” It was light thought, but it had started off as a solid thought deep 
inside his head, and then came up through his mind getting progressively lighter the 
closer it got to the surface. As this thought made it’s way up from the depths o f  his mind 
to the surface it transformed into a medium thought, and then into a light thought— at 
which point he grabbed it. Thus this thought originated from within the depths o f his 
mind and floated forward, apparently changing density along the way.
RD believed (although this was neither corroborated nor disconfirmed by 
samples) that the density o f “passing through” thoughts changed in the opposite 
direction: thoughts that originated outside his head were originally light, and as they 
passed through they became more and more solid. However, none o f the five passing- 
through thoughts that actually appeared in his sample showed this solidifying tendency: 
all the sampled thoughts that passed through were characterized as being light. For 
example, at beep 2.2 the unsymbolized thought, I  gotta land this trick, is a light thought 
floating though his otherwise open mind. Again at beep 5.6 he is saying to him self in his 
head, “I don’t want to watch this, it looks scary,” and that inner speech is a light thought 
that just passes through.
8 0
Feelings
We now turn to diseuss R D ’s emotion. In eight o f R D ’s 23 inner speaking 
samples (35%), RD recognized his voice as being emotional such as angry, excited, sad, 
or happy. Strikingly, in all but one o f these samples, he did not experience any feeling, 
even though his voice had an emotional sound, tone, and speed. For example, at beep 3.1 
RD was saying to him self in his head, in a pissed o ff voice, “Why did he kick me in my 
sore knee?” His inner speech was angry and rapid, yet he was not feeling pissed off. 
Immediately after the beep, RD recognized that his voice was pissed off, and he 
acknowledged that his pissed-off tone o f  voice reflected that somehow he was pissed off. 
However, at the moment o f the beep RD was not experiencing being pissed off, not 
experiencing tenseness in his body, seeing red, or any other aspect o f  experience that 
might be indicative o f  anger. Beep 5.2 illustrates a similar set o f  characteristics: R D ’s 
mom was showing him some DVDs she brought home. At the moment o f the beep he 
was exclaiming to him self in his head, “Oh crap! You got R o cky ll” His voice contained a 
mix o f  delighted surprise and excitement, but he did not experience that delight, surprise, 
or excitement directly in the moment.
R D ’s inner-speech-with-feeling-tone-but-no-feeling-experiences may reflect his 
developing capacity to experience feelings fully and directly. These instances may 
reflect, we speculate, an adolescent condition in which a nascent feeling exists in the 
body but is not fully formed enough to manifest as its own inner experience. Perhaps the 
best RD can do in his stage o f development is to express his nascent feelings through 
inner speech, which is his primary— and most well-developed— form o f inner experience.
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Though RD frequently (in 8 o f his 34 samples) expressed  emotions in his inner 
speaking tone, he experienced  emotion as a distinct inner experience only twice in 34 
samples (6%). Here are those two examples o f experienced feeling. At beep 5.1 RD was 
saying to him self in his head, “Aw, m an ... .dude, that really sucks,” and was feeling sorry 
for his friend, J, who had just fallen and appeared to be hurt. The tone o f his voice was 
sympathetic; it had a feeling-bad-for-J sound to it. M ost o f his awareness (about 70%) 
was on this inner speech itself, but the rest (about 30%) was on actually feeling sorry for 
J. The sorry feeling seemed natural to RD, his natural response to seeing someone get 
hurt. It was similar to a sad feeling, but not exactly the same. He felt it on the inside 
surface o f his chest and in his head, but not in any other part o f his body. In beep 6.6 
R D ’s feeling experience was less differentiated but still an entity distinct from his tone o f 
voice. At the moment o f the beep he was exclaiming out loud with frustration, “How 
could they lose?” after the Eagles lost the game he had been watching on TV. RD felt a 
tiny bit o f disappointment, and though he was not aware o f how the disappointed feeling 
manifested in his inner experience, he experienced the disappointment as separate and 
distinct from his speech. These samples suggest that RD may be just beginning to have 
feeling experiences, and that somehow his inner and outer speech may be assisting this 
developing capacity.
Open Space
RD had two samples (6%) in which he experienced “open space” in his mind. 
Both instances occurred along with “light” thought moving through his head. For 
example, at beep 2.2 roughly ha lf o f his awareness was devoted to a “light” thought 
floating through, and about a quarter o f  his awareness was devoted to cheeking the
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position o f the skateboard and visually confirming that his stance was okay to 
SLiceessfully execute the triek. The remaining quarter o f his awareness was just open. H e 
was not meta-aware o f being mentally open but a portion o f his mind was simply “free of 
thoughts.” R D ’s second mention o f this phenomenon oeeurred at beep 6.5: RD was 
thinking to himself, 21 to 20. There were no specific words even though the concept was 
perfectly clear. It was a light thought that came up from inside his head. Although it was 
the only thing in his awareness at the moment o f the beep, only about 50% o f his 
awareness was dedicated to the unsymbolized thought. The other 50% seemed to be 
space for something else, but at the moment there was nothing else there.
Perceptual Awareness
Perceptual awareness occurred in 12 o f R D ’s 34 samples (35%). R D ’s perceptual 
awarenesses always occurred along with a more dominant inner speech or an 
unsymbolized thinking experience. For example, at beep 2.5 RD was looking at his 
skateboard, which was flipped on its side. He had j ust sent the front right wheel spinning, 
and was unsymbolizedly wondering. H ow fa s t can 1 go? At the same time, he was 
hearing the wheel spin; this hearing was part o f his onging awareness, so we call it 
perceptual awareness. Similarly, at beep 3.4 RD commented on a pretty girl walking by. 
He said to him self in his head, “Oh snap! She’s hot!” Simultaneously, he was tracking the 
girl with his eyes, but not focused on any specific part o f  her. These instances illustrate 
R D ’s characteristic propensity to perceive sounds and sights in his inner experience, but 
not to be explicitly drawn into the perceptual stimuli, as is eharaeteristie in sensory 
awareness.
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Sensory Awareness
RD had sensory awareness in two o f his 34 samples (6%), both body based. At 
beep 4.2 RD was in a hurry, and his body felt a little jittery and anxious as he rushed to 
get ready. At beep 6.3 he was standing up, yelling at the TV screen while watching a 
game, and he was aware o f his weight in his feet and how that felt different than how his 
body felt when sitting a moment before.
Discussion
Overall RD showed sophistication in his ability to do the DES tasks. He was able 
to capture, report, and discuss the phenomena, features, and characteristics o f  his inner 
experience clearly, and very quickly to identify and discuss hard-to-know-and-explain 
experiences like unsymbolized thinking. Eor example, RD was able to discriminate 
between awareness vs. meta-awareness, a discrimination that is exceedingly difficult to 
make for many subjects. At Beep 6.2 RD was observing him self watching the football 
game on TV. He confidently understood that to be very different from merely watching 
the game; in this ease he was actually aware o f  him self watching the game. Furthermore 
RD was committed to uncovering and telling the truth— exactly as it was for him— about 
his experience. On more than one occasion he risked his own embarrassment to reveal the 
details o f his inner experience. For example, at beep 3.3 RD was on his bed, arms folded 
behind his head, arms, head, and upper body pulsing to music. RD was singing/ehanting 
along in his head to the song on the radio, “1-like-big-butts...” M ost o f his awareness 
(75%) was on his singing in his head while the rest (25%) was on listening to the song. It 
was quite embarrassing for RD to say he was singing about butts; he had to fight down
84
the urge to avoid telling us about this. But he went forward anyway, despite his 
embarrassment, to tell us about his inner experience.
Finally, RD seemed to grasp the importance o f adhering to the moment o f the 
beep and to remain faithful to that, even to the point o f telling the investigators on more 
than one occasion, “But that doesn’t really matter because it was after the beep.” Fie 
appeared to surprise even him self regarding some aspects o f his inner experience, for 
example, his discovery that many o f his thoughts “float through” his mind. Despite the 
strangeness/absurdity/foreignness (to him) o f this type o f unexplainable and heretofore 
unknown aspect o f his very own inner experience, he bravely stood behind it.
Table 2
Number o f  samples = 34
Characteristic Frequency” Total instances*’
Feelings 2(6% ) 2(6% )
Inner Speech 23 (68%) 23 (68%)
Meta Awareness 2(6% ) 2(6% )
Open 2(6% ) 2(6% )
Perceptual Awareness 12 (35%) 12 (35%)
Sensory Awareness 2(6% ) 2(6% )
Unsymbolized Thinking 9 (27%) 9 (27%)
Total characteristics 52 52
Characteristics per sample‘s 1.53 1.53
“ Number o f  samples in which characteristic occurs (there may be two or more different 
characteristics per sample)
*’ Number o f  instances o f  a characteristic (there may be two or more instances o f  one 
characteristic in a sample)
Characteristics per sample is calculated by dividing total characteristics by the number o f  
samples, which yields a statistic describing the average richness/fullness/complexity o f  RD’s 
inner experience across samples.
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CHAPTER 7
“BC”
BC was a 12 year-old female who sampled in February and March o f 2007. She 
sampled on five separate occasions, collecting a total o f 22 samples. BC had difficulty 
mastering the sampling task and because o f this her first three samples were eliminated 
due to task errors. Thus 19 samples are included in our discussion and analysis o f B C ’s 
inner experience. Fifteen o f these 19 samples (79%) contained little o f what we usually 
call inner experience. In 11 o f the 19 samples (58%) BC reported that she was just doing 
things (listening, talking, watching, cleaning, etc.) without any inner experience. In three 
o f her samples (16%) BC was doing nothing and having no inner experience at all, and in 
one sample (5%) she thought she had some inner experience but she did not know what it 
was. However, four o f B C ’s samples (21%) did feature inner experience: two samples 
(11%) involved perceptual awareness, one sample (5%) involved sensory awareness, and 
one sample involved inner seeing (5%), though this occurred a few seconds after the 
moment o f the beep. We elected to include this example o f inner seeing in our 
consideration o f BC, even though it occurred after the beep and would therefore typically 
be excluded, because it provided us with additional information about the 
existence/state/frequency o f her inner experience itself and her ability to describe 
experience.
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Sampling with BC was remarkably different from our experiences with other 
subjects in this study. She had prolonged difficulty mastering the sampling task, and she 
appeared to have very little inner experience overall. Thus, unlike previous and 
subsequent idiographic chapters, the present chapter is structured as chronological 
narrative rather than an inner-experience-by-characteristic analysis.
Day-By-Day Account o fB C  ’s Inner Experience 
DES subjects often struggle to note and talk about their inner experience during 
the first few sampling occasions but with practice they become increasingly skilled at 
doing so. Initially, BC appeared to struggle with the sampling task as most subjects do: 
she was visibly surprised by the detailed interview questions, she could not locate the 
exact moment o f the beep, and she could not identify her inner experience, and she 
resorted to describing outer events instead. Despite this struggle, BC appeared to have 
one sample involving inner seeing (aka image) on the first day o f  sampling. At beep 1.5 
B C ’s brother was talking to her about playing basketball. BC was not sure what was in 
her experience at the moment o f the beep— maybe nothing. After the beep, however, BC 
described having an image o f herself and her brother playing one-on-one on a basketball 
court. In the image BC had the basketball and was standing in front o f  her brother, who 
was gesturing in frustration because BC won. Though she knew it was a basketball court, 
she did not see the basketball hoops or any other distinctive features o f  the court in her 
image. The image was still (i.e., not moving) and appeared in black and white. Despite 
this exposition, it was not possible to establish whether BC actually experienced an image 
at the mom ent o f  the beep; she may have been experiencing an image at the time o f the
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expositional interview and describing that as it unfolded. In some ways, her report was 
typical of descriptions o f images m inner experience as discovered by DES, but it 
occurred on B C ’s first day o f sampling and may have been substantially shaped by our 
training-aimed questions, so there are many good reasons to doubt whether there was any 
image present whatsoever.
By the end o f Day 2 BC decidedly was not reporting her inner experience as most 
subjects do. Instead, she communicated to us with increasing frequency and confidence 
that she was just doing things, without any corresponding inner experience. Beep 2.5 
illustrates this: BC was scrubbing the counter closest to the stove. At the moment o f the 
beep there was nothing in her awareness. She had finished doing the dishes— specifically, 
finished washing the last knife— and had begun to wipe down the counters. It was a fact 
o f her universe at the moment o f the beep that she was scrubbing the counter hard, but 
she was not aware o f  that, or o f anything else at that moment. In this sample BC was 
confident in describing the details o f her outer experience; she reported the sequence o f 
events without hesitation and she could accurately pinpoint her activity at the moment o f 
the beep (scrubbing the counter closest to the stove). Yet there was nothing in her inner 
experience at the moment.
There was, however, some inkling o f  inner experience on Day 2 when BC was 
able to describe two instances in which she may have been experiencing perceptual 
awareness. At beep 2.1 she was looking at the leaves on a tree in her front yard, though 
she was not focused, drawn in, or “into” the leaves in any sensorial way— she just 
happened to have her eyes pointed at the leaves at that moment. It is difficult for us to be 
confident about the accuracy o f  this description. For example, we couldn’t (or at least
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didn’t) distinguish unequivocally between “looking at the leaves” as meaning that she 
was interested in the leaf-ness o f her perception or as meaning that she was looking at the 
top half o f the tree (the part where the leaves were as opposed to the trunk).
Similarly, at beep 2.3 BC was perceptually aware o f pain in her front tooth, but 
she was not aware o f the pain in any deeper way than knowing it was there at the 
moment. In both o f these instances, BC had trouble discriminating whether these 
perceptual awarenesses were just facts o f the universe or actually present in her 
experience in some way. We elected to call these experiences perceptual awarenesses 
because there seemed to be something more than nothing at all.
On Day 3 we decided to alter the protocol format. Instead o f  B C ’s collecting 
beeps and then coming to the lab for the interview, we waited outside her house while she 
sampled so that we could interview her directly after each beep. The idea was to 
eliminate retrospection. It was possible that B C ’s difficulty stemmed from the writing or 
the remembering, not the lack o f experience itself; we sought to minimize that by 
eliminating the writing and shortening the remembering to its limit. However, even with 
the change in format, BC did not report much inner experience at the moment o f the 
beep. For example, at beep 3.1 BC was talking to her cat, telling him how handsome he 
was. At the moment o f the beep she had paused and was just waiting, with no inner 
experience. At beep 3.2 BC was walking home from next door, ju st passing her mailbox 
at the mom ent o f  the beep, with no inner experience. In both instances BC described 
outer events with detail (talking to her cat, passing her mailbox) but denied the presence 
o f inner events.
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B C ’s increasing reports o f “nothing” in her inner experience led us to wonder 
whether, A) she did have inner experience but was incapable, for whatever reason(s)
(e.g., developmental stage, cognitive deficit, chaotic environment), o f capturing and 
reporting said inner experience, or B) she simply did not have inner experience at those 
sampled moments. A clue to this question arrived at the end o f  the third sampling day. At 
beep 3.4 BC was watching Halle Berry on TV. At the moment o f  the beep, she was 
paying attention to the way Halle Berry was speaking, that is, with an accent that BC 
recognized as unusual. When describing her inner experience, BC was 
uncharacteristically clear, precise, and confident that her attention was focused on the 
sound o f Halle B erry’s speaking, not Halle B erry’s white dress or the Oscar statuettes 
that were also on the screen at the same time. BC was also uneharaeteristically 
enthusiastic during the interview about this beep. She was animated and energetic, and 
defended the fact that she was listening to Halle Berry’s accent at the moment of the 
beep, not looking at her dress or the Oscar statuette or anything else. This was a markedly 
different sample from any other encountered over three full days o f  sampling with BC.
As a result o f the Halle Berry sample, a few possibilities oeeurred to us: A) 
perhaps it had taken BC a little longer than the average subject to master the sampling 
task and now that she had done it once, she would describe more inner experience, or B) 
perhaps BC didn’t have much inner experience, but once and a while she did, and when 
she did she could report it clearly and confidently.
On Day 4 we continued the wait-outside-BC’s-house-and-interview-immediately- 
after-the-beep procedure. BC collected three samples, each finding nothing in her inner 
experience. For example, at beep 4.1BC was spending time with her family at home. The
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music was playing loud and everyone was dancing. At the mom ent o f the beep BC had 
stopped dancing and was watching everyone else, laughing at the way they were dancing, 
but she was not aware o f anything at the moment o f the beep. At beep 4.2 she was 
walking next door to her sister’s house, holding her little brother in her arms. At the 
moment o f that beep she was just walking; there was nothing in her inner experience.
And at beep 4.3 BC was watching the end o f the movie. The Land Before Time, on TV. 
Again, she was not aware o f  any inner experience. BC requested that we end sampling 
early that day after just three samples, as she was bored and irritated with the procedure.
Overall, Day 5 sampling also yielded very little inner experience, although there 
were a few instances in which we speculated that BC might be experiencing inchoate and 
incipient forms o f  inner experience. At beep 5.2 BC was hitting her friend in the face 
with her right hand. Although BC maintained that she did not have any inner experience 
at that moment, we wondered if  this sample might indicate the presence o f an inchoate 
feeling. That is, perhaps BC was feeling something that caused her to hit her friend in the 
face, but that feeling was so undeveloped that she could not identify it directly. At beep 
5.3 BC was picking out a movie to take to her friend’s house. At the moment o f  the beep 
BC was saying out loud to her friend, “Do you want the Winnie the Pooh  or the Tigger 
movie?” BC was quite sure that there was something in her awareness at the moment of 
the beep but she was unable to identify it. This sample lead us to speculate whether, (a) 
B C ’s inner experience was only partially formed and thus not identifiable; (b) BC had 
had a fully formed inner experience but her recall was inadequate; or (c) some other 
possibility.
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In the spirit o f discovery, mid-way through sampling Day 5 we relaxed the DES 
procedure and reminded BC of her inner experience o f attending to Halle B erry’s accent 
a few days back (Sample 3.4) and asked her if  she had any inner experience similar to 
that in any o f her more recent samples. BC enthusiastically recalled her experience at the 
Halle Berry beep, but maintained that none o f her samples since included inner 
experience.
Discussion
One potential explanation for B C ’s reporting no inner experience is that she does 
not have the capabilities to capture and/or describe it even though she has it. Another 
possibility is that BC does not have inner experience very often, and that her inner 
experience occurs only intermittently. Four o f B C ’s samples (21% ) suggest that her inner 
experience occurs in fits and starts rather than continuously. Imm ediately preceding beep 
2.4, BC had taken an aspirin for her tooth pain, but at the exact m om ent o f the beep 
nothing was in her awareness. In her description o f her experience, she suggested that the 
aspirin taking had somehow factored into her inner experience, but now, after that was 
done, she was left with nothing in her inner experience until the next stimulus came 
along. Similarly, at beep 2.6 B C ’s mom had just finished m using aloud about how long it 
would take the researcher to get to their house. BC had heard and comprehended what her 
mother said, but at the mom ent o f  the beep she had moved on from it. BC explained that 
her attention had not yet landed on something new, so she was not aware o f anything at 
the moment o f the beep. A t beep 3.1 BC was in the middle o f  a “conversation” with her 
cat, telling him how handsome he was. To the best o f her knowledge, at the moment o f
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the beep she was “waiting” for her to meow back in reply. She was engaged in the just 
doing o f the conversation, but she was also seemingly “in-between” experiences. Finally, 
at beep 3.3 BC was writing her sister a letter. At the moment o f the beep she had stopped 
writing and was paused, waiting to see what to write next. At that moment there was 
nothing in her inner experience yet she was waiting for something to come next. This 
sample suggests that B C ’s inner experience comes in fits and starts and that she must 
wait for it, so that she can act on it. It is very possible that these samples illustrate what it 
is like for a young person who does not yet have well-developed, ongoing inner 
experience.
Though it is difficult to interpret the meaning o f B C ’s characteristic pattern o f 
nothing in inner experience, it is interesting to note that over the course o f sampling she 
became an unenthusiastic participant in DES. She was initially excited by the prospect o f 
sampling, but almost immediately seemed bored by the task. During the initial few 
interviews, BC yawned profusely and fidgeted in her chair. By the third sampling day she 
began making excuses to end early and wanted to know how many more times she “had 
to do this.” On the final day o f sampling BC reported that she found DES to be “weird” 
and “boring.” The weirdness seemed to be in response to our real-time sampling- 
interview format, and the boring was simply a reflection that she did not enjoy the task, 
which is fairly unusual. However, in light o f our speculations that she may not be able to 
do the task or that she may not have much inner experience it makes sense that a person 
would be bored by repeatedly trying to do something they cannot do.
Overall, our best understanding o f these interviews is that BC had no inner 
experience at most o f her samples. Only one o f  B C ’s samples (beep 3.4, the Halle Berry
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sample) revealed inner experience similar to that reported by other subjects. In four 
others, there may or may not have been some kind o f rudimentary inner experience.
Table 3
Number o f  samples = 1 9
Characteristic Frequency'* Total instances**
Incipient Inner Experience 1(5% ) 1(5% )
Inner Seeing 1(5% ) 1(5% )
Just Doing/W atching/Talking 11 (58%) 11(58%4)
No Inner Experience 3 (16%) 3 (16%)
Perceptual Awareness 2(1P% ) 2(1P% )
Sensory Awareness 1(5% ) 1(5% )
Total characteristics'^ 5 5
Characteristics per sample'* .26 .26
Number o f  samples in which characteristic occurs (there may be two or more different 
characteristics per sample)
Number o f instances o f  a characteristic (there may be two or more instances o f one 
characteristic in a sample)
'' Total characteristics excludes the DES categories “just doing” and “no inner experience” (just 
doing and no inner experience are not actually “characteristics” o f  inner experience, so they are 
not included in the total characteristics count)
Characteristics per sample is calculated by dividing total characteristics (excluding just doing 
and no inner experience) by the number o f samples, which yields a statistic describing the 
average richness/fullness/complexity o f  BC’s inner experience across samples.
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CHAPTER 8 
“ AV”
AV was an 11 year-old female who sampled with us in early April 2007. She 
collected a total o f 25 samples on five separate days and met with us for five 
corresponding expositional interviews. Inner speech was the most frequently occurring 
characteristic o f  inner experience across A V ’s samples, occurring in seven samples 
(28%), as shown in Table 4. Sensory awareness occurred in three samples (12%) and 
perceptual awareness occurred in five samples (20%). In six samples (24%), AV was just 
doing various activities without any separate inner experience. Two samples involved 
unsymbolized thinking (8%), and she had no samples involving inner seeing (aka 
images). Remarkably, none o f A V ’s samples featured feeling experiences directly, 
despite the fact that one o f  her classmates unexpectedly had died the week before and in 
casual conversation she had often reported feeling sad about this. However, feeling did 
play a very important indirect role in eight o f  A V ’s samples (32%), being expressed as a 
secondary characteristic o f other inner experiences and/or appearing as the content o f her 
experiences.
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Idiographic Description o f  A V ’s Inner Experience
Inner Speech
Inner speech was the most frequently occum ng characteristic discovered in A V ’s 
samples. It appeared in seven o f her 25 samples (28%), and three o f  these seven samples 
(43%) featured straightforward inner speech. Her remaining four inner speech samples 
(57%) involved emotion, and thus are discussed in the Feelings section.
A V ’s very first sample o f inner experience, at beep 1.1, captured her inner speech. 
She was watching TV and a big bald man in a tuxedo had just appeared on screen. AV 
was looking at the m an’s head, noticing a small patch o f  hair that apparently had missed 
being shaven. At the moment o f the beep, AV was saying to herself in her head in a 
dramatic voice, “Oh my god, they cut his hair w rong...! don’t know why he went to those 
people.. .” This was A V ’s first sample on her first sampling day and though she was not 
yet skilled enough to pinpoint her exact word(s) at the mom ent o f  the beep, she was clear 
that her experience was o f innerly speaking these exact words to herself. With practice 
over time AV developed into a very accurate observer o f her inner speaking at the exact 
moment o f the beep. By her fifth day o f sampling AV had was able to make fine-grained 
discriminations regarding her inner speaking in relation to the onset o f  the beep. For 
example, at beep 5.3, AV was asking herself in her head in her usual speaking voice, 
“Should I sleep?” At the exact moment o f  the onset o f  the beep she was saying the word, 
“I” and she continued innerly speaking, saying the word, “sleep?” as the beep was 
sounding.
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Feelings
AV had a feeling experience in only one o f her 25 samples (4%), although even in 
this sample it was the sound o f the beep that triggered her to realize that she was feeling 
sad. At beep 1.4 AV was reading Bridge to Terabithia, specifically the part in which the 
main character finds out that his best friend is dead. When AV heard the beep, she 
noticed that she felt sad deep inside her eyes and that she was trying not to cry. She also 
became aware that she somehow was debating in her head about whether or not to go 
ahead and cry, because she didn’t want her parents to notice her crying and become 
worried. However, the feeling and the thinking were in her awareness just after the 
beep— apparently brought into awareness by the beep. At the mom ent o f the beep (i.e., 
the last undisturbed moment before the beep) A V ’s inner experience was just reading.
Although beep 1.4 was A V ’s only “true” feeling sample, seven o f her 25 samples 
(four inner speech, two speaking aloud to another, and one speaking aloud to self, or 28% 
of all samples) were emotionally toned. For example, just before beep 1.5 AV had been 
wondering whether to eat ice cream or cereal. The beep sounded as she was saying to 
herself in her head, “I should eat both.” Her inner voice sounded sad; it was softly 
lilting— like a sad little girl— yet AV did not feel sad at the moment. She had been sad all 
day, crying off and on about her friend’s sudden death. But at the moment o f the beep, 
she was not experiencing sadness despite the sad tone o f her voice. Similarly, at beep 2.1 
AV was watching a TV show in which her favorite contestant was about to lose a 
competition. At the moment o f the beep AV was innerly saying to herself in a sad tone, 
“M elrose is going to lose.” In this sample AV was less descriptive about the tone o f her
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voice, but she was confident that it sounded sad while at the same time confident that she 
was not actually feeling sad.
Another example o f A V ’s expressiveness-without-actually-feeling occurred at 
Beep 4.4: AV was having her blood drawn for the first time ever. Her eyes were squeezed 
shut as the needle was just beginning to pierce the skin in the inside crease o f her right 
arm. At the moment o f the beep AV was commanding herself in a rapid, high-pitched, 
dramatic squeaky little voiee, “I ’m not going to cry!” She felt the uncomfortable 
sensation o f  the needle entering her skin. Next, she quickly reminded herself in her head 
in her normal speaking voice, “Rem ember AV, don’t put [squeeze] your hand too strong 
because then it’s gonna hurt more.” This utterance came after the beep, just after the 
more desperate-sounding, “I ’m not going to cry!” At the moment o f  this sample, AV 
clearly was undergoing a stressful experience yet she did not directly experience any o f 
the anxiety/panic/worry/fear that was expressed in her little squeaky voice. Thus in these 
two samples, as in the other five speaking samples that included emotional tone, AV did 
not experience her feelings despite the fact that her inner speech expressed feelings.
Emotionality infiltrated many o f A V ’s speaking samples, sometimes expressively 
in tone o f voice (as in 1.5, 2.1, and 4.4 above), and sometimes thematically in the content 
o f what she was saying. Before beep 4.5, A V ’s younger brother had messed up a 
computer game being played by her older brother, Marco. As the beep sounded, AV was 
asking, “M arco, are you sad?” Thematically, this sample suggests that AV not only is in 
the process o f developing her own feeling skills, but that she is also learning to recognize 
feelings in others. This sample further illustrates the developmental difficulty o f 
acquiring the emotion-recognition skill. It is likely that M arco is not sad, but rather angry
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or frustrated at his younger brother. AV, however, is sad, the result o f her friend’s death. 
She may well be unable, or at least unskilled, at differentiating another’s feelings from 
her own.
Another striking example o f how A V ’s speech thematically expressed feeling that 
was not directly experienced occurred at beep 2.4. In this sample one o f A V ’s favorite 
TV show characters died. AV had turned off the TV, gone into her room, turned off the 
lights and lay down on her bed. She stared at the ceiling while repeating out loud to 
herself, “I ’m sad. I ’m sad. I ’m sad. I ’m sad ...” At the moment o f  the beep, AV was 
saying the final, “I ’m sad” in the chain. Remarkably, even though AV was saying she is 
sad, she was not actually feeling sad at that moment.
One way to understand this sample, and A V ’s preoccupation with sadness 
throughout her samples, is that she’s telling herself repeatedly “I ’m sad” because she 
hasn’t yet acquired the ability to feel sadness directly; so “I ’m sad. I ’m sad” is a way o f 
practicing organizing sadness, in the same way that repetitively building block towers is a 
way o f practicing organizing fine motor coordination. I f  this is the case, it’s not merely a 
disconnect between what one tells oneself and what is occurring; it is that there is only an 
incipient, discoordinated, inexpert set o f  occurrences that later (as an adult) will be 
immediately, skillfully recognized as sadness. O f course it is also possible that A V ’s 
repertoire o f  inner experience does include experiencing differentiated feelings and that 
our 25 samples simply did not capture it. I f  this is the case, this sample, as well as the 
other examples we have given, may simply represent the frequency o f this disconnect in 
A V ’s inner experience.
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AV was, apparently, able to feel sadness— she could do so just after beep 1.4 (the 
Bridge to Terabithia sample)— or at least she was able to feel the component parts of 
sadness (her eyes, etc.). But she apparently did not routinely feel sadness as it was 
occurring. This leads us to speculate that sadness-recognizing is a skill that is learned 
gradually, that is difficult, slow, awkward at A V ’s stage, but that later might be quick and 
facile. This sample also leads us to speculate. M ight DES be useful in helping adolescents 
(and adults) learn to identify and experience their feelings (or other budding forms o f 
inner experience) clearly? I f  adolescence is indeed a time o f storm and stress, perhaps 
one o f  the reasons for this is that inner experience is not yet developed and/or not yet as 
clearly experienced as it is in adulthood. I f  DES could facilitate such development, might 
that reduce some o f the apparent inner turmoil adolescents grapple with?
Sensory and Perceptual Awareness
We now turn our discussion toward A V ’s sensory and perceptual inner 
experiences. Sensory awareness occurred in three (12%) o f  A V ’s samples and perceptual 
awareness occurred in five (20%) o f her samples, which suggests that these forms are 
highly characteristic o f her inner experience. AV described four instances o f sensory 
awareness across three samples, which means in one sample, beep 1.2, she experienced 
two distinct yet simultaneous sensory awarenesses. At beep 1.2 AV was standing in the 
grass in her yard while the sprinklers were on. At the mom ent o f  the beep she was feeling 
her right foot slowly become soaked by water seeping into her tennis shoe and through 
her sock. At the same time she could feel the sensation o f  wet grass clippings stuck to her 
right ankle, partially lodged in her somewhat wet sock. She was completely focused on 
these two sensations at the moment o f  the beep.
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At beep 3.1 A V ’s sensory awareness was a visual experience. She was typing on 
the computer keyboard in the family room. At the moment o f the beep she was looking at 
the “D ” key, specifically staring at the size and shape o f letter “D.” Prior to the beep, AV 
had been typing steadily until she got to “D .” She paused as she noticed that this 
particular letter “D ” was smaller than the “D” on her brother’s keyboard. However, at the 
moment o f the beep she was no longer comparing “D ” keys; she was simply engrossed in 
the size and shape o f  the “D .”
A V ’s beep 3.2 was a visual sensory awareness. AV opened a drawer to see if  her 
missing wallet m ight be in there. The drawer was filled with a tangle o f  computer and 
media cables and controls. At the moment o f the beep AV was noticing the sheer amount 
o f “s tu f f ’ packed in the drawer. She was aware o f the tangle o f stuff as a whole; she was 
not focused on any o f the individual items, and she was not thinking about her wallet at 
that particular moment. In this instance, A V ’s visual experience o f  the tangled mess in 
the drawer had momentarily drawn her away from her w allet-finding effort. We note here 
that this sample was difficult to code because it seemed to be on the border between 
sensory awareness and perceptual awareness. We elected to code it sensory awareness 
because her perception o f  the tangled mess in the drawer somehow captivated her, and 
we weighted that captivation significantly in our coding. However, this sample easily 
could be argued to be a perceptual awareness, as AV was not captivated by a particular 
quality (like color), aspect (like shape), or feature (like one particular cord) o f  the tangled 
mess in the drawer. Thus it might be most accurate to say that her inner experience at the 
moment o f the beep was o f  being drawn away from the wallet-finding task toward her 
visual perceptual awareness o f  the tangled mess in the drawer.
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Perceptual awareness occurred in five (20%) o f A V ’s samples. For example, at 
beep 3.3 AV was playing with a button on the table in front o f her. She was poking the 
tip o f her pen in and out o f the holes, fitting it in to one hole, pulling it out, fitting it in to 
another, and so on. At the moment o f  the beep, AV was noticing the particular hole that 
the tip o f her pen was in. She was mostly aware o f the hole, not the pen, though the pen is 
in the hole at the moment. As in beep 3.2 above (in which AV was drawn to the tangled 
mess in the drawer), this sample seems to exist on the border o f  sensory awareness and 
perceptual awareness. We elected to code it perceptual awareness rather than a sensory 
awareness because she was not engrossed in any specific sensory characteristics o f  the 
hole as she was, for example, when looking at the “D ” key in Beep 3.1.
Similarly, at beep 3.5 AV was noticing the mole on a cartoon character’s face but 
was not drawn in by any particular sensory aspect o f the mole. At beep 4.4 AV felt the 
needle pierce her skin when having her blood drawn. Although she noticed the sensation, 
she was not engrossed in the sensory feeling o f the experience. At beep 5.2 AV was 
looking at the blue dress bordered with floral print worn by a girl on TV. At the moment 
o f the beep AV was looking at the bottom portion o f the dress, but not at anything in 
particular— not the blueness, or the flowered border, or the billow o f the fabric, etc. And 
finally, at beep 5.4 AV was looking at a bite o f pancakes on her fork, getting ready to eat 
it. She was not absorbed in any particular feature o f  the bite o f pancakes, she was simply 
seeing it on the way to eating it.
Just Doing
AV had six samples (24%) in which she was just doing various activities without 
any other separate inner experience. For example, at Beep 4.1 AV was logging on to
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millsberry.com, typing in her username and password. At the m om ent o f the beep she 
was pressing “A ” on the keyboard, not particularly aware o f the letter A or o f anything 
else. Similarly, at beep 1.5 she was just reading; at 2.2 she was just coloring in a coloring 
book; at 2.5 she was just talking to her mother; at beep 5.1 she was just dressing her 
virtual pet dog on Nintendo DS; and at 5.5 she was just lining up during talent show 
practice. In each o f these samples A V ’s inner experience simply was o f the activity she 
was engaged in at the moment.
Unsymbolized Thinking
Unsymbolized thinking occurred in two o f A V ’s samples (8%), and both 
instances appeared somehow to be involved in her problem -solving efforts. At beep 2.3 
AV had just finished singing a song by T Pain to herself in her head. At the moment o f 
the beep she was just beginning to wonder, Should I sing another song? The beep caught 
her at the outset o f that thought but just after the beep, apparently in response to that 
thought, AV heard in her head the rapper Aeon singing “ Smack that on the floor” along 
with the rhythm o f the song. It was as if  her hearing “Smack that” was the answer to her 
wondering what song she should sing next. A nother unsymbolized thinking instance 
occurred at beep 3.4. This time AV was working on a word find puzzle, trying ways to 
find the word “neur.” Her strategy was to search for the letter “n” row by row, thus at the 
moment o f  the beep she systematically was scanning the horizontal rows (specifically the 
3"* row) for a letter “n.” AV was sure that at that moment the letter “n” was “in mind.” It 
was hard for her to articulate how it was in mind— there was no image o f the letter, and 
she was not saying the letter to herself—but the letter “n” was somehow present in her 
awareness at the moment o f the beep. In both o f  A V ’s unsymbolized thinking instances.
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the unsymbolized thoughts (Should 1 sing another song? and “n”) were part o f  problem 
solving processes. In the former, AV was trying to decide whether or not to sing another 
song and the unsymbolized thought was the question itself, which was subsequently 
answered by another form o f  inner experience (inner hearing). In the latter, AV had the 
letter “n” in mind as she searched for it in her word find puzzle. It would have been 
interesting to see what A V ’s inner experience would have been if  she had found the “n” 
in the word search. In any case, one possible explanation for the unsymbolized thinking- 
problem solving connection is that for AV unsymbolized thinking is a useful way to 
lightly hold information in her mind so that she can be open to receiving an answer.
Discussion
Overall AV was an outstanding DES participant. She was timely, organized, and 
committed, but most importantly she was earnest in her efforts to learn the task and to do 
it well. Though she was the youngest subject to participate in the current study, her inner 
experience was further developed and broader across forms than some o f  her older peers. 
It appears that at A V ’s current stage o f  development, her feelings are known and 
expressed through her speech, though her capacity to experience feelings as distinct 
experiences may be on the cusp o f  emerging (as evidenced in beep 1.4, when she was 
triggered by the beep to recognize her sad feeling). AV is a strong inner speaker and 
tends toward frequent sensory-perceptual inner experiences. Unsym bolized thinking is 
also solidly within her inner experience repertoire. It is notable that AV did not describe 
any experiences o f  images; this may be because image making occurs in later stages o f 
inner experience development.
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Table 4
N um ber o f  samples = 25
Characteristic Frequency" Total instances'*
Inner Speech 7 (28%) 7 (28%)
Just Doing/W atching/Talking 6 (24%) 6 (24%)
Perceptual Awareness 5 (20%) 5 (20%)
Sensory Awareness 3 (12%) 4(16% )
Speaking Aloud to Self 1 (4%) 1 (4%)
Unsymbolized Thinking 2(9% ) 2(9% )
Total characteristics'* 18 19
Characteristics per sample** .72 .76
Number o f samples in which characteristic occurs (there may be two or more different 
characteristics per sample)
Number o f instances o f  a characteristic (there may be two or more instances o f  one 
characteristic in a sample)
Total characteristics excludes the DES category “just doing” (just doing is not actually a 
“characteristic” o f inner experience, so it is not included in the total characteristics count)
* Characteristics per sample is calculated by dividing total characteristics (excluding just doing) 
by the number o f samples, which yields a statistic describing the average 
richness/fullness/complexity o f  A V ’s inner experience across samples.
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CHAPTER 9 
“JT”
JT was a 14 year-old male who sampled in late April 2007. During that time he 
collected 25 samples on five separate days, and discussed 22 o f these samples (two 
samples were lost to interference and one sample was deemed private) in five separate 
expositional interviews. Sensory and perceptual experiences appeared to dominate JT ’s 
inner experience. As shown in Table 5, sensory awareness occurred in 15 o f  JT ’s 22 
samples (68%), and perceptual awareness occurred in 10 samples (45%). JT also 
experienced unsymbolized thinking in eight samples (36%), inner speech in four samples 
(18%), images in three samples (14%), feeling in two samples (9%), and inner hearing in 
one sample (5%). Twenty o f JT ’s samples featured more than one characteristic o f  inner 
experience; 11 samples featured two characteristics, seven samples featured three 
characteristics, and two samples featured four characteristics. In five o f these “complex” 
samples, all o f  the occurring characteristics were thematically related, while in the 
remaining 15 complex samples, some o f the occurring characteristics were unrelated.
Idiographic Description o f  J T ’s Inner Experience
Sensory Awareness
JT ’s samples featured sensory awareness more frequently than any other form o f 
inner experience. Fifteen o f his 22 samples involved sensory awareness (68%), and 7 o f
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these fifteen samples (47%) featured more than one sensory awareness per sample. Thus, 
as shown in column 2 o f Table 5, JT had 23 separate instances o f sensory awareness 
within these 15 samples. Ten o f JT ’s 23 sensory awareness instances (43%) involved 
bodily sensory awareness in which he was specifically attending to a sensation in or on 
his body. For example, at beep 2.1 JT was aware o f the cool breeze on his cheek, at beep 
2.4 he was aware o f  his stomach feeling full, at beep 3.5 he was aware o f a burning 
sensation in the white o f  his right eye, at beep 4.2 he was aware o f a painful fire-like 
burning in his hands, and at beep 5.2 he was aware o f the sensation o f sneezing, noticing 
how the pressured air was blowing out o f his nose and mouth.
Thirteen o f  JT ’s 23 sensory awareness instances (57%) were external sensory 
awarenesses o f visual, auditory, or olfactory characteristics. JT experienced seven 
instances o f visual sensory awareness (30% o f his 23 sensory awareness) in which he was 
engrossed in the visual characteristic(s) o f something in his environment. For example, at 
beep 1.4 JT was looking at a box o f comics. At the moment o f the beep he was staring at 
one face o f the box, engrossed in the white color and, separately, at the 
brightness/vibrancy o f  the white. He was focused on one central area on the face o f  the 
box, but the whiteness/brightness seemed to occupy his entire visual field. JT had been 
staring at the face o f the box for a few seconds, so the sound o f  the beep penetrated an 
ongoing process. Similarly, at beep 1.5 he was noticing the pixilated quality o f a book 
cover rendering o f Oliver Twist, at beep 2.4 he was engrossed in the reflection o f a light 
bulb in the shiny silver stripe o f a coke can, and at beep 3.5 he was examining the 
characteristics o f a patch o f blue stucco wall. In beep 4.1 JT was examining dark blue
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lettering on a sign, while at beep 5.1 he was staring at the pouffy texture o f the carpet, 
and finally at beep 5.4 he was noticing the shininess o f a candy wrapper on his floor.
Additionally, JT had five instances o f auditory sensory awareness (22%) and one 
instance o f olfactory sensory awareness (4%). Examples o f his auditory sensory 
awarenesses occurred at beep 2.2 when he was hearing the sound o f mustard pushing out 
of the bottle as he squeezed it, at beep 2.2 when he heard the clanging sound o f pots and 
pans, at 3.2 when he heard the metallic rattle o f  mints in a can, at beep 5.1 when he heard 
the grinding noise o f the air conditioner, and at beep 5.3 when he heard the “crunch” 
sound as he bit into a hard pretzel. JT ’s olfactory sensory awareness occurred at beep 2.1 
when he was smelling hamburgers cooking on the grill. Overall it appears that JT ’s 
capacity for sensory awareness was skilled and well differentiated as his reports were 
frequent, clear, and diverse (bodily, visual, auditory, olfactory).
Perceptual Awareness
Perceptual awareness occurred in 10 o f JT ’s 22 samples (45%). These instances 
appeared to be similar to his sensory awareness experiences in that they involved bodily 
sensation, hearing, and seeing. However, in these perceptual awareness instances, JT was 
not engrossed, drawn in or captivated by the sensory stimuli. For example, at beep 2.3 JT 
felt a burning sensation in his throat, but he was not focused on the burning sensation 
itself. Instead, he was simultaneously wondering (unsymbolized thinking) why the water 
he had just sipped was causing his throat to bum. At beep 3.1 JT heard the sound o f the 
bathroom door latching shut. He was listening for the sound so that he could know when 
the door had completely closed; he was not interested in the sensory quality o f the sound 
o f the latch clicking shut. Similarly, in beep 4.4 JT noticed a bug flying, and that it
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looked like a speck. His seeing o f  the bug was in his awareness, but only as a perceptual 
stimulus that he was considering whacking, he was not sensorily interested in the bug-as- 
speck visual experience.
Unsymbolized Thinking
Unsymbolized thinking occurred in eight samples (36%), which suggests that it is 
fairly characteristic o f his overall inner experience. His unsymbolized thoughts were 
typical and unremarkable in form and content. For example, at beep 1.1 JT was thinking 
to him self something like, here we go again, but not in words or images. At beep 2.5, JT 
was thinking he ought to clean up the strawberry ju ice dripping out o f  the com er o f  his 
mouth. At beep 4.5, JT was wondering if  he should kill the bug flying around the room, 
and at beep 5.3 JT was thinking that he should probably move his legs o ff o f the 
footboard since they were beginning to bum  from the friction.
Inner Speech
JT also experienced inner speech in four samples (18%), images in three samples 
(14%), feelings in two samples (9%), and inner hearing in one sample (5%). JT ’s 
instances o f  inner speech were clear and straightforward: at beep 3.3 he was saying to 
himself, “Tomorrow is the last time I ’ll get to wear a Speedo. . at beep 4.2 he was 
asking himself, “How many [push-ups] do you wanna do?” ; and at 5.5 he queried 
himself, “W hy would the tree be m oving?”
Inner Seeing
JT ’s inner seeing experiences, though infrequent, were very detailed— particularly 
his image at beep 1.5: JT was looking at the cover o f  the book Oliver Twist, which 
included a large portrait o f  the young Oliver. Foremost in his experience, JT was looking
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at O liver’s eyes and recognizing the eyes to be sad. At the same time, in his own head he 
saw three screens depicting different scenes that depict JT ’s way o f thinking about what 
O liver’s life was like, and what events might have caused O liver’s sadness. The screens 
in JT ’s head were at right angles to each other, with one screen directly in front o f him, 
much like the side and front walls o f  an office. The screen directly in front o f  JT depicts 
Oliver as a little boy in a dreary orphanage cafeteria begging for food, his hands cupped 
and outstretched. The image was similar to a still photograph with only the little boy in 
focus. The other two screens flanked JT to the right and left at right angles to the front 
screen. These screens also depicted sad scenes, one o f a dog dying and the other o f  a 
person dying. It was difficult for JT to recall which scene was on what side, but he knew 
they were all there in his mind.
JT experienced two other images over the course o f sampling, and though they 
were not as elaborate as the Oliver Twist related image, they were also well formed (i.e., 
not in the process o f  being formed) and clear. At beep l . I  JT saw an image o f  his father 
angrily mouthing to him to clean up his messy room; and in beep 3.2 JT was imagining 
him self turning his head to the left to see the red numbers, 5:30, lit up on his digital 
clock. Overall, images do not appear to be frequent occurrences in JT ’s inner experience, 
but when they do occur, they are mature.
Feelings
Four o f JT ’s 22 samples involved feelings (18%). He reported direct inner 
experience o f feelings in two samples (9%) and recognition o f  another person’s emotion 
in two samples (9%). At beep 3.3 JT experienced sadness in his head: at the moment o f 
the beep he was saying to himself, “Tomorrow is the last time I ’ll get to wear a Speedo.”
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The sad feeling was about swim season ending and JT experienced it as a separate 
accompanying phenomenon to his thought. JT ’s report o f his experience o f feeling sad 
was confident but he was unable to describe the feeling itself. We have noticed a similar 
reporting style regarding feelings with other adolescents in which they are able to identify 
an experience o f a specific feeling but unable to discuss/verbalize/describe the 
characteristics and/or qualities o f the feeling itself. Additionally, we have noticed that 
other adolescent subjects report experiencing feelings in their heads.
In beep 4.1 JT experienced another feeling, this time partly in his head and partly 
in his body: he was lying down on the couch and his dog was lying on top o f him. At the 
moment o f the beep, he felt the dog’s weight pressing down on his stomach and the 
pressure was slightly painful. At the same time JT was annoyed, which involved wanting 
to throw the dog off o f him. This annoyance seemed to be a feeling in his head, which 
somehow was expressed in his arms. JT was sure that this annoyance was not an explicit 
thought, and he was sure that there was some sensation like throwing the dog off in his 
arms, but he was less sure o f the annoyance in his head.
It appeared that JT was able to recognize other’s emotions with more ease than he 
was able to experience his own feelings. At beep 1.1 JT saw an image o f  his Dad and 
immediately recognized that his Dad was angry with him (for not having cleaned up his 
messy room). Similarly at beep 1.2 JT looked at a rendering o f  Oliver Twist and 
effortlessly was aware o f  sadness in O liver’s eyes. In contrast, JT labored to describe his 
own experience o f sadness and annoyance, ostensibly because he had to struggle to use 
words to describe his own feeling experience— which he is probably not accustomed to 
doing. JT reported his recognition o f  his father’s anger and Oliver Tw ist’s sadness easily.
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as he has likely had plenty o f practice reading facial cues and m atching them to the 
names o f feelings. This discrepancy suggests that the skills o f recognizing emotion in 
others may come easier and precede the skills o f experiencing and articulating one’s own 
feelings.
Inner Hearing
Inner hearing occurred in one sample only (5%). At the m om ent o f beep 2.3 JT 
heard him self saying that it was peculiar that water would cause his throat to bum. He 
was not innerly speaking, yet he innerly heard  him self comment on the water burning his 
throat. This sample is noteworthy for two reasons. First, inner hearing is a rare form o f 
inner experience. It requires finely tuned introspective discrimination, particularly when 
the sound internally heard is the subject’s own voice, as is the case in JT ’s example. 
Second, JT described that he heard his musing float through his mind in the baekground, 
terminology closely resembles that o f our seeond subject, RD. Although this is the only 
instance in whieh JT refers to “floating though,” it does seem an unlikely random 
coincidence.
Complexity Discussion
Twenty o f  JT ’s 22 samples (91%) featured more than one eharacteristic o f inner 
experienee in his awareness at the moment o f  the beep. That represents an unusually high 
number o f “com plex” samples as eompared to the other adolescent partieipants in this 
study. These eomplex samples featured two, three, and sometimes up to four aspects o f 
inner experienee oecurring at the same time. One possible explanation for this is that JT 
is our oldest (14 years) adolescent subject. I f  inner experienee itse lf develops over the
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course o f adolescence, it would make sense that older adolescents would have more inner 
experiences than younger adolescents -  after all they’ve had more practice.
However, just because JT has more characteristics packed into his inner 
experience at any given sample does not mean that his capacity for mature inner 
experience is as developed as it would be in an adult. Adults tend to have singular or 
thematically related complex inner experience. Five o f JT ’s “complex” samples mirrored 
adult samples; they featured aspects o f  inner experience that were thematically related. 
However, fifteen o f JT ’s “complex” samples featured aspects o f  inner experience that 
were not all thematically related. That is, some aspects o f inner experience were 
thematically clustered, but one or two aspects were completely unrelated, almost as if  
they were interferences. For example, at beep 4.3 JT was in the car with his mom at a 
drive-thru. At the moment o f the beep he was looking at the very dark blue lettering on 
the drive-thru window (sensory awareness), wondering whether the lettering is blue or 
black. His thought was clear yet it did not manifest in words or images (unsymbolized 
thinking). At the same time JT ’s mom was talking to him. Although he was in some way 
taking in her talking (perceptual awareness), the meaning o f what she was saying was not 
impacting him. He had not “latched onto” what she was saying; he was not thinking 
about what she was saying.
In this sample, JT had three ongoing characteristics o f inner experience occurring: 
sensory awareness, unsymbolized thinking, and perceptual awareness. Clearly, his 
sensory awareness and his unsymbolized thinking experiences were related to the same 
theme (deciphering the color o f the lettering.) However, JT ’s perceptual awareness o f his 
m other’s talking (as well as the heretofore uncoded experience o f  “not yet latching onto”
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the meaning o f  her words) is/are relative to a separate unrelated-to-the-sign-lettering 
theme. Put another way, the foreground experience in this sample was JT ’s looking 
at/wondering about the dark blue lettering, while the background experience was his low- 
grade awareness o f his m other’s talking to him. From a Gestalt perspective, this sample 
illustrates JT ’s inability to destroy background phenomena to make way for clear 
foreground experience— singular or complex. Instead, JT ends up with background- 
noise-inner-experience (his perceptual awareness o f  his m other’s talking) bleeding 
through to contaminate what would otherwise be clear foreground inner experience 
(deciphering w hether or not the blue-black lettering was actually dark blue or black).
This incomplete foreground/background phenomenon occurs in an additional 14 
o f  JT ’s samples; for example at beep 2.2 JT was paying attention to the sound o f the 
m ustard bottle blowing air and bits o f  mustard onto his hamburger, but he was also 
separately drawn into the sound o f pots and pans clanging in the background; at beep 3.5 
most o f  JT ’s awareness was on his eye burning, but another portion o f  his awareness was 
on noticing a patch o f  blue stucco wall; at beep 4.4 he was speaking aloud to him self but 
a tiny part o f his awareness heard the TV in the background; at beep 5.2 he was 
engrossed in looking at the pouffy texture o f the carpet but he also heard the grinding o f 
the air conditioner in the background; at beep 5.3 his legs were hurting and he was 
thinking about moving them, but separately he heard the crunch o f the pretzel he was 
biting into at that moment.
Notably, many o f JT ’s “complex” or “incomplete figure/ground” samples involve 
a variable form o f inner experience in the foreground, but almost always an auditory
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inner experience in the background (i.e., hearing  the pots and pans clanging, the murmur 
of the TV, the grinding o f the air conditioner, his mother talking in the background).
There are, o f course, other possible explanations for JT ’s thematically unrelated 
complex samples. These samples could be interpreted as multiple inner experiences, but 
that nomenclature does not quite fit because true multiple inner experience is 
characterized by many equally salient inner experiences all competing for attention. 
Another possibility is that JT characteristically is and will always be a sophisticated inner 
experiencer, able to attend to many things in his experience at one time, and able to 
notice the background phenomena that most subjects are unable to capture. The only way 
to rule this out would be to sample with JT in a few years. It is also possible that JT was 
exhibiting a response bias toward reporting something in the environment (i.e., 
background noise) for some unknown reason. However, we find it most plausible that 
JT ’s foreground/background pattern across samples suggests that he may be in the 
process o f learning how to have clear and thematically singular inner experience; that is, 
he may not (yet) be capable o f  destroying the background noise in his inner experience in 
order to focus on the foreground/main figure in his inner experience. W e propose this 
interpretation o f JT ’s inner experience based on inner experience sampling with adults; 
psychologically healthy adults typically have clear and thematically singular inner 
experience (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006).
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Table 5
Number o f  samples = 22
Characteristic Frequency" Total instances'*
Feelings 2 (9% ) 2(9% )
Inner Seeing 3 (14%) 3 (14%)
Inner Speech 4(18% ) 4(18% )
Inner Hearing 1(5% ) 1(5% )
Perceptual Awareness 10(45% ) 10(45% )
Sensory Awareness 15 (68%) 23 (105%)
Speaking Aloud to Self 1(5% ) 1(5% )
Unsymbolized Thinking 8 (36%) 9 (41%)
Total characteristics 44 53
Characteristics per sample** 1.51 1.83
Number o f samples in which characteristic occurs (there may he two or more different 
characteristics per sample)
** Number o f instances o f  a characteristic (there may he two or more instances o f one 
characteristic in a sample)
* Characteristics per sample is calculated by dividing total characteristics by the number o f  
samples, which yields a statistic describing the average richness/fullness/complexity o f  JT’s inner 
experience across samples.
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CHAPTER 9 
“JW ”
JW was a 13 year-old female participant who sampled with us throughout June 
and July o f 2007. She collected 32 samples during this time and met with us on five 
separate occasions to discuss her inner experience. As shown in Table 6, JW  was just 
doing in 17 o f those 32 samples, or 53% o f the time. Feelings occurred in six o f her 
samples (19%), and feeling fact o f  body, or ongoing emotion present in her body (left 
over from a just prior inner experience o f feeling), occurred in three o f her samples (9%). 
Additionally, perceptual awareness occurred in five samples (16%), inner speech in three 
samples (9%), sensory awareness in one sample (3%), and unsymbolized thinking in one 
sample (3%). JW did not have any inner experience o f inner seeing (aka images) across 
samples but she did have one sample (3%) in which she was reading, providing us a 
glimpse o f her reading process.
Idiographic Description o f  J W ’s Inner Experience
Just D oing
JW ’s most frequently occurring inner experience was just doing. In more than 
half o f her samples (17 o f  32, or 53%), she was engaged in everyday activities, such as 
talking on the phone, watching TV, playing on the computer, caring for her dog, and 
fixing food. For example, at beep 1.5 JW was talking on the phone to her friend T,
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discussing when she could see T ’s newly dyed hair; at beep 2.6 she was watching a 
movie, seeing the title M onster’s Inc. appear on the TV screen; at beep 3.5 she 
wasclicking the Spider Solitaire icon listed on the Start menu o f her computer; at beep 4.5 
she was buckling a collar around her dog’s neck, fitting the prong into a hole; and at beep 
5.1 she was putting hot sauce on her taquitoes. In each o f  these instances, and in all o f  her 
instances o f just doing, JW was unaware o f  any inner experience separate from/other than 
her engagement in those activities. There were instances o f  just doing on all five 
sampling occasions, further indicating that just doing is a principle form o f JW ’s inner 
experience at this stage o f  her development.
Feelings
Feeling was also a prominent form o f inner experience in JW ’s samples. Six o f 
her samples (19%) involved her experience o f  feeling, including being excited, sad, 
proud, and shocked. In 5 out o f 6 feeling instances, JW  experienced her feelings in 
various parts o f  her body. For example, at beep 1.2 JW  experienced excitement as an 
intense sensation o f butterflies in a small area just above her belly button. A t beep 1.3, 
she experienced a similar, though less intense, excited feeling in the same upper stomach 
area. At beep 2.1 JW experienced feeling sad everywhere throughout her head and upper 
body. At beep 2.2 she experienced a feeling somewhere between happiness and pride, 
located in her head only. And at beep 3.4 JW experienced feeling sad, again in her upper 
body and head. However, in her sixth feeling instance, at beep 5.4, JW  felt 
shocked/surprised but she did not locate this feeling in any part o f her body as she had 
done in all prior instances o f feeling experience.
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JW ’s descriptions o f her feeling experiences ranged from precise and confident to 
sometimes vague and uncertain. For example, at beep 1.2 JW gave a very detailed, 
succinct description o f her experience o f excitement as butterflies in her stomach area. 
During the interview she described the feeling as occupying a 2-inch by 2-inch area 
located about two inches above her belly button and one inch inward. M oreover, she 
confidently nam ed her experience “excitement.” In contrast, at beep 2.2 JW reported that 
her inner experience was a feeling but when asked about the qualities and characteristics 
o f the feeling experience she had trouble describing her felt sense o f the experience 
(finally settling on it being in her head only), and she had some difficulty naming the 
feeling experience itself (settling on somewhere between happy and proud). Fven further 
down the spectrum o f precision and confidence, at beep 5.4 JW struggled to discuss her 
inner experience at all. By this time JW was skilled at sampling her inner experience and 
participating in expositional interviews. She clearly understood that our interest was in 
knowing the precise details o f her inner experience, and she had become skilled at 
describing her inner experience with fidelity. Yet in discussing her 30^ sample, she 
struggled with whether her experience was a thought or a feeling (settling on it being 
somewhere between a thought and a feeling), she struggled with knowing what her 
feeling was (settling on somewhere between shock and surprise), and she had no bodily 
awareness o f  the thought/feeling o f shock/surprise whatsoever.
One possible explanation for JW ’s range o f  feeling experience descriptions is that 
JW experiences feelings in a range o f  ways. That is, sometimes JW  experiences clear, 
mature, robust feelings while other times she experiences partially formed, nascent, or 
inchoate feelings. This range o f  feeling experiences may be idiosyncratic to JW, but it
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may also be indicative o f an adolescent in the process o f developing her capacity to have 
clear and consistent feeling experiences. Although inner experience o f  feeling across 
adult DES subjects varies in form (i.e., some adults experience emotion in the body, 
others in the head, still others experience emotion cognitively as a type o f thinking), adult 
feeling experiences are typically (a) very clearly feelings and (b) consistent in form 
within a single subject (Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007). In contrast, JW ’s range o f 
feeling experiences reveals that she is neither clear that her experiences are feelings nor 
consistent in the fonn o f  experience her feelings take. Again, perhaps that is simply a 
characteristic o f JW  and how she will experience feelings across her life, or perhaps the 
variability in her emotional experience points to a developmental phase.
Another possibility to explain JW ’s range o f  feeling experiences is that as she 
became a more accurate observer and reporter o f  her experience, she found feelings more 
difficult to apprehend and/or describe. JW ’s clearest feeling experience occurred on the 
first day (at beep 1.2 when she felt excitement manifesting as butterflies in the 2 x 2  inch 
small area above her belly button), yet her feeling experiences on days two and three 
were less specific (for example, at beep 3.4 she felt sad throughout her upper body). On 
the last sampling day, JW was least sure about her last feeling experience. On the last 
day, at beep 5.4, she was shocked/surprised, but the experience was between a thought 
and a feeling, and she did not know anything else about how it was manifesting in her 
experience. Thus the decline in JW ’s ability to report feelings could suggest that she was 
actually becoming a more accurate observer o f her inner experience and that she was 
finding out that feeling experiences were far less clear to her than she had originally 
thought.
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Feeling Fact o f  Body
Feeling fact o f body occurred in three samples (9%). In these instances a recently 
experienced feeling was somehow still lingering in her body though not expressly in her 
experience at the moment o f the beep. For example, at beep 1.1 JW  was playing solitaire 
on the computer, moving the king card down, not aware o f anything in her inner 
experience other than the task at hand. Yet at the moment o f  the beep she had a sense that 
her feeling o f anger, experienced a few moments before the beep, was somehow still 
present in her, though not expressly in her experience. Similarly, at beep 4.3 JW was 
playing with her puppy, noticing the spots on the puppy’s nose and head. Just prior to the 
beep she had been feeling the joy o f  having a new puppy. JW  thought that state was 
probably still bodily present in her at the moment o f  the beep, though again it was not 
expressly in her experience. A final example o f feeling fact o f body occurred at beep 5.3. 
In this instance JW  was watching her puppy playfully running toward her. JW  stated that 
her feeling o f happiness was somehow present as she watched her puppy barreling 
toward her, but that she was not experiencing her feeling at that moment. These instances 
o f feeling fact o f body may be further evidence to suggest that JW is in the process o f 
developing her capacity to experience feelings.
Perceptual Awareness
Perceptual awareness was JW ’s third most frequently occurring form o f inner 
experience. All o f  JW ’s five perceptual awareness experiences (16%) occurred on the 
second to last day o f sampling (Day 4). It is therefore possible that JW  learned to 
describe perceptual awareness only toward the end o f sampling and that she may actually 
experience perceptual awareness more frequently than is represented here. For example.
121
at beep 4.1 JW was eating the last bite o f her eggs. Though she was not noticing any 
particular aspect o f the eggs’ taste, such as saltiness, or texture, she somehow tasted the 
eggs in that moment— she was not just eating the eggs. At beep 4.2 JW caught sight o f 
her reflection in the bathroom m irror at the moment o f the beep. She saw herself from the 
waist up. At beep 4.3 JW was noticing the spots on her puppy’s nose and head. And at 
beep 4.6 JW felt pain on her right back ankle where her brother’s puppy was biting her 
with its tiny new teeth. Although she was not engrossed in the sensation o f  the tiny teeth 
biting into her ankles, she felt the tiny-teethness o f the biting. JW ’s perceptual awareness 
o f tiny teeth biting her ankle actually may have been a sensory awareness; it was difficult 
to discern. JW did experience one instance o f unambiguous sensory awareness at beep 
4.6 in which she was pouring dry dog food in her dog’s bowl. At the moment o f the beep 
JW was noticing the bone-shaped-ness o f  the food pieces; her experience in this instance 
was sensory awareness rather than perceptual awareness because she was drawn in by the 
specific bone-shaped characteristic o f  the food pieces.
Inner Speech
JW experienced inner speech in three samples (9%), and while it was not a 
frequently occurring form o f her inner experience, her capacity for inner speech appeared 
to be skilled. Two instances o f her inner speech co-occurred with corresponding feeling 
experiences. For example, at beep 1.2 JW  was saying to herself excitedly in her head, 
“Ohmigod, I ’m gonna talk to my boy friend... what should I say?” while feeling excited 
with butterflies in her stomach. Similarly, at beep 2.1 she was cooing sadly to herself in 
her head, “Ooh, that’s so sad, he d ied .. .” while feeling sad in her upper body and head. In 
each o f these samples JW experienced two forms o f inner experience simultaneously
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(inner speech and feeling), which illustrates a developing capacity for complex inner 
experience. Furthermore, the two co-occurring forms o f  inner experience (inner speech 
and feeling) were cohesively related (i.e., her inner speech expressed/matched her 
feeling), which illustrates a developing capacity for rich, multi-faceted inner experience.
However, JW ’s third instance o f inner speech conspicuously did not feature a 
m atching feeling experience despite the fact that the situation appeared to warrant some 
feeling. At beep 2.5 JW was logged onto M ySpace, noticing that she had received a new 
email message from a girl who had been sending her mean messages for no apparent 
reason. A t the moment o f  the beep JW was saying to herself in her head, “Okay, w hat’s 
gonna happen now?” but she did not experience any feeling, despite the unpleasant 
situation. The absence o f  feeling experience seemed unusual in light o f  two things: 1) JW 
was one o f our most emotionally sophisticated participants, and 2) JW ’s other two 
instances o f inner speech co-occurred with matching feeling. This could indicate that 
JW ’s inner experience fluctuates in terms o f maturity: sometimes it is complex and rich, 
other times it is partial or not fully fleshed out, not running on all cylinders. 
Unsymbolized Thinking
Regarding other forms o f  inner experience, only one o f  JW ’s samples featured 
unsymbolized thinking (3%). At beep 3.2 she was playing an Xbox 360 game with her 
brother and was thinking that she’s got to beat him, but that thought was not in words, 
images, or any other kind o f mental representation. Thus, though unsymbolized thinking 
was not a frequently occurring characteristic o f  JW ’s inner experience, she was capable 
o f  experiencing it.
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Reading Process
In one sample (3%), JW was reading text o ff a website, and her inner experience 
at that moment was more than just reading. At beep 2.4 JW was looking at the 
Burkholder M iddle School homepage on the internet. She was reading the first line o f 
text to herself, comprehending the meaning o f what she was reading word by word. JW 
seemed to understand the words one at a time, as if  each word entered her consciousness 
in sequence, one at a time, attached to its meaning. That is, she did not grasp a whole 
phrase, or fluidly grasp the meaning o f the read words; she linked each individual word to 
its own individual meaning. The words were not spoken or heard. Additionally, she was 
aware o f struggling slightly to read the text as the font was small and she was not wearing 
her glasses. The beep interrupted her in the middle o f this reading process, allowing us a 
glimpse o f  JW reading at her current skill level, which is likely to improve and change 
over time. Perhaps as she becomes more skilled at reading, she will cease taking in words 
one at a time in favor o f  a smoother, more efficient, masterful reading strategy.
Discussion
Overall, JW ’s samples o f  inner experience suggest that she is just doing much o f 
the time but that she does have a fair repertoire o f inner experience including feelings, 
perceptual awareness, sensory awareness, inner speech, unsymbolized thinking. At times 
her inner experience appeared to be mature and sophisticated, as evidenced in her 
detailed descriptions o f  some feeling experiences and her multi-faceted samples featuring 
simultaneous inner speech and corresponding feelings. However, JW  also appears to be 
in the process o f learning to have mature and sophisticated inner experience, as evidenced
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in her more vague and partially-formed descriptions o f feelings and inner speech. It is 
notable that JW did not have a single imaging experience. Perhaps imaging is not 
characteristic o f JW and will never be characteristic o f JW ’s inner experience. But it is 
more likely that the absence o f imaging reflects that JW, while ahead o f her peers in 
terms o f feeling experiences, has not yet learned how to make images as many o f her 
peers have to varying degrees, and that that capacity will emerge in JW ’s inner 
experience over time.
Table 6
Number o f  samples = 32
Charaeteristie Frequency" Total instances'’
Feelings 6 (19%) 6(19% )
Feeling Fact o f Body 3(9% ) 3(9% )
Inner Speech 3(9% ) 3(9% )
Just Doing/W atching/Talking 17 (53%) 17 (53%)
Perceptual Awareness 5 (16%) 5 (16%)
Reading Process 1 (3%) I (3%)
Sensory Awareness 1 (3%) 1 (3%)
Unsymbolized Thinking 1 (3%) 1 (3%)
Total characteristics'^ 
Characteristics per sample''
20
.63
20
.63
Number o f samples in whieh charaeteristie oeeurs (there may be two or more different 
eharacteristics per sample)
Number o f  instances o f  a charaeteristie (there may be two or more instances o f  one 
charaeteristie in a sample)
Total characteristics excludes the DES category “just doing” (just doing is not actually a 
“characteristic” o f  inner experience, so it is not included in the total eharacteristics count) 
Characteristics per sample is calculated by dividing total characteristics (excluding just doing) 
by the number o f  samples, which yields a statistic describing the average 
richness/fullness/complexity o f JW’s inner experience across samples.
125
CHAPTER 11
ACROSS-SUBJECTS RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
The previous six chapters were devoted to separate idiographic analyses o f our six 
subjects’ (EM, RD, BC, AV, JT, JW) individual inner experience. In this chapter we 
consider the collective pool o f samples across all subjects and present the eharacteristics, 
patterns, and trends that emerged. We compare these results to Heavey and H urlburt’s (in 
press) findings across a sample o f 30 young adults, and to Christy M onson’s (1987) 
findings across a sample o f five adolescents. W e also discuss some possible implications 
and interpretations o f our results.
As shown in Table 7, our aeross-subjeets results are based on a total o f  161 
samples o f inner experience; EM contributed 29 o f these samples (18%), RD contributed 
34 samples (21%), BC contributed 19 samples (12%), AV contributed 25 samples (16%), 
JT contributed 22 samples (14%), and JW contributed 32 samples (20%). Sampling 
began in Decem ber 2006 and was completed in July 2007. W e worked with one subject 
at a time; five subjects (EM, RD, BC, AV, and JT) completed sampling within one month 
and one subject (JW) completed sampling over a period o f  two months. Each subject 
collected an average o f  five (range: three to eight) samples on at least five separate 
occasions (the one exception was RD, who collected samples on six separate occasions). 
Additionally, each subject participated in an expositional interview within 24 hours o f
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Table 7
SI
“FM”
12/M
S2
“RD”
13/M
S3
“BC”
12/F
S4
"AV"
11/F
S5
“JT”
14/M
S6
“JW”
13/F
ALL
SUBJECTS
Number o f samples 29 34 19 25 22 32 161
Feelings 2
(7%)
2
(6%)
— — 2
(9%)
6
(19%)
12
(7%)
Feeling Fact o f Body 3
(9%)
3
(2%)
Inner Seeing 2
(7%)
1
(5%)
3
(14%)
6
(4%)
Incipient Inner Experience — 1
(5%)
1
(.6%)
Inner Speech 7
(24%)
23
(68%)
7
(28%)
4
(18%)
3
(9%)
44
(27%)
Inner Hearing 1
(5%)
1
(.6%)
Just Doing 2
(7%)
11
(58%)
6
(24%)
17
(53%)
36
(22%)
Listening Process 3
(10%)
3
(2%)
Meta Awareness 1
(3%)
2
(6%)
3
(2%)
No Inner Experience — 3
(16%)
— — 3
(2%)
Open — 2
(6%)
— — 2
(1%)
Perceptual Awareness 3 12 2 5 10 5 37
(10%) (35%) (11%) (20%) (45%) (16%) (23%)
Reading Process — — — — — 1
(3%)
1
(.6%)
Sensory Awareness 12 2 1 3 15 1 34
(41%) (6%) (5%) (12%) (68%) (3%) (21%)
Speaking Aloud to S elf 1
(3%)
1
(4%)
1
(5%)
— 3
(2%)
Unsymbolized Thinking 6
(21%)
9
(26%)
— 2
(8%)
8
(36%)
1
(3%)
26
(16%)
Worded Thinking 1
(3%)
— — — — — 1
(.6%)
Total characteristics" 38 52 5 18 44 20 177
(40)" (52) (5) (19) (53) (20) (189)
Characteristics p er  sample" 1.31 1.53 .26 .72 2.00 .63 1.10
(1.38) (1.53) (.26) (.76) (2.41) (.63) (1.17)
Note. Bold typeface delineates the five main characteristics of inner experience (as found in adult 
samples; Heavey & Hurlburt, in press).
" Total characteristics excludes just doing and no inner experience.
Parenthesized values count multiple instances of characteristics occurring at single samples. 
Characteristics per sample is total characteristics divided by the number o f  samples
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each sampling occasion; that is, there were five expositional interviews per subject 
(again, with the exception o f RD who participated in six expositional interviews).
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section presents our results 
regarding the five main characteristics o f inner experience, which are inner speech, 
sensory awareness, unsymbolized thinking, feelings, and inner seeing. The second section 
is devoted to two other characteristics o f inner experience found frequently across our 
subjects: perceptual awareness and just doing. Next, we discuss the phenom ena o f  meta­
awareness and speaking aloud to self, two characteristics o f  inner experience found 
infrequently but that occurred in more than one subject’s samples. The fourth section o f 
this chapter discusses differences in the complexity o f inner experience across subjects. 
Finally, the chapter closes with a discussion o f limitations o f this study and directions for 
future research.
Five Main Characteristics 
The five main characteristics are the five most frequently occurring forms o f inner 
experience consistently found across DES subjects over time (Heavey & Hurlburt, in 
press; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2002; 2005). These characteristics are known as inner speech, 
inner seeing (aka images), unsymbolized thinking, feelings, and sensory awareness. Each 
o f these characteristics occurs in approximately one quarter o f all samples o f  inner 
experience, and current understanding o f the phenomenology and frequency o f these 
characteristics primarily is based on research conducted with adult subjects.
One o f  the questions posed at the outset o f  the present study was. Is adolescent 
inner experience the same as or different from adult inner experience? Historically, DES
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studies have foeused on adult inner experience with few forays into adoleseent or ehild 
inner experience; the two exceptions are M onson’s 1987 study, which examined the inner 
experience o f five adoleseents, and H urlburt’s sampling with one youngster (see Hurlburt 
& Heavey, 2006). Overall, our findings in this study corroborate both M onson’s and 
Hurl hurt’s findings: it appears that adolescents ean and do experienee the same five main 
eharaeteristies o f inner experienee experieneed by adults. However, our findings also 
suggest that some o f  these eharacteristics are not consistently as fully formed and 
differentiated as they are in adults, and that some eharaeteristies may develop prior to 
others.
The five main eharaeteristies and corresponding frequeneies across subjects 
appear in boldface type in Table 7. We discuss our across subjects’ results in terms of 
each o f these five eharaeteristies here, beginning with the most frequently occurring 
(inner speech) and ending with the least frequently occurring (inner seeing).
Inner Speech
Inner speech was the most frequently occurring characteristic across subjects in 
our sample. It occurred in 44 o f 161 samples across subjects, or 27% o f the time. Heavey 
and Hurlburt (in press) found an overall frequency o f 26%  inner speech across 30 young 
adult subjects (mean age = 19.0 years), whieh is very similar to the 27%  frequency found 
across our adoleseent subjects (mean age = 12.5 years) here. M onson (1987) found inner 
speech occurred 21% of the time across her sample o f adoleseents (mean age = 13.2 
years); all five o f her subjects experienced inner speech during sampling.
Five o f our six subjects (FM, RD, AV, JT, and JW) experienced inner speech. A 
similar variability in frequency was reported for young adults, where the within-
129
participant frequency o f inner speech ranged from 0% to 75% (Heavey & Hurlhurt, in 
press). Inner speech dominated R D ’s inner experience, occurring in 23 o f his 34 samples 
(68%), and it occuiTed fairly frequently for FM (7/29 or 24%) and AV (7/25 or 28%). JT 
(4/22 or 18%) and JW (3/32 or 9%) reported inner speech less frequently. BC did not, 
apparently, have any instances o f inner speech.
Overall, the instances o f inner speech described by our adolescent subjects were 
quite similar in nature and content to those reported hy adults. Our subjects’ inner speech 
sounded like outer speaking except it occurred internally, and the inner speech content 
related to their ongoing experiences/activities/situations occurring in the moment. For 
example, FM innerly commented, “Wow, this is boring,” during an in-class math lesson 
on positive and negative numbers; RD asked him self in his head, “W hat should I wear?” 
while getting ready to go to the movies; AV exclaimed to herself in her head, “That mole 
is big!” upon seeing a lady with a big mole on her face on TV; JT mused to him self in his 
head, “Why is the tree moving?” while tracking a reflection o f a wind-blown tree in the 
window; and JW asked herself in her head, “Okay, now w hat’s gonna happen?” when 
noticing an anticipated new message in her M ySpace inbox.
However, two noteworthy patterns did emerge across instances o f  inner speech in 
our subjects, hoth related to the tone o f the inner speaking voice. First, ju st as in adults, 
some inner speech was recognized to have emotional characteristics (tone, manner o f 
speaking); there were a total o f 13 such experiences (FM=1, RD=7, AV=3, JT=1, and 
JW=1). In three o f those emotionally toned inner speech experiences, RD (I), JT (I)  and 
JW (I)  also experienced a simultaneous emotion. However, in ten o f  those emotionally 
toned experiences, RD (6), AV (3), and FM (I)  denied, even under careful questioning.
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the simultaneous experience o f emotion. One example o f  this emotionally toned inner 
speech occurred at R D ’s beep 3.2: he was saying to him self in his head with frustration 
and irritation, “ Stupid cat, get away!” but he did not feel the frustration or irritation that 
was so clearly conveyed in his manner o f  speaking. We discuss this phenomenon in detail 
in the Feelings seetion o f  this ehapter.
The second pattern we noticed, although infrequently and only in two subjects 
(RD=1 and AV=2), was inner speaking in dramatie eharaeter-like voices. On one 
oceasion RD mused, “I wonder what this tastes like?” in a slightly melodious but 
decidedly snobby English aeeent. Similarly AV reported two instances o f innerly 
speaking in a high-pitched, rapid, squeaky little voice: once while commenting on a bad 
haircut on TV (“Oh my god! They cut his hair wrong!), and once more while trying to 
stay stoic when having her blood drawn (“Em  not going to cry!”). During expositional 
interviews, both RD and AV took care to explain the eharacteristics o f  these dramatic 
voices, and they were able to mimie the voices for us. N either RD nor AV seemed to find 
their use o f  these character-like inner voices strange or surprising.
The prevalence and well-formed quality o f inner speech across our subjects 
suggests that it may be one o f the first characteristics o f inner experience to develop in 
young people. However, the instances o f emotionally toned inner speech suggest that our 
adolescent subjects may be in the process o f  learning to differentiate their inner speaking 
from their emotional experience. Furthermore, the instances o f inner speaking in dramatie 
voices may indicate that inner speaking is in a more flexible-whimsical state o f 
development in which character-like voices erupt instead o f  one’s own voice. Perhaps as
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their inner speech skills mature, RD and AV will settle into consistently using inner 
speaking voices that sound like their outer speaking voices.
Sensory Awareness
Sensory awareness was the second most frequently occurring main charaeteristie 
o f inner experienee across subjects. (Perceptual awareness was the second most 
frequently oeeurring charaeteristie across subjects [36/161 or 22%], but because it is not 
one o f  the five main eharaeteristies, these results are presented in a separate seetion 
below.) Sensory awareness occurred in 34 o f 161 samples (21%) and all six subjects 
experieneed it at some point in their sampling. Heavey and Hurlburt (in press) found an 
overall frequency o f 22% sensory awareness across their sample o f  young adults, and a 
w ithin-partieipant frequency that ranged from 0% to 100%.
M onson (1987), however, did not report any instances o f sensory awareness; 
twenty years ago, when her study was conducted, sensory awareness had not yet been 
identified as a form o f inner experienee (Hurlburt, personal communication, 2007). Yet, 
from M onson’s descriptions o f her subjects’ inner experiences, it appears that sensory 
awareness did occur but that she referred to it as either unsymbolized experienee or 
feeling, evidently due to the lack o f a sensory awareness category. For example, Monson 
wrote:
At the moment o f  the beep Sally was thinking about calling her next door 
neighbor, Nicole, and hoping she would be home. This thinking about Nicole and 
hoping she would be home had no words or images; it was just a thought, a 
knowing that she was thinking about Nicole and hoping she would be home. At 
the same time she was also wiggling her fingers and feeling undecided about
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whom to call. This indecision seemed to be located in her fingers and not 
anywhere else in her body [italics added]. (Monson, 1987, p. 116)
This sample was coded as unsymbolized experience and feeling; however it may actually 
illustrate an instance o f bodily sensoiy awareness experience. In order to determine that 
for sure, we would need to go back in time to the expositional interview and ask more 
questions o f Sally about the located-in-her-fmgers portion o f her inner experience. From 
the information we do have, it seems likely that she was experiencing sensory awareness 
in her fingers at the moment of the beep.
M onson described two more samples that she called feeling, but that seem likely 
to be sensory awareness:
A nita experienced only a couple o f Feeling moments (2 samples out o f 18 )...in 
Sample #33.. .Anita was feeling the warmth o f her cat on her lap and the softness 
o f its fur as she stroked it. In Sample #29 she was feeling the hot sauce in her 
mouth as she ate her snack and watched TV. (M onson, 1987, p. 169)
It is likely that A nita’s experience o f  warmth on her lap and softness o f  fur were both 
sensory awareness experiences, not feeling experiences. Likewise, the feeling o f  hot 
sauce in her mouth did not involve affect or emotion, and therefore seems likely to be a 
sensory awareness experience. W e cite these examples to further illustrate that M onson’s 
subjects probably did experience sensory awareness, but that it was coded as 
unsymbolized experience and/or feeling at the time. Thus M onson’s frequency counts 
and percentages for both unsymbolized thinking and feeling may be inflated as those 
categories accounted for sensory awareness experiences, too.
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In the present study, sensory awareness was the most frequently oeeurring 
charaeteristie in two subjects’ inner experienee: JT experienced it in 15 o f his 22 samples 
(68%) and FM experieneed it in 12 o f his 29 samples (41%). AV experieneed sensory 
awareness somewhat frequently, in three o f her 25 samples (12%), and RD experieneed it 
in two o f his 32 samples (6%). BC and JW experienced sensory awareness only onee 
each; for BC that translated to 5% o f the time (1/19), and for JW, 3% o f the time (1/32).
The deseriptions o f sensory awareness were eonsistently elear, definite, and 
preeise across subjects. Five subjeets (FM, BC, AV, JT and JW) experieneed at least one 
instanee o f external sensory awareness. For example, FM was engrossed in the shiny 
quality o f a single red bulb on a strand o f Christmas lights hanging in a restaurant; BC 
was foeused on the sound o f aetress Halle B erry’s aeeent; AV was staring at the size and 
shape o f  the “D” key on her eom puter keyboard; JT was engrossed in the vibraney and 
brightness o f a white eolored side o f a box; and JW was dawn into the bone-shaped 
quality o f  the individual pieces o f  dog food. Four subjeets (FM, RD, AV, and JT) 
experieneed bodily sensory awareness. For example, FM felt intense pain in his head 
whieh he metaphorieally deseribed like “a fire alarm ringing in my head”; RD felt the 
weight o f his body press through his feet as he stood up; AV felt the uneomfortable 
sensation o f the phlebotom ist’s needle pieree her skin; and JT felt his upper lip burning, 
right along the lip line.
Similar to inner speeeh, the prevalenee and mature quality o f sensory awareness 
across all six o f our subjects suggests that it may be one o f the first forms o f inner 
experienee to take hold developmentally. Remarkably, even BC, our subject who 
struggled most with DES because she rarely had any fully-formed inner experienee at all.
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reported a sensory awareness experience that was clear, definite, detailed, and 
differentiated. As mentioned above, in that sample BC was watching Halle Berry on TV. 
At the moment o f  the beep she was paying attention to the way Halle Berry was 
speaking; specifically, BC was focused on the sound o f B erry’s accent, and this was at 
the exclusion o f  all the other ongoing sensory stimuli in B C ’s environment at that 
moment. When describing this experience during the expositional interview, BC was 
uneharacteristically enthusiastie, and that seemed to be because she had an actual 
experience to tell us about. That is, it seems likely that BC typically had no inner 
experience but on this one occasion, she did have an actual experience to report the 
eharaeteristies o f  (that is, to answer our questions about)— and she enjoyed doing so. 
That this actual experience was a sensory awareness lends support to the hypothesis that 
sensory awareness may be more easily experienced, aceessible, or somehow 
developmentally charaeteristie o f  youngsters than the other main eharacteristics o f inner 
experienee.
Unsymbolized Thinking
Unsymbolized thinking was the third most frequently oeeurring main 
eharaeteristic across subjeets. It occurred in 26 o f 161 samples (16%), and five o f six 
subjects (JT, RD, FM, AV, and JW) experienced it. However, unlike inner speeeh and 
sensory awareness, unsymbolized thinking was not the dominant charaeteristie in any 
individual subject’s inner experienee. JT experienced unsymbolized thinking in eight o f 
his 22 samples (36%), RD experienced it in nine o f his 34 samples (26%); it occurred in 
six o f FM ’s 29 samples (21%), in two o f A V ’s 25 samples (8%), and in one o f JW ’s 32 
samples (3%).
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Heavey and Hurlburt (in press) reported an overall frequency o f unsymbolized 
thinking o f 22%, and a within-partieipant frequency o f inner speeeh that ranged from 0% 
to 80%. M onson (1987) reported an average overall frequency o f 37% across her subjeets 
and each o f her five subjeets experienced unsymbolized thinking in their samples. (As 
discussed above, one possible reason for M onson’s higher average is that she was coding 
some sensory awareness experiences as unsymbolized experiences.)
As Hurlburt reported (Hurlburt, 1993; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006; Hurlburt & 
Schwitzgebel, 2007; Hurlburt & Akhter, submitted) unsymbolized thinking initially is the 
most difficult type o f  inner experience for adult subjects to identify and articulate. 
Eventually, however, because there are unsymbolized experiences to report, adult 
subjects learn how to characterize the details o f those experiences with confidence, if  not 
ease. As would follow, our five adoleseent subjeets with unsymbolized thinking initially 
struggled to describe it. Onee they figured out how to talk about it, however, their 
experiences were found to be similar to those o f adults. For example, FM was thinking 
specifically that he had to get to class, but that thought was not in words, images, or any 
other form; RD was thinking she better not turn the channel/ don’t tell me she’s gonna 
turn the channel/1 hope she doesn’t turn the channel, but not in specific words; AV was 
wondering whether or not she should sing another song, but her wondering was not in 
words, images, sounds, or any other form; JT was seeing a bug fly around the room and 
was wondering whether or not he should try to hit it, but that thought did not include 
words, images or any other symbolism; and JW was thinking that she had to beat her 
brother at the video game, but her thought, though clear and present, was symbolically 
unrepresented in her mind.
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Feelings
Feelings occurred infrequently across our adolescent subjects in this study; only 
12 feelings occurred in 161 samples (7%), a substantially lower frequency than the 26% 
found in Heavey and Hurlburt (in press) or the 42% found in M onson (1987). (Here 
again, M onson’s overall frequency may be inflated as she was coding some sensory 
awarenesses as feelings). In the present study, four o f our six subjects experienced 
feelings; JW experienced feelings in six o f  her 32 samples (19%), while JT (9%), RD 
(8%), and FM (7%) each reported two instances. Eight o f  the 12 feeling experiences 
reported across subjects were fully formed and differentiated; the other four were 
underdeveloped, partially emergent, or simply ambiguous. In light o f  these four instances 
o f quasi-feelings, the 7% reported above actually may be too high; the percentage o f true 
feelings may be closer to 4%, far less than the 26% reported by Heavey and Hurlburt (in 
press) and the 46% reported by M onson (1987).
Psychologically healthy adult DES subjects typically experience feelings clearly 
and confidently (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006). Adults quickly recognize their specific 
experienced feeling (for example, sadness, happiness, anger, joy, love, embarrassment, 
etc.), and adults do not have any doubt about their experience o f  particular feelings. The 
form o f feeling experience varies across adult subjects; there are body based feeling 
experiences (spreading warmth in the chest), head-based feeling experiences (sadness in 
the head), thinking-based feelings (thinking angry thoughts), and phenomena-less 
feelings (experiencing fear but without any phenomenal features). A lthough adults may 
experience different forms o f feeling experience, they are typically consistently clear and 
confident about such experiences and they are readily able to distinguish their feeling
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experiences from other forms o f  inner experience such as inner speech or unsymbohzed 
thinking. However, even for adults, feelings are often more difficult to describe than 
other forms o f inner experience (Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007).
The eight “true” feelings experienced by our subjects appeared similar to adult 
experiences o f  feelings in that they were clearly recognized and confidently known. 
Several examples o f  true feelings follow here: JW felt intense excitement just before 
talking with her boyfriend on the phone. The excitement manifested as a sensation o f 
butterflies in her stomach, and the locus o f  the feeling was in a small area just above her 
belly button, about an inch inside o f her body. On another occasion JW  was excitedly 
blurting out baby names to her mother (who was on the phone with a newly pregnant 
friend), and she felt a similar but less intense feeling o f excitement in the same stomach- 
area location. On one occasion, FM was feeling sad about his m other and father splitting 
up, and described the sad feeling as being located in his head. RD experienced feeling 
sorry for his friend J, right after J took a bad fall and hurt himself. The sorry feeling was 
similar to sadness, but not exactly like sadness, more along the lines o f  sympathy. RD 
experienced this feeling on the inside surface o f  his chest. Finally, JT reported feeling sad 
as he contemplated the end o f swim season. As with FM, JT reported that the sad feeling 
was located in his head.
In contrast to “true” feeling experiences, four instances o f  feelings appeared to be 
underdeveloped, partially formed, or ambiguous. In these samples, our subjects were 
certain that they were experiencing a specific feeling but they could not describe the 
quality, location, corresponding body sensations, or any other details about the 
experienced feelings, and they were uncertain as to how to clearly label the feelings (i.e..
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sadness, anger, nervousness). In the first example, FM felt humor while watehing TV, but 
could not say anything more about what that experience was like for him; he simply said 
the show was funny and that his reaction to that funniness was somehow a part o f his 
inner experience at the moment o f the beep. In a second example, RD felt disappointment 
when the Eagles lost a game, but he didn’t know how or where he felt this feeling, just 
that it was there. In a third example, JT felt annoyed by his dog’s weight pressing down 
on his stomach; at first he reported that the annoyed feeling was in his head, but then later 
said he w asn’t sure where it was. Eventually it developed that the strongest part o f this 
sensation was a kinesthetic sense in his arms as if  they were throwing the dog off him. 
And in a final example, JW experienced shoek and surprise as her pit bull ripped a toy in 
half. JW  struggled to describe her experience o f shock and surprise, but she was unable to 
say whether the experienee was more eognitive (thought) or emotional (feeling).
Thus we have seen that feelings in our adoleseents were infrequent (oeeurring in 
12 o f  161 samples, or 7% overall), and that when feelings oeeurred, 30% o f the time 
(4/12) they were less differentiated or complete than in adults. M ore than that, however, 
there were 11 samples across subjects where our best understanding was that some kind 
o f emotional processes was ongoing but that our subjeets were not direetly experieneing 
their feelings. The most striking examples o f  this eame when our subjeets were speaking, 
either aloud or innerly, and recognized from their own tone o f  voiee and their manner o f 
speaking that they were in an emotional state. There were nine instanees o f  emotionally 
toned inner speech without corresponding experienced feelings. For example, FM 
lovingly innerly spoke about how cute his eat was, and deseribed the endearing tone o f 
his inner voice, but denied actually feeling loving or endearing or anything at all.
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Similarly, RD angrily spoke about his friend kicking him in his sore knee, reported the 
p issed-off tone and explosive quality o f his voice, but felt nothing at the moment. On 
another occasion RD was about to leave for the movies, excitedly whispering-hissing to 
him self in his head, “I can’t wait!” yet he did not experience any accompanying feeling 
o f excitem ent or anticipation. In one sample AV sadly spoke about her favorite m odel’s 
losing a competition and described the sad, little sound o f her voice— even replicated it 
for us— , but maintained that she didn’t feel sad at the moment. On another occasion, 
when having her blood drawn for the first time ever, AV com manded herself in a rapid, 
high-pitched inner voice, “I ’m not going to cry!” yet reported that she did not feel 
anything (no anxiety/fear/worry— nothing).
This same kind o f  separation between emotional speech and the inner experience 
o f emotion occurred twice in instances o f external speech. RD had jum ped off o f the 
couch and was yelling excitedly at the TV, “C ’mon, pick up that fumble!” He did not, 
however, experience any emotion despite the fact that he had jum ped up and he was 
excitedly yelling. Similarly, AV had found out that one o f her favorite TV characters 
died. She had gone to her room, turned o ff the lights, lay down in her bed, and stared at 
the ceiling while repeating out loud to herself, “I ’m sad. I ’m sad. I ’m sad. I ’m sa d ...” At 
the moment o f  the beep AV was saying the final, “I ’m sad.” Remarkably, despite 
repeatedly articulating her emotional state, she was not actually feeling sad— she 
apparently had no inner emotional experience at that moment.
On four occasions, however, three subjects did report experiencing emotionally 
toned inner speech along with an accompanying emotional experience. For example, JW, 
fe lt  excitement in the form o f butterflies in her stomach while saying to herself, “I ’m
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gonna talk to my boyfriend!” and on another occasion she fe lt  sad in the upper part o f her 
body (waist up and head) while saying to herself, “Ooh, that’s so sad, he d ied ...” JT felt 
sad (in his head) while saying to himself, “This is the last time I ’ll get to wear a Speedo.” 
And finally, RD felt sorry for his friend (when the friend fell and hurt himself) while 
saying, “Aw d ude .. .man, that really sucks.” That observation eliminates the 
interpretation that our subjects simply do not report feelings when they report inner 
speech, or that our interviewing techniques somehow prohibit that kind o f  reporting.
Thus, overall our subjects experienced few feelings ( I2 / I6I  or 7%), and those that 
they did experience were often incomplete experiences. Furthermore, feelings seemed to 
be expressed frequently via inner and outer speech, specifically tone o f  speech— and even 
when the feeling being expressed was not being experienced. Such findings seem to run 
counter to the prevailing view that adolescence is a time o f emotional turbulence and 
lability. One possible understanding o f  our observations is that it may be easier for 
youngsters to (a) engage in emotional behavior and (b) recognize/interpret emotion in 
others than it is to (c) experience one’s own emotion directly. As a result, the experience 
o f emotion may appear developmentally later, perhaps acquired somewhere around 
adolescence. This potential understanding is quite different from the common view that 
the development o f the understanding o f  the feelings o f  others comes later than the 
development o f one’s own feelings (Saami, Campos, Camras, & W itherington, 2006).
O f course, our sample size is small and non-random, so all o f  our conclusions must be 
viewed cautiously; however, we propose that this kind o f  understanding may make the 
careful observation o f  lived phenom ena worthwhile.
1 4 1
Here is the (rough, speeulative) iogie of this theory: (a) Emotional behavior is 
innate: infants ery when hungry or in pain, and this suggests that one does not need to 
have a elear inner experience o f emotion to engage in a behavior that can be called 
emotional. The (b) third-person skill o f observing/reeognizing/interpreting emotional 
expression in others is taught directly by the verbal community early in development. 
When Mom appears in a certain way and says, “I love you,” the child leams to match her 
smiling face and warm body language with her words. On other occasions, when M om ’s 
eyebrows furrow, and ber arms cross wbile she snaps, “I ’m angry at you,” the very young 
child leams to match this different emotional expression with these different words. Thus 
the child leams to recognize and interpret signs o f emotion in others by watching facial 
configuration and body language and by listening to vocal eharacteristies. However, our 
proposed theory asserts that the child receives little, if  any at all, direct training o f  (c) the 
first-person skill o f  recognizing emotion in himself/herself. Yet that skill is actually quite 
complicated, perhaps involving the recognition that this feature o f  my heart rate goes 
along with that feature o f my skin sensitivity goes along with that other feature o f my 
muscle tension goes along with yet that other feature o f my visual perception and so on. 
These are disparate microprocesses, represented quite separately in different regions o f 
the body and the brain. Eventually, that pattem  recognition becom es second nature, and 
the healthy adult recognizes his or her own angry feelings directly. That recognition thus 
is a skill that has to be acquired somewhere between infancy and adulthood; the 
developing child/adolescent has to figure out, on his or her own, with no help from 
outsiders, that this skin temperature recognition is associated with anger while that 
stomach gurgle is not. Furthermore, that developmental acquisition has to be made
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despite suppresions or interference with the nascent skill o f emotion recognition: “D on’t 
use that tone with m e!”
I f  this is indeed how emotional development works, or at least one way that it can 
develop, children/adolescents may learn the first-person recognition o f their own 
emotional states by observing their own behavior in the same third-person way as they 
would observe the behavior o f others. For example, when RD angrily spoke about his 
friend kicking him in his sore knee, he discovered he was angry hy observing in a third- 
person way the angry tone o f  his voice, much as he would have observed the angry tone 
o f his father’s (or any other external person’s) voice, not by recognizing the first-person  
experience o f  his own feelings. Eventually (i.e., some number o f  years in the making) 
R D ’s pattem  recognition abilities may enable him to integrate the features o f his own 
voice along with his heart rate m onitor (whatever that is), his muscle tension 
proprioceptors, etc., and he will become quickly, clearly, and confidently able to first- 
person recognize anger and other emotions when they occur. But perhaps that has not yet 
happened for him at age 13.
This understanding also affords one interpretation o f A V ’s lying in bed after 
discovering her TV character had died and saying repeatedly out loud to herself, “I ’m 
sad, I ’m sad, I ’m sad, I ’m sad ...” On this understanding, AY was stating a fact (I am  sad) 
and not stating a feeling (I fe e l  sad). This is different from experiencing feeling as a 
mental event; here AV is not mentally experiencing a feeling, she is experiencing inner 
speech in abstract reference to a feeling. On this understanding, she is saying I am sad 
precisely because she does not feel sad: this is a glimpse into emotional skill building as 
it takes place in the instant. Thus her simple “I ’m sad” actually may mean something like:
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“I am sad as a fact o f the universe. I have observed that when m y parents say they are sad 
they seem to be referring to something inside them. W hat is going on with me that I 
should recognize as part o f this sadness thing? Is it the itch in my shoulder— no, 
yesterday when I was sad my shoulder d idn’t itch. Is it the teary eyes? Yeah! That seems 
likely.” O f course that stylized version is much more scienee-like than actually was 
occurring. In reality it is emotional play, the learning how to coordinate emotional 
observation, expression, and feeling, much like the stacking o f blocks leads to fine motor 
coordination.
O f course emotional development may proceed along different pathways than the 
one suggested here. However, our findings confidently suggest that the nature o f 
emotional experience in adolescents may be much different from emotional experience in 
adults; speeifieally, adolescents may be in the process o f  developing the capacity to 
experience emotions directly while adults have already mastered that capacity.
Inner Seeing
Inner seeing (informally known as seeing images) was the least frequently 
occurring form o f inner experience across subjects. It occurred in six o f 161 samples 
(4%) and only three subjects experienced images. This is a substantially lower frequency 
than the 34% found in adults in Heavey and Hurlburt (in press) and the 26% in 
adolescents reported by Monson (1987). JT experienced inner seeing in three o f his 22 
samples (14%), while FM experienced it in two o f his 29 samples (7%). BC reported a 
single instance o f inner seeing across her 19 samples (5%), although this instance may 
not have occurred strictly at the moment o f the beep.
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Despite the low frequency o f inner seeing across our subjects, those that were 
reported represented a range o f ways to experience inner seeing. O f the three subjects 
who experienced inner seeing, JT ’s experiences were the most elaborate. In his first 
instance o f inner seeing JT had an image o f his dad, looking angry while mouthing 
something like, clean up your room and don’t make me ask you again. His second 
instance was by far the most complex as it involved him seeing in his mind three screens 
at right angles to one another. Each screen depicted a different scene relating to poverty 
and death, eirea the time o f Oliver Twist. JT experienced him self as being surrounded by 
these three screens, facing one directly while another was on his right side and the other 
was on his left side. JT ’s third and final inner seeing was o f his digital clock registering 
the numbers “5:30” in red light. In his inner seeing, JT was turning his head to the right 
so that he would see his digital clock. FM experienced one very detailed moving image o f 
his teacher’s ear accident as she was describing it to the class. He pictured a white ear 
stopped at a stoplight and a van coming up from behind, just about to hit the ear. F M ’s 
other inner seeing experience was o f seeing the word “eat” spelled out in bright orange 
lower case letters. The inner seeing o f letters and words is an infrequent oeeurrenee even 
in adult subjects. E C ’s inner seeing involved her picturing herself standing on a 
basketball court with the ball in her hands. Her brother was behind her, frustratedly 
gesturing because BC had won their one-on-one game. Though E C ’s image occurred just 
after the beep, we report it here, as it is noteworthy that our subject with scant inner 
experience was able to produce, identify, and describe an image at all.
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Both M onson (1987) and Hurlburt (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006) reported on 
adolescent subjects who were “slow-image-builders.” For example, M onson described 
one o f her subject’s incomplete images:
[Wendy] was reading the book Five Little Peppers about a little girl who got a 
nail stuck through her foot just behind the toes. W endy had just put the book 
down when the beep occurred. An image was present in her imagination at that 
moment, and was black and white and dark and fuzzy, a little out o f  focus. The 
image was o f  a foot, side view, with a dark spot on it ju s t above the toes. The foot 
was located a bit above W endy’s eyes so that she had to look up to see it; Wendy 
did not notice the ankle or leg. She was o f  the opinion that this image was in the 
process o f  form ing  (italics added); that if  the beep had not interrupted her, this 
image would have become clear and in color. Furtherm ore, the dark spot on the 
foot in the Image would likely have become the nail that stuck through the foot in 
the story. (M onson, 1987, p .88)
Although there were no samples involving slow-image-building discovered in the present 
study, there were instances o f movement and change in one o f  our subject’s inner 
experience. RD experienced his inner speech and unsymbolized thoughts to “come up” or 
“pass through” his head, changing density and sometimes even meaning, along the way. 
These samples appeared similar to W endy’s image-building samples in that both reflect 
in-process forms o f  inner experience.
Taken together, the low frequency o f  inner seeing in our subjects, the much 
higher frequency in adults, and the slow-image-forming found in M onson (1987) and 
H urlburt (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006), leads to a speculation about inner seeing that is
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similar to that for feelings discussed above: Inner seeing (“image m aking”) is a skill that, 
like the experience o f feelings, may need to be acquired gradually over a long period o f 
time. It seems quite possible that many if  not most people do not develop facility in the 
quick creating o f inner seeings until relatively late in adolescence. This speculation is 
based on very few subjects and therefore needs much additional investigation, but if  true, 
it would be (like the observation o f  the development o f feelings) an important 
contribution to the understanding o f human development.
Summary
Three-quarters o f  all samples across subjects ( I2 I / I6 I  or 76%) involved at least 
one o f  the five main eharacteristies o f  inner experience. Thus our adolescent subjects did 
experience the five main eharacteristies found in adults, although with somewhat 
different frequencies. While adults experience each o f  the main five characteristics, on 
average, 25% o f the time, our six adolescent subjects experienced inner speech 27% of 
the time, sensory awareness 21% o f the time, unsymbolized thinking 16% o f the time, 
feelings 7% o f  the time, and images 4% o f the time. This suggests that inner speech and 
sensory awareness may be among the first phenomena o f  inner experience to develop and 
mature, while unsymbolized thinking, feelings, and inner seeing may take longer to 
develop. Furthermore, the low frequency o f feelings and the underdeveloped quality o f 
30% o f the feeling experiences strongly suggests that emotions are among the more 
complex forms o f  inner experiences to master. Likewise, the low frequency o f  images 
found in our sample, combined with H urlburt’s (2006) and M onson’s (1987) observations 
o f slow-image building in adolescents, suggests that images, too, may be among the more 
complex inner experience skills to acquire. Thus although adolescents can and do
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experience the five main eharacteristies, there seem to be substantial differences in the 
maturity o f these experiences.
Other Frequently Occurring Characteristics 
In addition to experiencing the five main eharacteristies o f inner experience, our 
six adolescent subjects also frequently experienced perceptual awareness (23%) and just 
doing (22%) when sampled.
Perceptual awareness is not a main category o f inner experience, nor a well- 
established category o f  inner experience, and therefore it is not cited in many previous 
DES publications and manuals. The inner experience o f  perceptual awareness is the 
noticing o f perceptual stimuli as a function o f  whatever a subject is doing at the sampled 
moment. Perceptual awareness is similar to sensory awareness in that it involves noticing 
eharacteristies o f  internal or external stimuli, but unlike sensory awareness, perceptual 
awareness does not involve being engrossed in/drawn to/taken in by the sensory 
eharacteristies themselves. Instead, perceptual awareness is the experience o f consciously 
perceiving things as a natural function o f  being/living/doing/acting in the world. For 
example, at the moment o f the beep I may be noticing the red stop sign in conjunction 
with my slowing down to stop at the intersection; although the red sign is a specific part 
o f  my inner experience, I am not engrossed in the redness only for the sake o f the 
redness, as I would be if  I were experiencing sensory awareness.
However, perceptual awareness also is different from the experience o f just doing 
(results discussed below). In just doing a subject is simply being/living/doing/aeting 
without any separate sensory-perceptual awarenesses or other forms o f  inner experience.
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For example, at the moment o f  the beep my inner experience is o f  ju st driving the car. It 
may be objectively true that I am looking at the red stop sign and slowing down at the 
intersection, but those things are not distinctly or separately in my experience at that 
moment. Also, I am not having another form o f inner experience such as an inner speech 
or an unsym bolized thought. Instead, my inner experience is o f  just driving. In contrast to 
perceptual awareness, just doing is a well-established and frequently cited category o f 
inner experience.
In the two subsections that follow, we discuss our perceptual awareness and just 
doing results across subjects.
Perceptual Awareness
Perceptual awareness was the second most frequently occurring characteristic 
found across subjects (that is, it was second in frequency after inner speech). It occurred 
in 37 o f  161 samples, or 23% o f the time. Neither Heavey and Hurlburt (in press) nor 
M onson (1987) reported instances o f perceptual awareness. A lthough perceptual 
awareness was not the dominant characteristic in any subject’s inner experience, all six 
subjects experienced perceptual awareness while sampling. It occurred frequently for JT 
(10/22 or 45%) and RD (12/35 or 35%), fairly frequently for AV (5/25 or 20%) and JW 
(5/32 or 16%), and sometimes for FM (3/29 or 10%) and BC (2/19 or 11%).
JT experienced perceptual awareness when he heard the metal latch scrape across 
the strike plate o f  the bathroom door. At that moment he was listening for this sound in 
order to know that the door had closed completely. Thus he was perceptually aware o f  the 
sound, not engrossed in any characteristic o f it, but not oblivious to it either. Similarly, 
FM experienced perceptual awareness when wiping o ff a Pirates o f  the Caribbean DVD.
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At the beep, he was noticing a half-wiped away fingerprint on the DVD. FM was 
perceptually aware o f the fingerprint as part o f his overall effort to get the disk to work—  
but he was not engrossed in a particular quality or characteristic o f the fingerprint itself 
(like the smudgedness or the pattern o f the fingerprint— that would have been sensory 
awareness). Other examples o f  perceptual awareness included RD noticing a pretty girl 
walk by while commenting on her “hotness,” AV looking at a small bite o f pancakes on 
the tip o f  her fork while eating breakfast; JW noticing the spots on her puppy’s nose and 
head as the puppy ran toward her.
As perceptual awareness is not a well-established category o f  inner experience, it 
is hard to determine whether the 23% frequency we found across our subjects is typical 
o f adults as well, or if  perceptual awareness occurs with greater frequency during 
adolescence for some developmentally relevant reason. It is possible that perceptual 
awareness is related to the process o f developing mature inner experience. One 
hypothesis is that perceptual awareness is actually a nascent form o f sensory awareness; 
that is, an adult JW would have been engrossed in the brownness o f  the spots on her 
puppy’s head but the adolescent JW only perceptually notices the spots because her 
sensory awareness apparatus is not yet fully mature. Another perhaps more likely 
hypothesis is that the phenomenon o f perceptual awareness actually represents a failure to 
destroy background inner experience in order to focus on a singular foreground inner 
experience. The samples themselves seem to support this second hypothesis: thirty-two of 
the 37 total instances o f perceptual awareness across our subjects (86%) co-oeeurred with 
other forms o f inner experience at the moment o f the beep. This suggests that the inner 
experience o f perceptual awareness in adolescents reveals a developmental phase in
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which background awareness bleeds through into foreground awareness. This theory is 
discussed further in the section below on variations in the complexity o f  inner experience.
Just D oing
As mentioned above, just doing is an established DES category o f inner 
experience defined as “being engaged in some activity but with no awareness o f thinking 
about it, and no other aspect o f inner experience is in awareness” (Hurlburt & Heavey, 
2000). In the present study our subjects were just doing in 36 o f 161 samples, or 22% of 
the time. Thus just doing was the third most frequently oeeurring inner experienee aeross 
subjects (that is, it was third in overall frequency after inner speech and perceptual 
awareness). M onson (1987) discovered a similar overall frequency o f 21% aeross her 
adolescent subjects, however Heavey and Hurlburt (in press) reported an overall 
frequency o f  only 2% aeross their adult subjects. Thus just doing appear to occur more 
frequently in adolescents than in adults.
In the present study, four out o f six subjects (BC, JW, AV, and FM ) experienced 
just doing, and two (RD and JT) did not. Just doing was the dominant inner experienee 
aeross B C ’s samples (I I / I9 or 58%) and JW ’s samples (17/32 or 53%), and it occurred 
less frequently across A V ’s samples (6/25 or 24%) and infrequently aeross FM ’s samples 
(2/29 or 7%). We note that our female subjects reported just doing more frequently than 
our male subjects (34 to 2).
In a sample that illustrates just doing, JW was in the process o f  walking out o f the 
front door o f  her apartment. Her hand was on the doorknob, but she was not aware o f 
anything at that moment— she was just walking out the door. Similarly, in a just doing 
sample, AV was logging on to Milberry.com. She was pressing the letter “A ” while
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looking at the keyboard but she was not aware o f anything else at that moment. In 
another instance o f just doing, BC was scrubbing the part o f the kitchen counter next to 
the stove. It was a fact o f the universe that she was scrubbing the counter hard, but she 
was not explicitly aware o f that or anything else at the moment. In a final example o f just 
doing, FM was unwrapping a package o f  cheese to make a quesadilla, but he was not 
explicitly aware o f any thematic thing.
Our finding that adolescents are just doing 22% o f the time (in Monson, 21%) 
may help explain why when parents ask an adolescent what they’re doing, the recurrent 
answer is, “Oh, nothing.” Adolescents are often criticized (sometimes harshly) for their 
apparent doing nothing (think o f the prototypical mom yelling at her son to be useful 
once and a while). But what if  the adolescent’s supposed doing nothing actually reflects 
an inner experience o f just doing? How is an adolescent supposed to explain that he 
spends a fifth o f his time in an inner experiential state o f  just doing? And how is he 
supposed to explain that to an adult, who, according to Heavey and Hurlburt only 
experiences just doing 2% o f the time? Thus when criticized for saying, “Oh, nothing” 
the adolescent is perhaps put in a position o f having to defend him self for being in a 
developmental phase, something he doesn’t even know about himself. This finding may 
shed at least a small beam o f light into the giant chasm in communication between teens 
and their parents. M aybe teens’ and parents’ inner experiences are fundamentally 
different enough from each other that each feels that talking to the other is like talking to 
a Martian. (How many times have parents heard teenagers scream, “How could yow 
possibly understand m el)
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Less Frequently Occurring Characteristics
Ten other characteristics o f inner experience emerged across subjects in the 
present study. Eight o f these characteristics occurred in single subjects only and were 
discussed in the idiographic chapters; those characteristics are feeling fact o f body 
(JW=3), incipient inner experience (BC=1), inner hearing (JT=1), listening process 
(FM=3), no inner experience (BC=3), open (RD=2), reading process (JW=1), and worded 
thinking (FM=1). Flowever, two o f these characteristics (meta-awareness and speaking 
aloud to self) occurred in more than one subject, and thus are addressed here. 
M eta-Awareness
M eta-awareness occurred in three o f 161 samples (2%), and only in two subjects 
(FM and RD). Neither Fleavey and Flurlburt (in press) nor M onson (1987) reported any 
instances o f  meta-awareness in their subjects’ inner experience, so we are unable to make 
comparisons o f  meta-awareness frequency aeross studies. However, meta-awareness is 
known to occur in some adult subjects, as described by Hurlburt and Heavey (2000; 
2006). RD experienced meta-awareness twice in his 34 samples (6%). The first instance 
occurred while he was looking at his friend’s moon sand, and at the same time he was 
aware o f him self looking at the moon sand. R D ’s second experience o f  meta-awareness 
occurred while watching an Eagles game on TV. He was saying to him self in his head, 
“C ’mon, the Eagles have to win,” but most o f his awareness was focused on him self 
watching the game; that is, at the moment o f the beep he was m eta-aware o f  him self 
watching the game. Similarly, FM experienced meta-awareness when the headphone fell 
out o f his ear and he was catching it. At that mom ent (which, incidentally, was also the 
moment o f  the beep), FM was thinking about him self catching the headphone while
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actually catching it. Although this may have been a case o f induced-by-the-beep meta­
awareness (there was a lot happening related to sampling at the moment o f  the beep, 
which may have facilitated FM to meta-think about his experience), it illustrates that at 
least some adolescents, like adults, have the capacity for meta-awareness.
Speaking A loud to S e lf
Speaking aloud to self occurred in three o f all 161 samples (2%) across subjects. 
Although Flurlburt and Fleavey (2000) acknowledge the phenomenon o f  speaking aloud 
to oneself, they did not find any instances in their study o f young adults (Fleavey and 
Hurlburt, in press). M onson (1987) did not report instances o f  this phenomenon either. 
Three subjects experienced this phenomenon once each. The first example o f  this 
occurred in one o f FM ’s samples (1/29 or 3%). He spoke aloud to him self in a lowered, 
breathless tone, saying “1 need to go talk to my mom .” At the same time he was feeling 
sad. The second example occurred in A V ’s experience (1/25 or 4%). One o f  A V ’s 
favorite characters on a TV show had died. She turned off the TV, went into her room, 
turned o ff the lights, and lay down in her bed. She stared at the ceiling while repeating 
out loud to herself, “Fm  sad. I ’m sad. I ’m sad. I ’m sad .. .” At the moment o f  the beep AV 
was saying the final, “I ’m sad.” Although AV was not feeling sad at the moment o f  the 
beep, her speech itse lf was about feeling. The third and final example o f speaking out 
loud to self occurred in one o f JT ’s samples (1/22 or 5%). In this instance JT was 
thinking about what he should watch next on TV. At the same time, he was saying to 
him self out loud, “That movie is going to be over soon.” In this example, there was no 
feeling experience or implied emotion; JT ’s speaking out loud to h im self was in a matter 
o f  fact tone. One possible explanation for the phenomenon o f  speaking out loud to
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oneself in adolescence may be that it is actually a nascent form o f inner speech. Clearly 
the speech is private, meant for self only, much like inner speech is.
Variations in Complexity o f  Inner Experience  
This section o f  this results-across-subjects chapter presents differences in the 
complexity o f our subjects’ inner experience. W e measured complexity o f  inner 
experience as the average number o f characteristics experienced per sample. As shown in 
Table 7, 161 total samples o f  inner experience were collected aeross subjects. However, 
as it is possible for more than one characteristic to occur in any one sample o f inner 
experience, the total characteristics count for each subject not always is equal to the total 
number o f  samples collected. In the present study, 177 eharacteristies o f inner experience 
occurred aeross 161 samples. (The calculation o f  177 characteristics aeross subjects 
excludes the categories o f  just doing and no inner experienee, as these do not constitute 
apparent and present characteristics o f inner experience.) The following two samples 
illustrate the difference between a single characteristic sample and a complex sample in 
which three characteristics occurred at the moment o f the beep:
AV Beep 5.4; AV is eating breakfast before going to school. At the moment o f 
the beep she is looking at a bite o f pancakes on her fork, getting ready to eat the 
bite. She is not interested in any particular characteristic o f  the bite o f  pancakes; 
instead she is simply looking at it on the way to eating it. (Coding: Perceptual 
Awareness)
JT Beep 3.3: JT is thinking about the end o f  swim season sort o f  retrospectively. 
At the moment o f  the beep he is saying to himself, “Tomorrow is the last time I ’ll
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get to w ear a Speedo.” At the same time, JT feels sad, and the sadness is in his 
head. The sadness is about swim season ending and JT experiences it as a separate 
aceompanying phenomenon to his thought. Additionally, at the moment o f  this 
beep, a good deal (50%) o f JT ’s awareness is on noticing the messiness o f his 
room. He sees the mess o f  everything in his room at once and he cannot see the 
floor for all the stuff on it. However, JT is not noticing anything in particular, nor 
explicitly thinking anything about the messiness at the moment. (Coding; Inner 
Speech; Feeling; Perceptual Awareness)
Thus we see that among subjeets there were differenees in the eomplexity o f inner 
experience samples. To describe the relative complexity o f each subject’s inner 
experienee, we calculated a characteristie-per-sample (cps) statistic by dividing the 
number o f  eharacteristies (177) by the number o f samples (161) to arrive at an average 
complexity rating o f  1.10 aeross subjects, as shown in the bottom right-hand com er o f 
Table 7. Although this eps statistic has not been referred to in previous DES literature, we 
introduce it here so that we have a grounded way to discuss differenees in the complexity 
o f inner experienee aeross our subjeets. We then calculated a eharaeteristie-per-sample 
statistic for each individual subject by dividing the number o f eharacteristies reported by 
each subject by that subject’s total number o f samples, as shown in the last row o f Table 
7. There are two ways that these cps statistics can be calculated; we illustrate using JT as 
an example (see the third-from-right column o f Table 7). As the table shows, JT had 15 
samples in which sensory awareness occurred. But in 7 o f  those 15 samples, there were 
multiple instances o f sensory awareness (for example, in beep 3.5, there were three 
separate sensory awarenesses: the sensation o f  his right eye burning, his absorption in the
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blue color o f  the wall, and his interest in the stucco texture o f the wall. The question 
becomes, should the numerator o f the cps statistic count the number o f occasions in 
which sensory awareness occurred (in which case, beep 3.5 counts as one occasion) or 
the number o f instances o f sensory awareness (in which case, Beep 3.5 counts as three 
instances). Arguments can be made for both ways, so the last two rows o f Table 7 present 
both ways o f  counting, putting computations based on the number o f  instances in 
parentheses. Thus JT ’s total number o f characteristics based on the 15 occasions that 
sensory awareness occurred is 44, resulting in a cps o f  44/22 = 2.00. However, JT ’s total 
number o f characteristics based on the 23 instances o f  sensory awareness and the nine 
instances o f  unsymbolized thinking (instead o f  the eight occasions in which 
unsymbolized thinking occurred) is 53, resulting in a cps o f  53/22 = 2.41. As the last row 
o f Table 7 shows, these two different ways o f  counting give approximately the same 
results: JT is the only subject where the two ways provide substantially different results, 
and by either measure, JT has easily the most complex inner experience. Therefore, in 
what follows we will use the occasion (non-parenthesized) method o f computing cps.
As discussed above, the average eps aeross subjeets was calculated to be 177/161 
= 1.10; that is, for every sample o f  inner experience, there were an average o f  1.10 
characteristics reported (excluding just doing and no inner experienee). Three subjects 
(JT, RT), and FM) exceeded this average. JT had the most complex inner experience 
among subjects, with a cps o f  2.00 (44 characteristics/22 samples). Twenty o f his 22 
samples (90%) featured more than one eharaeteristie. RD had the second most complex 
inner experience among subjeets, with a cps rating o f  1.53 (52/34). Twenty-two o f  his 34 
samples (65%) featured more than one characteristic. FM had the third most complex
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inner experience among subjects, with a cps rating o f 1.31 (38/29). Sixteen o f  his 29 
samples (55%) featured more than one characteristic. All three subjects who exceeded the 
cps average across subjects were male.
Each o f  the three female subjects in this study (AV, JW , and BC) had a 
characteristic-per-sample average less than the average across subjects (1.10) and less 
than one characteristic-per-sample (1.00). A V ’s cps was calculated to be .72 (18/25).
Only one o f her 25 samples (4%) featured multiple characteristics. JW  had a cps rating o f 
.63 (20/32) and five o f  her 32 samples (16%) featured multiple characteristics. And 
finally, BC had cps o f .26, which was the lowest among all subjects. She did not have a 
single sample in which she experienced multiple characteristics.
One possible explanation for finding greater complexity o f  inner experience in 
some subjeets, for instance JT, is that highly complex inner experience in adolescence 
suggests a failure to organize perceptual stimuli. That is, an overabundance o f  inner 
experienee might reflect a developmental stage in which one cannot yet achieve clear and 
singular inner experienee. Eiurlburt (Personal communication, 2007) drew on Fritz Peris’ 
Gestalt Therapy theory (Peris et al., 1951) to better understand JT ’s complex inner 
experience. Peris (Peris et al., 1951) was o f the opinion that healthy people create clear, 
differentiated, vivid figures (or Gestalten) out o f the undifferentiated general perceptual 
world. That process, Peris held, is both constructive and destructive. It is constructive 
because no Gestalt exists in nature; a Gestalt is the result o f  a person’s construction 
superimposed on natural bits o f  sensation. For example, consider the well known 
faees/vase ambiguous figure. It is not the case that the face and the vase exist on the 
paper; instead, bits o f  black ink and white patches exist. The viewer constructs now the
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faces, now the vase out o f  the raw material o f the ink bits and paper patches. The healthy 
process is also destructive in the sense that when one now constructs the vase, one must 
destroy the faces that one had been seeing.
For Peris, psychological health is thus the continual, fairly rapid (every second or 
so) destruction o f the past and the creation o f  a present clear, vivid. Gestalt. From that 
point o f  view, a healthy person selects one thing or cluster o f things out o f the welter o f 
available stimuli and makes that thing or cluster o f things her figure or Gestalt (Peris (and 
Flurlburt) use the terms figure and Gestalt interchangeably). That thing might be an inner 
speaking, or an image, or a visual perception, whatever. And it may be an organization o f 
disparate things, such as the smelling o f  the aroma and the simultaneous imaging o f  a 
barbecue. But healthy Gestalten are clear and vivid, and the healthy Gestalt-building 
process destroys the competing Gestalt opportunities that exist in the welter.
From that point o f  view, JT ’s inner experience (at beep 5.3) o f simultaneous 
burning in the back o f  his legs, thinking to him self that he should move his legs, hearing 
the pretzel crunch as he bites into it, and hearing droning o f the TV in the background is 
an example o f an incompletely formed Gestalt. A healthy adult would construct a Gestalt 
o f the painful burning sensation, perhaps along with the thought o f  moving his legs. The 
crunch o f  the pretzel would be destroyed into the ground, as would the undifferentiated 
noise coming from the TV. Perhaps a second later, that healthy adult would create a 
Gestalt that consisted o f  the pretzel crunch/taste, which would entail the total destruction 
o f the leg-burning experience. Then in the next second, the TV sound might become the 
Gestalt, entailing the destruction o f  the pretzel crunch/taste. Then in the next second, the 
pain in the legs might return, entailing the destruction o f  the TV sound. And so on.
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Our observations o f JT ’s pattern o f inner experience are, lightly held, consistent 
with the view that Gestalten may be much slower to form in adolescents than they are in 
adults. Peris took for granted the almost instantaneous creation o f  Gestalten, but that may 
be an adultomorphie point o f view. I f  one accepts the possibility that children/adolescents 
have to learn to create Gestalten, then that makes it seem quite reasonable that they have 
to learn to coordinate the constructive/destructive elements o f  that skill. That makes it 
reasonable that JT ’s leg-buming/thinking/pretzel-eruneh/TV-hearing is the result o f  his 
not-yet-skillful destruction o f the pretzel and the TV aspects o f  the welter o f his 
experienee. Assuming he is healthy, which he appeared to be, he will leam  to perform 
that constructive/destructive skill faster and more completely, although it may take him a 
few more years o f  practice to become rapidly skilled at it, as is the healthy adult.
On the other end o f the spectrum from JT ’s possible failure to organize an 
overabundance o f  inner experience, a paucity o f  inner experience suggests a different 
type o f  immaturity in inner experience. BC, for example, apparently had very little inner 
experienee at all: only five o f her 19 samples involved salient characteristics o f inner 
experienee, and she never experienced more than one characteristic o f inner experience at 
a time. Her cps o f  .26 thus may reflect a profound lack o f inner experienee overall. 
Clearly BC had the ability to identify and articulate her inner experience when it was 
there— in fact, she did so with enthusiasm and specificity when discussing her sensory 
awareness experienee o f  Halle Berry’s accent in one o f  her samples. That BC enjoyed 
discussing her experience o f Berry’s accent far more than repeatedly reporting “nothing” 
in her inner experienee strongly suggests that her reports o f no inner experienee were 
accurate. Why else would an 11-year-old choose to take the harder/duller road o f
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reporting “nothing”? W e feel confident that if BC had had other inner experiences to 
report to us, she gladly would have.
Thus we speculate that B C ’s lack o f  inner experience reflects her early stage o f 
development with regard to inner experience. Furthermore, although she experienced it in 
only one sample, BC was the only subject to have an incipient inner experience. In that 
instance she was sure that something was in her inner experience but she had no idea 
what it was; something coalesced enough for her to recognize its presence, but her skills 
were not yet developed enough to form the experience into something recognizable or 
describable. Perhaps in a year or two her inner experience capacities will have matured 
enough to produce identifiable characteristics.
JT and BC can be viewed as working on different developmental challenges with 
regard to inner experience. BC is just learning to have inner experience while JT has 
mastered the capacity to have several forms o f inner experience (including the five main 
forms), yet his current challenge seems to be to figure out how to have clear and singular 
inner experience, to focus on the figure and allow the ground to fall away.
Nascent Inner Experience 
Based on our adolescent subjects’ samples o f  inner experience, we have 
speculated that the experiences o f  feelings and o f  inner seeing are skills just beginning to 
be acquired in adolescence. As a way o f  focusing on those nascent skills, let us examine 
the work o f  the Flavells (1995), who, more than any other researchers, have explored the 
thinking o f  children. They find in their studies that kids o f age 5 or 6 consistently report 
having no thinking, but they assert that their young subjects report no thinking because
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they lack the attention/cognitive capacities/language skills necessary to be able to 
describe their thoughts. Thus the Flavells do not believe their child subjects’ reports o f no 
thinking. Instead they construct a theory to explain why the kids aren’t telling the truth. 
This theory is based on a presupposition: It can’t possibly be true that kids don’t 
experience thinking— everyone experiences thinking!
However, Hurlburt (in Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007) proposed the possibility 
that the kids that participate in Flavell’s studies are accurately describing their inner 
experience: that they in fact did not experience themselves as thinking, even in situations 
where most if  not all adults would experience thinking.
In a typical Flavell experiment, the child is seated on a carpet and the 
experimenter says:
I ’m going to ask you a question, but I don’t want you to say the answer out loud. 
Keep the answer a secret, OK? M ost people in the world have toothbrushes in 
their houses. They put their toothbrushes in a special room. Now don’t say 
anything out loud. Keep it a secret. Which room in your house has your 
toothbrush in it? (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1995, p. 57).
The child is then moved to a table and asked if  she had been thinking while seated 
on the carpet, and if  so, about what. Adults and older children typically say they were 
thinking— saying “bathroom” to themselves or seeing an image o f  their bathroom. 
However, the majority o f 5-year-olds deny they were thinking. Flavell and his colleagues 
conclude that, “children lack the disposition and the ability to introspect. Lacking 
introspective skills, they would be unlikely spontaneously to notice and reflect on their
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own mental experiences and, consequently, unlikely to attribute such experiences to 
others” (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1995, p. 52).
Hurlburt (in Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007) disagreed with this interpretation, 
reasoning that inner experience (including thinking, feeling, and so on) does not 
automatically occur when a person is bom. Like other basic skills and capacities, for 
instance walking or talking, he asserted that perhaps children leam, gradually over time, 
how to experience (how to experience thinking, how to experience feeling); that the 
ability to have differentiated inner experience may be the end result o f  a developmental 
process that begins at birth and stretches into young adulthood. Thus it is reasonable to 
interpret that the Flavells, with painstaking care, have demonstrated precisely the absence 
o f thinking in young children. That is diametrically counter to the FlavelFs interpretation, 
the result, perhaps, o f the Flavells’ failure to bracket presuppositions about inner 
experience (Hurlburt, in Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007).
Hurlburt further suggested that if  inner experience is built via slow skill 
acquisition with practice over time, this process may occur in fits and starts, contingent 
on other ongoing developmental processes (such as cognitive development) and 
environmental opportunity. On this view, it would make sense that (a) young children 
may not have inner experience at all; and that (b) as youngsters begin acquiring the skills 
necessary for inner experience, the inner experience they do have may not be full-formed, 
and thus may be quite different from adult inner experienee. The present study was 
designed to explore these issues, specifically targeting young adolescents to try to “catch” 
inner experienee in the middle o f  this proposed developmental process.
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The results o f  this study lend support to Hurlburt’s assertions. We observed that 
among the five main characteristics, feelings and images occurred in much lower 
frequencies than they occur in adults. O f the feelings that did occur across our adolescent 
subjects, one-third o f  these were remarkably underdeveloped. Instead, we found that our 
subjects most often came to know their feelings through the tone and content o f their own 
inner and outer speech rather than through direct experience o f emotion. This suggests 
that feelings are complex forms o f inner experience that require skill building over time, 
and that young adolescents appear to be smack in the midst o f  that feeling acquisition 
process. Similarly, Hurlburt (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006) and M onson (1987) both 
observed slow-image-building in their adolescent subjects. Those findings, combined 
with the low frequency o f inner seeing among subjects in the present study suggests that 
inner seeing is also a complex form o f inner experience that develops over time with 
practice. In contrast, inner speech, sensory awareness, and unsymbolized thinking were 
found to occur with similar frequencies as found in adults. Thus these forms o f  inner 
experience may develop and mature earlier on, perhaps in late childhood; future DES 
research with younger subjects is needed to bear this out.
In addition to our findings on the five main eharacteristies, we also observed that 
perceptual awareness and just doing occurred with far greater frequency than found in 
adults. This suggests that young adolescents spend many moments not generating inner 
experienee; that is their organisms are not presenting or selecting or coalescing abstract 
or symbolic or complex forms o f  inner experienee. The prevalence o f  perceptual 
awareness and just doing in our subjects’ samples suggests that young adolescents are 
ju st living/being/doing a good deal more o f the time than adults.
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Finally, we observed differences in the overall prevalence and complexity o f  inner 
experience in our subjects. One o f our subjects, BC, had very little inner experience at all, 
which suggests that she is in the process o f developing her basic capacities for inner 
experience. Our subject with a great deal o f inner experience, JT, also appeared to be in 
the process o f  developing his inner experience skills. Unlike B C ’s challenge to develop 
inner experience, JT ’s developmental task appeared to be focusing on one dominant form 
o f inner experience while allowing background interference to fall away. Both cases 
reveal young adolescents in the midst o f  inner experience developmental processes, 
lending strong support to H urlburt’s views.
Study Limitations and Suggestions fo r  Future Research 
Because DES studies are time and labor intensive, the sample size was small 
(7V=6). To apply the DES method thoroughly, as described in the M ethods section 
(Chapter 3), approximately 50 hours were devoted to “running” each subject 
(coordinating meeting logistics and transportation, introducing the method, training the 
subject, expositional interviews, digitizing the interviews, several iterations o f writing 
narrative descriptions o f  each sample, coding the samples where appropriate, several 
iterations o f writing idiographic narrative descriptions o f  each subject’s inner experience, 
considering all samples across all subjects, several iterations o f  writing a narrative 
description o f  the salient characteristics across all subjects). Furtherm ore, two 
investigators worked on all aspects o f the process. Future studies m ight be streamlined by 
conducting on-site investigations in settings where there is access to several adolescents 
at one time, for example in schools, camps, mental-health facilities, juvenile detention
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facilities. This might allow investigators to sample with more adolescents in a shorter 
period o f time.
Another limitation o f this study related to the small sample size is that statistically 
significant conclusions cannot be drawn from the data. Because the proper data o f this 
study are the samples o f  inner experience, these data cannot be reduced to mere numbers 
and analyzed accordingly. The closest we came to statistical analysis was our coding o f 
the samples for salient characteristics and then taking frequency counts o f  those salient 
charaeteristies. To conduct tests o f statistical significance, larger samples o f adolescent 
subjects are needed. However, even with larger sample sizes yielding more samples o f 
inner experienee, any statistical analysis would be o f codings only as the actual 
experiences themselves cannot be reduced to numbers.
A third limitation o f the present study is that the data were not correlated with any 
extant standardized psychological measures. Although statistical correlations would have 
been impossible (as stated above, because o f inherent reductionism in codings and small 
sample size), it might be worthwhile qualitatively to compare subject’s inner experiences 
to performance on standardized tests (for example, the W ISC-IV and the MMPI-A). 
Future studies might consider conducting standardized assessments with subjects after 
sampling has occurred so as not to “contaminate” DES. For a more rigorous design, 
investigators could remain blind to standardized testing results throughout DES (both 
sampling and analysis phases), and only consider testing results after all DES narrative 
descriptions had been written.
A fourth limitation o f the present study is that it was not theoretically grounded 
and no hypotheses were made at the outset o f the study. In the present study we elected to
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conduct basic exploratory research, that is, to apply DES to adolescents to see (a) if  they 
were capable o f  doing the method and, if  so, (b) to explore their samples o f inner 
experience. Our rationale for this approach was that by conducting atheoretical basic 
research we might be free to discover aspects o f adolescent inner experience that would 
otherwise be trampled by preexisting viewpoints and questions. Prior to eonducting this 
study, methodologically relevant literature was reviewed but only in the service o f 
understanding the types o f data on adolescent experience derived from other methods. 
The aim here was to remain free o f  theoretical and hypothetical trappings; however this 
approaeh can also be seen as a major weakness in the sense that the study does not 
explieitly advance any psychologieal theory. Future research into adolescent inner 
experienee may use theoretically-grounded hypotheses— but those hypotheses will be 
informed by clues derived from basic studies, such as the present study, in which there 
were no agendas or externally imposed influenees.
A fifth limitation o f the present study is the lack o f  interrater reliability. Although 
two investigators, a student and her advisor (Hurlburt, the originator o f  DES), colleeted 
the data and reviewed the data independently and together, the study may have benefited 
from additional data reviewed and rated by a third investigator. It is difficult to estimate 
how much benefit that would add to the clear seeing o f the data themselves, but in terms 
o f providing a measure o f  rating reliability, this step would have strengthened the study. 
Future studies may ehoose to build in such a step to the design.
Based on our findings in the present study, we believe that more research on 
adolescent inner experience using DES would be worthwhile. DES research is needed on 
healthy adoleseents, but future studies might also consider exploring the inner experience
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o f special adolescent populations. One example o f such a population is teenagers who 
suffer from as yet “undifferentiated” mental illness. Research exploring the inner 
experience o f this population may shed new light on the etiology o f psychopathologies, 
such as schizophrenia (particularly first breaks, which often occur during adolescence) or 
personality disorders (which often begin expressing during adolescence). Another 
direction for future DES studies on youngsters would be to use cross-sectional and 
longitudinal designs to explore the inner experience o f different age groups o f  kids and 
teens. Basic research would need to be conducted first, addressing questions such as, At 
what age are children able to identify and discuss the phenomena o f their inner 
experience? W hat are the developmental differences in inner experience across childhood 
and adolescence? How do those findings compare to the linchpin theories of 
development?
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APPENDIX
SUBJECT SAMPLES 
F M ’s Samples (See Chapter 5)
Interview: 1 
Date: 12/11/06 
Time: 3:45pm  
Interviewers: SA & RH  
Num ber of Beeps: 6
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 12/10/06, 5pm-6:30pm & 12/11/06, 7am-8:30am
1.1 (12/10/06): EM is a little hungry and is standing in the kitchen thinking about what to 
eat. At the moment o f  the beep he is thinking to him self a thought, which if  expressed in 
words would be something like, “what should I get to eat?” but no words were actually 
present. At the same time, he is also saying to him self in his head, “I gotta hurry up and 
go watch my show” (American Dad on TV). This thinking is experienced as being in his 
own voice with it natural characteristics, just as if  spoken aloud. O f the two thoughts 
present in his awareness, thinking about rushing because he doesn’t want to miss his 
show is more prominent than wondering what to eat. (Unsymbolized Thinking; Inner 
Speech)
1.2 (12/10/06): EM is in his room watching the TV show, American Dad. On the show, 
Roger, an alien, has squirted reproductive fluid into the potato salad as a mayonnaise 
substitute. The family eats the potato salad and likes it very much and FM finds this 
funny. At the moment o f  the beep FM is experiencing humor in reaction to the scenario. 
He is completely absorbed in the funny TV show. (Feeling)
1.3 (12/10/06): The TV show has ended and FM is back in the kitchen. He is hungry and 
his brother has ju st suggested he make a quesadilla. At the mom ent o f  the beep FM is 
unwrapping the cheese from the packaging, though he is not explicitly aware o f this. 
Instead he is getting the cheese out knowing h e’s gonna make a quesadilla. (Just Doing)
1.4 (12/10/06): FM is back in his room watching The Family Guy on TV. At the moment 
o f the beep, FM is wondering to himself, though not particularly in words, when is the 
beep going to go off? Though the TV is on, FM is thinking about the beep and not really 
paying attention to the show. (Unsymbolized Thinking)
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1.5 (12/11/06): FM is in homeroom at school. The substitute teacher is handing FM some 
papers to take to the front office. At the moment o f the beep, FM is in the act o f taking 
the papers from the teacher. Simultaneously, he is aware o f hearing some kids saying 
something in the background and he is trying to make out what they are saying. He later 
deduces that they were wondering what he had in his ear (the earphone). (Doing; 
Listening Process)
1.6 (12/11/06): FM is in homeroom and his teacher is talking about her recent car 
accident. At the moment o f the beep, FM is paying attention to his image o f the accident. 
He is trying to pay attention to his teacher and he is picturing in his head a white car 
stopped at a stoplight with a van just about to hit it from behind. This is a moving picture 
and FM sees several cross traffic cars going through the intersection as if  viewed from 
the back. The beep seems to stop the image from continuing. FM isn ’t sure what color his 
teacher’s car actually is, or whether she was rear-ended by a van or some other kind o f 
vehiele, but in his image those details are clear to him. Also at the mom ent o f the beep, 
FM is thinking to him self—almost saying to himself, OK, when is the beep going to go 
off? (Listening Process; Image; Unsym bolized Thinking)
Interview: 2 
Date: 12/13/06 
Time: PM
Interviewers: SA & RH  
Num ber o f Beeps: 6
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 12/12/06 & 12/13/06
2.1 (12/12/06): FM is at school in orchestra class where the movie White Christmas is 
playing. His eyes are closed and he is not really watching the movie. FM starts to yawn 
when the beeper beeps. At the moment o f the beep he is aware o f yawning, though not in 
words or images. (Just Doing)
2.2 (12/12/06): FM is in the library at school. I t’s lunchtime and he wants to play a 
eomputer game with his friend. At the moment o f the beep FM is reaching for the power 
button (located on the baek side o f the maehine) to turn on the computer. He is aware o f a 
thought process about reaehing baek to turn it on, that he wants to get the computer on so 
that he can play the game. At that same moment he is saying out loud to his friend, “ I 
wanna hurry u p ...” (Unsymbolized Thinking; Talking)
2.3 (12/12/06): The bell rings signaling the end o f lunch and FM shut down the 
computer. He is walking out the library door on his way to class and he is looking at the 
classroom he is heading toward. At the moment o f the beep FM is aware o f his 
physicality engaged in the act o f walking. He feels the soft step o f his right foot on the 
ground. At that mom ent he is also aware o f  a thought proeess about having to get to elass, 
though that thought is not in words or images. (Sensory Awareness; Unsymbolized 
Thinking)
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2.4 (12/12/06): FM is in class and the teacher is explaining positive and negative 
numbers. At the moment o f the beep FM is saying to him self in his head, “Wow, this is 
boring.” If  he were saying this aloud it would have been a low muttering to himself.
(Inner Speech)
2.5 (12/12/06): FM is in his period class watching The Grinch. In the film the Grinch 
is pushing Cindy Lou into the package-sorting machine. At the mom ent o f the beep FM is 
just watching and listening as Cindy Lou falls into the machine. FM also hears the sounds 
o f the guy sitting next to him playing with a skateboard. The sound is pulling his 
attention away from the movie and FM is aware o f being pulled away at the moment o f 
the beep. (Watching; Listening Process)
2.6 (12/13/06): FM is in the car on his way to UNLV with SA. They are talking about the 
pick-up football game in the neighborhood that afternoon. SA has ju st finished speaking 
and they are just driving. At the moment o f the beep FM is thinking to him self that he 
was going to go play football but this (DES meeting) is more important. This thought is 
not in words yet it is clear to him. FM is also noticing the building and wall they are 
passing, and the moment o f the beep he is seeing the wall. (Unsymbolized Thinking; 
Perceptual Awareness)
Interview: 3 
Date: 12/14/06 
Time: 3pm
Interviewers: SA & RH
Number o f Beeps: 6
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 12/14/06
3.1 (12/14/06): FM is eating cereal with his little brother, Adam, in the morning. Adam 
has just spilled some o f  his cereal and FM is getting a napkin for him. At the moment o f 
the beep FM is reaching for a napkin and thinking, “Adam needs to clean up that mess.” 
He is thinking these exact words but he is not saying them nor seeing them. All o f the 
words are there at the same time. Though FM is reaching for a napkin at the moment o f 
the beep, he is not aware o f it in the moment. (W orded Thinking)
3.2 (12/14/06): FM is lying on his couch, watching a movie, closing his eyes, about to 
fall asleep. A t the moment o f the beep FM is ju st being tired though he is somewhat 
aware that he is tired. His awareness o f this is not a thought process. He is not paying 
attention to the TV. (Tired)
3.3 (12/14/06): FM ’s mom and dad have just broken up. He is at his m om ’s house, 
they’ve been talking, and he goes into his sister’s room to see what it looks like. At the 
moment o f the beep FM is saying to him self out loud in a lowered, almost breathless, 
voice, “I need to go talk to my M om .” He is aware o f  feeling sad and knows that the 
sadness is somehow in his mind. He is not aware o f  anything else at the moment o f the 
beep. (Talking out loud to himself; Feeling)
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3.4 (12/14/06): FM is talking with his older brother, Drew, and Drew has just spoken the 
phrase, “L et’s go eat.” At the moment o f the beep FM ’s mind is stuck on the word “eat.” 
He is innerly seeing the word “eat” printed in big, bold, lower case orange letters against 
a blaek background. He is seeing this word straight on from the front. He is hungry but 
that fact is not in his awareness at the moment o f the beep. (Image o f a word)
3.5 (12/14/06): FM is in a restaurant and his sandwieh has just been brought to the table. 
He is looking up at the string o f Christmas bulbs on the eeiling, notieing the different 
colors. At the mom ent o f the beep FM  is looking at the red bulb. He is somehow aware 
that the red bulb appears shinier than the other bulbs. (Sensory Awareness)
3.6 (12/14/06): FM has gone (with a family member) to his unele’s house to drop off 
some board. He gets into the truek to go home and thinks to himself, “Phew! W e’re 
done.” At the mom ent o f the beep, FM is thinking, “Phew!” and is at the same time 
letting out a deep breath. (He is not saying an onomatopoeia-ish “Phew !” aloud; the 
thinking and the breathing are distinet proeesses, though eonneeted.) M ost o f  his 
awareness is foeused on thinking, “Phew!” and only about 20% o f his awareness is on his 
exhale. (Inner Speeeh; Sensory Awareness)
Interview: 4
Date: 12/16/06
Time: 12pm
Interviewers: SA
Number o f Beeps: 6
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 12/15/06
4.1 (12/15/06): FM went downstairs to get the disk Pirates o f  the Caribbean: Curse o f  
the B lack Pearl. His Dad said that the disk didn’t work so FM was eleaning the disk off 
when the beeper beeped. He noticed a big fingerprint on the disk and was going over it 
with the eloth. At the moment o f the beep FM pieked up the rag and is notieing that the 
fingerprint is still halfway there. At the same time he is saying to him self in his head, “I 
hope I ean get the disk to work.” (Inner Speech; Doing; Perceptual Awareness)
4.2 (12/15/06): FM has a stuffy nose and feels siek. He is in his room and his little 
bother, Adam, eomes in. FM says, “Adam, I ’m so sick.” The beep oceurred in the middle 
o f his saying the word “siek, right at the “i.” In a separate proeess at that moment FM is 
also mildly aware o f A dam ’s eowliek, specifically the circulam ess o f  it. After the beep he 
feels amused at the way A dam ’s hair sticks up in that circular area, but this comes after 
the beep. (Talking; Sensory Awareness)
4.3 (12/15/06): FM finished watching the movie and is lying in bed wanting to get some 
sleep. Next to the pow er button (presumably to the TV or DVD player) there is a little 
green light, which means the power is on. At the moment o f  the beep FM is just staring at 
that little green light. The yellowish-green color is drawing his eye. He is not aware o f 
anything else at that moment. (Sensory Awareness)
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4.4 (12/15/06): FM has a bad headache. At the moment o f the beep he is mostly (50%) is 
aware o f  the pain in his head. The pain is like the sound o f a fire alarm ringing in his 
head. He is also aware (25%) o f  holding his head, specifically o f  pressing his fingertips to 
his temples. He feels the sensation in his fingertips. The rest o f FM ’s awareness (25%) is 
on speaking words aloud about the pain in his head. Those words could be, “Oh, my 
headache” or “My headache” or “Oh, I have such a headache” but he is not sure o f  the 
exact phrasing. (Sensory Awareness; Sensory Awareness; Talking)
4.5 (12/15/06): FM is eating cereal. At the moment o f  the beep he notices the bright 
lemon yellowness o f the Pops in his bowl. Nearly all o f his awareness (90%) is on the 
color. The remaining portion o f his awareness (10%) is on his saying to him self in his 
head with surprise, “Wow, they’re yellow.” (Sensory Awareness; Inner Speech)
4.6 (12/15/06): A minute or so before the beep, FM was lying down again when his 
brother’s cat, Kix, came in. Kix attacked FM ’s hand and scratched it but eventually FM 
calmed Kix and got him to lie down. FM then sat up and was looking at how cute Kix 
looked curled up a little ball. At the moment o f the beep FM is saying to him self in his 
head with endearment, “Aw, he’s so cute.” A t the same moment a new process is 
beginning: FM ’s eyes have just landed on the white tuft o f  fur on K ix’s chin. FM is 
focusing mainly on the whiteness, though he is also aware o f the goateeness o f the tuft.
At the moment o f  the beep roughly half o f  FM ’s awareness is on the latter end o f the 
process noting K ix’s cuteness and the other half is on the rising o f  a process noting, in a 
different way, K ix’s goatee. (Inner Speech; Sensory Awareness)
Interview: 5 
Date: 12/17/06 
Time: 1pm
Interviewers: SA & RH  
Number of Beeps: 5
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 12/16/06 & 12/17/06
5.1 (12/16/06): FM is fixing cereal for him self and the headphone fell out o f his ear. At 
the moment o f the beep FM is in the process o f catching it and he is thinking about 
catching it. He cannot remember exactly what or how he was thinking about catching it 
but he knows he was thinking about it in addition to doing it. The onset o f  the beep is 
clear to him despite the headphone being mid-fall, approximately neck level. (Doing; 
M eta-Awareness)
5.2 (12/16/06): FM is in the car with SA and they are talking about getting his WII (video 
game system). At the moment o f  the beep FM hears SA say the “-ey” in the word 
“money.” Though he has been listening to what SA has been saying, at that moment he 
simply hears the sound “-ey.” At the same mom ent a small portion o f  his awareness 
(roughly 5%) is focused on hearing the “clunk, clunk” sound o f SA changing gears. 
(Sensory Awareness; Sensory Awareness)
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5.3 (12/16/06): FM is sitting on his bed looking down at his phone. At the moment o f the 
beep he is in the midst o f staring at the blue color on part o f the phone. M ost o f his 
awareness is focused on the blue-ness o f the phone but he is also aware o f  thinking in 
words to himself, matter-of-factly, “The edge o f my phone is blue.” The beeper beeps on 
the word “edge.” (Sensory Awareness; Inner Speech)
5.4 (12/16/06): FM is staring at the green basket in his closet. At the moment o f the beep 
he is absorbed in the yellow-green color o f the basket. He is holding his cat but is 
unaware o f this fact. (Sensory Awareness)
5.5 (12/17/06): FM is walking home from R D ’s house and has just passed SA ’s house. 
There is a blue van parked on the side o f the road and at the moment o f the beep FM is 
looking at the blue tire cover on the van. He is equally aware o f the blue-ness and the 
tire-covemess. (Sensory Awareness; Perceptual Awareness)
RD  ’s samples (See Chapter 6)
In terv iew : 1 
D ate: 12/04/06 
T im e: 7:45pm  
In terv iew ers: SA & RH  
N um ber o f Beeps: 5
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 12/03/06 & 12/04/06
1.1 (12/03/06): RD is skateboarding, flanked by two o f  his friends, J and S. At the 
moment o f the beep RD is saying to himself, “please, don’t hit a rock.” He says this to 
him self in his own voice, inside his head, in those specific words. RD is also somewhat 
aware o f  his two friends, J and S, who are just slightly ahead o f him. Although he is on 
his skateboard in motion he is not aware o f  the act o f  skating or o f  moving/speed/etc. RD 
is also watching out for J and S; should one o f them fall, he knows he will stop skating to 
help, but this is more a fact o f R D ’s universe than in his awareness at the moment o f  the 
beep. (Inner Speech; Perceptual Awareness)
1.2 (12/03/06): RD is skateboarding, this time down a hill toward an intersection. At the 
moment o f the beep he is thinking he hopes there isn’t a car coming and he experiences a 
sense o f  mental hesitation. This thought/mental hesitation is not in words, but instead 
encompasses the whole idea o f  hoping there isn’t a car with hesitation in his mind. After 
the moment o f the beep, the hill steepens and RD gains speed. He feels some fear about 
the possibility o f  encountering an oncoming car but decides to h im self to “just go for it; 
whatever happens, happens.” (Unsymbolized Thinking)
1.3 (12/03/06): RD is watching TV with his roommate. The roomm ate is just completing 
the act o f  taking the remote control from his hand. A t the m om ent o f the beep RD is 
thinking, she better not turn the channel/don’t tell me she’s gonna turn the channel/I hope 
she doesn’t turn the channel. The idea is not in specific words, though the idea itself is 
specific and apparent to him. R D ’s experience at the m om ent o f  the beep is matter-of-
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fact; he is not aware o f any accompanying affect or bodily sensations. After the moment 
o f the beep, he thinks/feels to himself, “I ’ll get you back for that.” (Unsymbolized 
Thinking)
1.4 (12/04/06): RD is in his house working on polishing his m om ’s table. At the moment 
o f the beep he is saying to himself, “I gotta fix the table.” The notion that he has to and 
wants to is “solid” to him (as in, this notion is unquestioningly present to him), and this 
solid knowing is part mind, part body. Bodily, he feels this mainly in his arms, and 
mentally he is focused on the thought o f having to fix the table. Close to the moment o f 
the beep— but probably not at the exact moment o f the beep— he is aware o f hearing the 
sounds o f  his friend skateboarding in front o f  his house; part o f him  would rather be 
outside skateboarding with his friend. RD knows/understands/is aware that he is fixing 
the table because his mom had been sad about it earlier, but whether or not this is in his 
awareness at the moment o f the beep is unclear. (Inner Speech)
1.5 (12/04/06): RD is still working on fixing his m om ’s table, wanting to finish it as a 
surprise for her before she gets home. Just before the moment o f  the beep he hears the 
sounds o f  his m om ’s car and realizes that she is home. A t the mom ent o f the beep he says 
to himself, in his head, in his own voice, “crap, she’s home!” (Inner Speech)
Interview: 2
Date: 1/8/07
Time: 3:45pm
Interviewers: SA & RH
Num ber o f Beeps: 5
Date(s) Beeps Collected: I/7/07& 1/8/07
2.1: RD is in the act o f  bowling, in the windup (arm swinging backward) before the 
release o f  the ball. At the moment o f  the beep RD is deeply focused on a thought: I have 
to get a strike. This thought is not comprised o f  specific words, and its meaning could 
also be rendered by I gotta get a strike, or I need a strike, or please let me get a strike. The 
meaning is unambiguously elear to RD. Nearly all o f his awareness is involved in this 
thought, which lies deep inside his head. Though his body is engaged in aetivity (aim 
pulling back, eyes on the pins at the end o f  the lane) he is not aware o f  anything other 
than the thought.
RD used two terms to describe his experience in this beep that seemed to have particular 
significance for him. He said his thought was “solid,” by which he apparently meant that 
he was absorbed in it, that it oecupied his entire awareness in a thorough, steady, 
extended in time way. In attempting to define solid, he said that this thought was so solid 
that if  one o f his friends were to speak to him at this moment, the sound would not 
penetrate into his awareness.
The second term was “quiet”. He said that exeept for the solid thought, the rest o f his 
thoughts were quiet, by whieh he apparently meant that there w ere other nascent, or soft, 
or incompletely artieulated, or hinty thoughts ongoing at a very low level. The solid
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thought occupied 90% o f his experience, he said; the quiet part was 10%. We o f course 
don’t know what his understanding o f 90% and 10% is, but it did seem that he was not 
confusing 10% with zero. That is, he was not saying that there were no other thoughts, 
only that the other thoughts were quiet. (Unsymbolized Thinking)
2.2: RD is doing a trick on his skateboard. The skateboard meets the ground on its thin 
lateral side and RD is momentarily balanced on the opposing lateral side, mid-trick. At 
the moment o f the beep his mind is open and a light thought is floating through; I gotta 
land this trick; please, let me land this trick. The thought is not in specific words, but it is 
a clear thought. It is not a “solid,” heavily concentrated, deeply focused thought (as in 
Beep 2.1) and he is quite permeable to external stimuli. Roughly half o f his awareness is 
devoted to this “light” thought floating through, and about a quarter o f his awareness is 
devoted to checking the position o f  the skateboard and visually confirming that his stance 
is OK to successfully execute the trick. The remaining quarter o f his awareness is just 
open. He is not meta-aware o f being mentally open but a portion o f  his mind is simply 
“free o f thoughts.”
In this beep RD described the state o f his mind as being “open.” By this he seems to 
mean that there is nothing occupying his mind, that i t’s free from encombrances, there’s 
no residue o f past thoughts, worries about the future, or even stuckness on the present 
thought.
RD describes the present thought as “light,” meaning that as the opposite to “solid,” as 
used in Beep 2.1. A light thought means that he is not deeply focused on the thought or 
working on the thought. I f  we could see into R D ’s head, w e’d see that thought easily, 
whereas w e’d have to look deep to find a solid thought.
Similarly RD says the present thought is “floating through.” W hen describing this he uses 
his hands to show an imaginary thought passing through his head from left to right at 
about forehead level. When asked if  he has a sense o f  the thought traveling through his 
head, he says no. In this instance it is plausible that the lightness o f  the thought is related 
to it’s floating through his open mind. (Unsymbolized Thinking; Perceptual Awareness; 
Open)
2.3: RD is hungry and is looking at various food items. At the moment o f the beep he is 
saying to him self in a low, slow, almost mumbled voice, “W hat - should -  I - eat?” He is 
not speaking aloud, but speaking inside his head, “kinda talking to m yself.” (Inner 
Speech)
2.4: At the moment o f  the beep RD is saying to himself, “W hat should I do?” As in Beep 
2.3, he is speaking to him self internally rather than aloud but this time he is speaking with
an even slower, bored sounding cadence, “W h a t sh o u ld  I  d o  ?” (Inner
Speech)
2.5: RD is looking at his skateboard. He has it flipped on its side and just sent the front 
right wheel spinning with his hand. At the moment o f  the beep he is wondering to
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himself, how fast can I go? The thought isn’t in specific words. At the same time he hears 
the sound o f the wheel spinning. His eyes are looking at the skateboard but he is not 
aware o f  that at the moment. (Unsymbolized Thinking; Perceptual Awareness)
Interview; 3
Date: 1/9/07
Time: 3:45pm
Interviewers: SA & RH
Num ber of Beeps: 6
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 1/8/07
3.1: RD is saying to him self in his head, in a pissed off voice, “Why did he kick me in 
my sore knee?” He internally speaks these exact words angrily and rapidly. All o f  his 
awareness is completely focused on this thought at the moment o f  the beep. In R D ’s 
lingo, it was a “solid” thought. Solid means that all o f his awareness is devoted to the 
thought, that he is completely concentrated on the thought, that the thought is perfectly 
clear to him, and due to being so deeply concentrated and focused on the thought, he is 
deep inside himself, insulated from the outside world, that it seems that someone would 
have to shake him by the shoulders to rouse him out o f that thought. After the beep he is 
aware that he is angry and wants to take revenge by kicking J. Also after the beep, RD is 
aware o f  feeling pain in his sore knee. (Inner Speech)
3.2: RD is saying to him self in his head with frustration and irritation, “Stupid cat, get 
away!” The thought is less than solid in that it’s not a focused, concentrated thought, but 
it is more than light and fleeting. In R ’s lingo, this constitutes a “m edium ” thought, which 
means he is partially absorbed in it and that it would not be very difficult to get his 
attention at that moment. RD knows that he is frustrated and irritated by recognizing 
those qualities in his inner voice and it seems his understanding o f  his emotional state is 
deduced by hearing the tone o f his own voice. He does not feel the frustration/irritation in 
his body, not is he aware o f  it in any other way. (Inner Speech)
3.3: RD is singing/chanting along in his head to the song on the radio, “I-like-big- 
b u tts .. . ” He is innerly singing/chanting the lyrics quietly but with rhythm and in sync 
with the music. M ost o f  his awareness (75%) is on his singing in his head while the rest 
(25%) is on listening to the song. RD is lying on his bed, arms folded behind his head, 
arms, head, and upper body pulsing to the music— but none o f  this is in his awareness at 
the moment o f the beep. Note: It was quite embarrassing, difficult for RD to say he was 
singing about butts. It seemed evident that he had to fight down the urge to avoid telling 
us about this, and then went forward. He said the embarrassment was about the prospect 
o f telling us, not a feature o f  the singing at the moment o f  the beep. (Inner Speech; 
Perceptual Awareness)
3.4: RD is looking out the car window. At the moment o f the beep he is saying to him self 
in is head, “Oh snap, she’s hot!” The words are clear and specific and it’s a light thought 
in that it seems to be on the surface o f his mind rather than deep within. I f  we could see 
inside R D ’s mind w e’d be able to access this thought easily because it’s right there on the
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surface. Most o f  his awareness is on the thought (85%) but a small amount o f his 
awareness is on the girl (whom his thought is referring to) crossing the road. He is 
looking at all o f her, not a specific part or aspect o f her. (NOTE: R D ’s solid-medium- 
light continuum seems to have more to do more with focus/attention/deepness than with 
clarity. Here we have a light but clear thought.) (Inner Speech; Perceptual Awareness)
3.5: RD is saying to him self in his head, “W ow.” The “wow” is uttered slowly and is 
loaded with meaning: what-you-are-doing-is-unbelieveably-stupid-looking-but-I-can’t- 
stop-watching-because-it’s-so-ridiculous. Roughly half o f his awareness is on this 
thought, while the other half is on watching his friend, S, dance. After the beep he is 
aware o f  laughing at her. (Inner Speech; Perceptual Awareness)
3.6 (1/8/07): RD is thinking a wordless thought in his mind. I f  words were to be used to 
translate the meaning o f the thought, they might be something like: What on earth is she 
doing? Though no words are spoken, heard, pictured, or otherwise known, the thought 
itself is clear. Simultaneously RD is making a face expressing his thought, though he is 
not aware o f  this at the moment o f the beep. (Unsymbolized Thinking)
Note: the beeps appear at the end o f  each o f these thoughts, whether worded or 
unworded. That is, the beep is understood as arriving immediately after the conclusion o f 
the thought (or a slight delay thereafter).
Interview: 4 
Date: 1/10/07 
Time: 4:45pm  
Interviewers: SA & RH  
Number of Beeps: 5 
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 1/9/07
4.1: At the moment o f  the beep I ’m wondering to m yself what this cheese tastes like. 
Specifically, in my head I’m musing in my own voice, “I w onder what this tastes like?” 
The way I ’m saying this is a touch dramatic, with a slight accent on “taste,” like a snobby 
English butler might pronounce the word. Also, my voice kind o f  has a stylized melodic 
lilt to it, similar to the voice you might use playing hide-and-seek with a little kid: “I- 
wonder-where-Rory-is?” But my voice isn’t loud as it would be in that situation where 
you want the little kid to “overhear” you. Instead my voice is rather low and quiet, 
definitely to myself, for myself. D on’t get me wrong, I ’m not exactly paying attention to 
all o f  these vocal qualities, I just know tha t’s what my voice sounded like. At the moment 
o f  the beep, most o f  my awareness is on what I ’m saying to myself, a medium thought, 
and I ’m somewhat aware o f looking at the cheese in my hand. (Inner Speech; Perceptual 
Awareness)
4.2: I ’m mostly aware o f asking m yself in my own voice in my head, “W hat should I 
wear?” I ’m in hurry, I don’t want to be late, and my body is a little bit jittery and anxious, 
but I ’m only slightly aware o f this, say I0% -I5% . M ost (85%-90%) o f  my awareness at
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the m om ent o f the beep is absorbed in my saying to myself, “W hat should I wear?” Just 
before the beep I was aware that 1 was going to the movies. I m ight have even said out 
loud to myself, “I gotta get to the movies.” But that the moment o f  the beep I ’m no longer 
aware o f  the movies, only o f asking m yself about what I should w ear and the slight 
jittery-anxiousness o f needing to hurry. This is a medium thought. (Inner Speech;
Sensory Awareness)
4.3: I ’m wondering to myself, how do I look? This “medium” thought is not in words, 
unlike the thoughts in the previous two beeps, but it is clear and nearly all o f my 
awareness is on thinking it. A small amount o f my awareness, maybe 10%, is on looking 
at m yself in the mirror, checking out the way I look overall. I ’m in the midst o f posing 
m yself in various cool stances, but I ’m not aware o f this at the m om ent o f the beep.
(Inner Speech; Perceptual Awareness)
4.4: Just before the beep I heard J fart, and said aloud, “Oh! Snap! That smells!” But I 
had said that based on the sound o f the fart, before I actually smelled the fart. Now, at 
the mom ent o f  the beep, I just caught wind o f J ’s fart and I ’m aware o f smelling the fart 
and quietly exclaiming to m yself in my head, “Oh crap, that really does smell!” About 
half o f my awareness is on smelling the fart and the other half is on what I ’m saying to 
myself. I t’s a light thought, in words, just passing through, not deeply focused. (Inner 
Speech; Perceptual Awareness)
4.5: I ’m excitedly whispering-hissing to m yself in my head, “I can’t wait!” I t’s a small, 
light thought. I ’m at the movies about to go in and what I can’t wait for is the movie 
itself, but I ’m not aware o f that at the moment o f  the beep. (Inner Speech)
Interview: 5
Date: 1/12/07
Time: 3:30pm
Interviewers: SA & RH
Number o f Beeps: 7
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 1/11/07
5.1 : My friend, J, just fell and is hurt. At the mom ent o f the beep I ’m saying to m yself in 
my head, “Aw, m an....dude, that really sucks,” and I ’m feeling sorry for him. M ost o f 
my awareness (about 70%) is on the thought/words. It’s a light/medium thought and my 
voice has a feeling bad sort o f sound. The rest o f  my awareness (about 30%) is on feeling 
sorry for him because I can see that he is really hurt. The sorry feeling seems natural to 
me, like my natural response to seeing someone get hurt. It is similar to a sad feeling, but 
not exactly the same. I feel it in my chest -  definitely not in my heart or anything -  but 
it’s like on the inside surface o f  my chest. The feeling is a light/medium one, and if  I 
were to rank it on a scale o f  black (heavy/solid) to white (light), it would be white. I t’s 
weird because the feeling is in my head too, so both in my chest and head, but not in any 
other part o f my body. The feeling might be sort o f  connected to the thought but it also 
seems distinct from the thought I ’m having. I ’ve never had a beep quite like this before
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(where I ’m having a feeling) so it’s hard for me to say exactly how it was. (Inner Speech; 
Feeling)
5.2: M y mom is showing me the DVDs she got. At the moment o f the beep I ’m 
exclaiming to m yself in my head, “Oh crap! You got Rocky?!” My voice is a mix of 
delighted surprise and excitement, but unlike Beep 5.1 I don’t experience my feelings 
directly. It is a fact that I am happy, and my voice in my head evidences happiness but I 
don’t experience the happiness separately from my thought. Even so, I know I ’m happy 
and if  you were to see me at that exact moment, you’d know just from looking at me that 
I was happy. It’s a light thought and most o f my awareness (80%) is on this thought. A 
smaller percentage o f  my awareness (about 20%) is on looking at the cover o f the Rocky 
DVD case that m om ’s holding in front o f me. I ’m not looking at anything in particular on 
the case cover, ju st the overall thing. (Inner Speech; Perceptual Awareness)
5.3: I ’m saying to m yself in my head, in a quiet yet surprised voice, “Wow, those are 
nice shoes.” I t’s a light thought, but i t’s different than any other thought I ’ve had while 
being beeped because it started off as a thought deep inside my head, and then came up 
through my mind getting progressively lighter the closer it got to the surface. So on it’s 
way from the depths o f my mind to the surface o f my mind the thought became a medium 
thought, and then became a light thought— and that’s when I grabbed it. Other light 
thoughts I ’ve had seem to pass through, from somewhere (no specific location, could be 
from any direction, though in previous beeps I ’ve gestured as though they’re coming in 
from the left and exiting right at about temple level) outside my head to inside my head 
and then out again. This thought, on the other hand, feels like it originated from within 
the depths o f my mind and sort o f floated forward, changing density along the way.
I ’m not sure why this thought happened in this way but I do think that I can sort o f 
control whether I ’m going to have a solid, medium, or light thought. For example, when 
I ’m having an argument with someone, I can focus really hard to think up deep, 
intelligent facts and angles that are very difficult for my opponent to dispute. I f  my 
opponent comes back at me with something just as deep and sophisticated— on the 
level— then the game is on and it’s a solid conversation.
In the case o f  this beep, however, there’s no deep or otherwise conversation happening in 
relation to my thought. Earlier my friend told me he had on really nice shoes, but he’s 
often wrong/misrepresents things so I didn’t really believe him. Before the moment o f the 
beep I was gazing at his shoes and at some point I realized that his shoes really were nice. 
At the moment o f the beep that thought had come forward in the way I described and I 
grabbed it at light, saying to myself, “Wow, those really are  nice shoes.”
One last thing about this beep: I ’m chillin’, ju st relaxed during this whole thought 
process. The fact that his shoes really are nice isn ’t some huge, big deal. I t’s just a chilled 
out noticing kind o f  process happening in me. (Inner Speech)
5.4: The game had just ended and I semi-yelled out loud with a mixture o f glee and gloat 
to my friend, J, “I told you the Eagles would win!” A t the mom ent o f  the beep I ’m saying
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to m yself in my head— with a good deal more gloat— , “Uh! [As in, “take that” or “in 
your face, punk”] I told you the Eagles would win!” repeating w hat I had just said aloud. 
I ’m not yelling this second thought in my head, but it’s not exactly quiet either. It has 
more force, more smartass-ness to it—rcspecially in the “Uh!” which is a pretty big deal 
in my awareness. I ’d say about 99% o f my awareness is on the thought in my head and 
only about 1% o f my awareness is on what I just said to J out loud. After the beep I ’m 
thinking about the fact that J would probably have gotten mad at m e had I waited to gloat 
about the Eagles’ win, but that came after the beep. (Inner Speech)
5.5: I ’m looking at my friend’s moon sand and I ’m saying to m yself in my head, “W hat’s 
that stuff?” About 50% o f my awareness is on this thought/question and the other 50% is 
divided between seeing the moon sand (25%) and knowing/being meta-aware o f  m yself 
seeing the moon sand (25%). The quarter o f my awareness devoted to just seeing the 
moon sand isn ’t focused on any particular characteristic o f  the moon sand, I ’m just seeing 
the moon sand overall. ((Inner Speech; Perceptual Awareness; M eta-Awareness)
5.6: I ’m saying to m yself in my head, “That stuff is really cool,” (referring to the moon 
sand) and I ’m looking at my friend, maybe even talking to my friend. I ’m not sure 
exactly. About 70% o f my awareness is on my thought, which seems to be just passing 
through but not from any particular direction. Another way to describe the passing 
through thing is to say the thought is like a pop-up -  those mean pretty much the same 
things to me, either way would explain it. It seems to take a couple o f  seconds to pass 
through/pop up. The other 30% o f my awareness is on looking at my friend overall. 
(Inner Speech; Perceptual Awareness)
5.7: I ’m saying to m yself in my head, “I don’t wanna watch this, it looks scary.” All o f 
my awareness is on this thought. I t’s a light thought, just passing though. There’s 
something wimpy about my saying this but that’s not in my awareness at the moment o f 
the beep. (Inner Speech)
Interview: 6
Date: 1/15/07
Time: 7:30pm
Interviewers: SA & RH
Num ber o f Beeps: 6
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 1/14/07
6.1: I ’m asking m yself in my head, “How is she doing that?” Shana is doing something 
freaky but at the moment o f  the beep all o f  my awareness is on my thought, none o f  it is 
actually on S. (Inner Speech)
6.2: M ost o f  my awareness is on me, RD, watching the game. T hat’s different from my 
just watching the game; in this case I ’m actually aware o f m yself watching the game— I 
know I ’m watching the game. At the same time a little bit o f my awareness is on my 
saying to m yself in my head, “C ’mon, the Eagles have to win.” I t’s a medium thought, 
but I ’m saying it in a hard and demanding way. (M eta-Awareness; Inner Speech)
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6.3: I ’m yelling out loud, “C ’mon, pick up that fumble!” My voice is loud and excited, 
and this is a medium thought. I ’m also aware o f my standing as I ’m yelling and I know 
this mentally and physically. I feel the weight in my feet and the difference in my body 
from how it was when I was sitting just a moment ago. (Talking; Sensory Awareness)
6.4: I ’m thinking a definite thought, but the thought does not have words, unlike the last 
three beeps. If  I were to put words to this thought, it would be something like: The Saints 
can’t win, dude. They can’t. I t’s a disappointing thought, sort o f sad, and it seems to 
come up from deep inside my head. I ’m not separately aware o f my sadness or 
disappointment; those things are part o f the thought.
Thoughts like this that originate from deep inside my head are developing or evolving or 
transforming as they come up and they do not really have specific words to them. They 
start out solid, deep in my head, and as they eome outward they become medium and then 
light, all the while developing. Depending on where I grab/catch the thought, it has a 
certain density (on the solid-medium-light continuum) and a certain meaning. In order for 
me to tell you the meaning o f a thought I ’ve grabbed, I put words to it— in this case the 
best words to articulate my though are: The Saints can’t win, dude.
Thoughts that come up are different from the kinds o f thoughts that pass through. The 
passing through thoughts can also be solid, medium, or light, but they seem to always 
come with specific words and those words don’t change as they pass through. Also, the 
passing through thoughts seem to come from outside o f my head, enter my head, and then 
pass out o f my head. I can grab them at any point as they’re passing through, and 
depending on the point, they’re either solid, medium, or light. But with passing through 
thoughts, the longer I wait to grab them, the solider they are. (Unsymbolized Thinking)
6.5: I ’m thinking to myself, 21 to 20. Again, there are no specific words even though the 
concept is perfectly clear. This is a light thought that’s come up from inside my head. 
Although this is the only thing in my awareness at the moment o f the beep, only about 
50% o f my awareness is dedicated to it. The other 50% is ju st room for something else, 
although at the moment there’s nothing else there. (Unsymbolized Thinking; Open)
6.6: I ’m exclaiming-lamenting out loud with frustration, “How could they lose?!” It’s a 
light thought and it’s passing though. Also at that moment I ’m a tiny bit aware o f my 
disappointment about the Eagles’ loss. I don’t feel the disappointment anywhere in my 
body, I ju st know I ’m disappointed and that is somehow distinct from what I ’m saying 
out loud. This was a passing through exclamation and is an example o f  the fact that 
things spoken aloud can be passing through. (Talking; Feeling)
B C  Samples (See Chapter 7)
Interview: 1 
Date: 2/12/07
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Time: 3:45pm  
Interviewers: SA & RH  
Num ber o f Beeps: 5 
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 2/11/07
1.1: BC is talking to her cousin, Angelic, on the phone. Angelie is telling BC about how 
her boyfriend ended up in jail. Angelie’s mother is yelling at her to get o ff the phone and 
at the same time, B C ’s mother is yelling at BC to do the dishes. It is difficult for BC to 
pinpoint the moment o f the beep and she is unable to report her experience at that 
moment. (Task Issue)
1.2: BC is cleaning her closet and eating a piece o f ice. She is w orking on cleaning up the 
shoes and blankets on the floor o f the closet and not particularly liking the task. She does 
not know  what she is aware o f at the moment o f the beep. (Task Issue)
1.3: At the moment o f the beep BC is in the midst o f telling her little sister that she is 
doing a good job in school. BC knows that they are bonding, something they do not do 
often, though this is not in her awareness at the exact moment o f the beep. (Task Issue)
1.4: BC is watching the TV show “The Suite Life o f Zack & Cody.” At the moment o f 
the beep, she is completely absorbed in watching the show. (Just watching TV)
1.5: BC is eating a dinner o f  cereal. Her mother is watching TV, but BC is not paying 
attention to the show that’s on. At the moment o f  the beep her brother is talking to her 
about going to play basketball. She’s not sure w hat’s in her experience at the moment o f 
the beep— maybe nothing. After the beep, BC has an image o f  herself and her brother 
playing one-on-one on a basketball court. In the image BC has the basketball and is 
standing in front o f her brother who is gesturing in frustration because BC has won. She 
sees herself from the side. Though she knows it’s a basketball court, she doesn’t see the 
basketball hoops or any other distinctive features o f  the court. The image is still and in 
black and white. (Image -  but not ATMOB)
Interview: 2
Date: 2/16/07
Time: 3:45pm
Interviewers: SA & RH
Number o f Beeps: 6
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 2/16/07
2.1: BC is sitting down waiting for her sister and her mother to come home. She is 
looking out the window at the tree in her front yard. At the m om ent o f  the beep she is 
looking at the leaves on the tree. She is not focused on any particular aspect or sensory 
property o f  the leaves (i.e., color, shape, movement, etc.), she is just looking at the leaves 
overall. (Perceptual Awareness)
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2.2: BC is watching Sponge Bob Square Pants on TV. At the moment o f the beep she is 
just watching and listening as Sponge Bob screams, “Can I have a job at the Crusty 
Crab?” as he jum ps up and down. The beep comes at the word “Crusty.” (Just Watching 
TV)
2.3: At the moment o f the beep BC feels pain in her front right tooth. She is pressing her 
pointer finger against her tooth, but at the moment o f the beep she isn’t sensing that, only 
the pain in her tooth. She had been drinking cold milk just before the beep, and it was the 
coldness o f the milk on her tooth (she’d had dental work earlier that day) that had 
apparently caused the pain. (Perceptual Awareness)
2.4: At the mom ent o f  the beep BC is not aware o f anything. She had just finished taking 
an aspirin for her tooth pain, but at the moment o f the beep nothing was in her awareness. 
(No Inner Experience -  Waiting))
2.5: BC is scrubbing the counter closest to the stove. At the moment o f  the beep there is 
nothing in her awareness. She had finished doing the dishes— finished washing the last 
knife— and had begun to wipe down the counters. It was a fact o f her universe that at the 
moment o f the beeps she was scrubbing the counter hard, but she was not aware o f that, 
nor o f  anything else at that moment. (Just Doing)
2.6: B C ’s mom had finished musing aloud about how long it would take SA to get to the 
house. BC had heard and comprehended what her mother said but had moved on. Her 
attention had not yet landed on something new and so at the moment o f  the beep, BC is 
not aware o f anything. (No Inner Experience -  Waiting)
Interview: 3
Date: 2/23/07
Time: 2:45pm
Interviewers: SA & RH
Number o f Beeps: 4
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 2/23/07—LIVE
3.1: BC is looking at her cat and talking to him, telling him  how  handsome he is. She is 
waiting to see if  he is going to meow back. The beep comes in the midst o f  this 
“conversation” but BC does not know exactly when it comes or what her experience is at 
that precise moment. (??)
3.2: BC is walking home from next door and is just passing her mailbox at the moment of 
the beep. She is not aware o f anything at that moment. (Just Doing)
3.3: BC is writing her sister a letter telling her why it took so long for her to write back. 
She has stopped writing and is holding the pencil up waiting to see what to write next 
when the beep comes. At the mom ent o f  the beep she is not aware o f anything. (No Inner 
Experience -  W aiting)
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3.4: BC is watching Halle Berry on TV. At the moment o f the beep, BC is paying 
attention to the way Halle Berry is speaking; Halle Berry is speaking with an accent that 
BC recognizes is not the way Halle usually sounds. BC is uncharacteristically clear and 
precise about what she was attending to (Halle B erry’s accented speech) at that moment 
o f the beep; she indicates with apparent confidence that it is the speech pattern she is 
paying attention to, not Halle B erry’s white dress or the Oscar statuettes that were also on 
the screen at the same time. BC is also uncharacteristically enthusiastic during the 
interview about this beep. (Sensory Awareness)
Interview: 4
Date: 2/28/07
Time: 6:00pm
Interviewers: SA & RH
Num ber of Beeps: 3
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 2/28/07—LIVE
4.1: BC is spending time with her family. The music is playing loud and everyone is 
dancing. At the moment o f  the beep BC has stopped dancing. She is watching everyone 
else and laughing at the way they’re dancing. She is not aware o f anything at the moment 
o f the beep. (Just Doing)
4.2; A t the moment o f the beep BC is walking next door to her sister’s house to tell her 
sister what her mom said. She is holding Isaiah in her arms. BC is not aware o f anything 
at the mom ent o f  the beep. In particular, she says she is not thinking about what her mom 
has said even though that is the intention o f going next door. (Just Doing)
4.3: BC is watching the end o f the movie The Land Before Time. A t the moment o f the 
beep she is not aware o f anything. A bit before the beep she had wondered if  the movie 
would end before the next beep came, but that thought had passed by the time the beep 
actually came. (Just W atching TV)
Interview: 5
Date: 3/2/07
Time: 2:30pm
Interviewers: SA & RH
Num ber o f Beeps: 4
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 3/2/07—LIVE
5.1: BC is having a danee-off with her friend. A t the moment o f  the beep she is dancing 
with her friend to hip-hop. She is not particularly aware o f  anything. (Just Doing)
5.2: At the moment o f  the beep BC is hitting her friend in the face with her right hand. 
Again, she is not particularly aware o f anything. (Just Doing)
5.3: BC is picking out a movie to take to her friend’s house. At the mom ent o f  the beep 
BC is saying out loud, “Do you want the Winnie the Pooh or the Tigger movie?” There
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may be something in her awareness at the moment o f the beep but BC is not sure, and is 
unable to identify it. (Talking; Incipient Inner Experience)
5.4: BC is eating apple slices and listening to her step-dad talking. He is jokingly telling 
BC that she should tell us that he’s whupping her the moment o f the beep. BC is just 
about to put an apple slice in her mouth at the moment o f the beep, but she is particularly 
not aware o f anything at that moment. (Just Doing)
Â V ’s Samples (See Chapter 8)
Interview: 1 
Date: 4/3/07 
Time: unrecorded  
Interviewers: SA & RH  
Num ber of Beeps: 5 
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 4/2/07
1.1: AV is watching TV and a big, bald man wearing a tuxedo has just appeared on 
screen. At the moment o f  the beep AV is looking at the m an’s head, noticing a small 
rogue patch o f hair protruding, apparently missed last time he got his hair cut. While 
looking at the patch o f uncut hair, AV is saying to herself in her head, “Oh my god, they 
cut his hair w rong ...1 don’t know why he went to those people.. .” H er inner voice is 
high-pitched, squeaky, and dramatic, sort o f like Fran Dresher, as if  AV is acting out a 
character’s lines in her head. (Inner Speech)
1.2: AV is standing in the grass in her yard while the sprinklers are on. At the moment o f 
the beep she is feeling her right foot get slowly soaked by water seeping into her tennis 
shoe and through her sock. AV can also feel the sensation o f wet grass clippings stuck to 
her right ankle, partially lodged in her now somewhat wet sock. She is solely focused on 
these sensations at the moment o f the beep. (Sensory Awareness; Sensory Awareness)
1.3: AV is carrying a bag o f  trash to the trash can. A t the moment o f the beep, she is 
holding the bag and walking toward the trash can. She is not aware o f anything at that 
moment. After the beep sounds, AV throws the trash bag down and watches it settle 
among the other trash bags— but that occurs after the beep. (Task Issue)
1.4: AV is reading the book Bridge to Terabithia. When the beep sounds, she is absorbed 
in reading the part o f the story in which the main character finds out that his friend, 
Leslie, is dead. (It was not clear whether she was reading lines or looking at a picture in 
the book at that moment.) The beep causes AV to notice that she is sad, and that she is 
trying not to cry, but none o f that was apparently in awareness at the moment o f the beep. 
After the beep, she feels the sadness deep inside her eyes and she debates to herself, 
should I cry or not? She knows that if  she begins to cry her parents will notice. (Just 
Reading)
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1.5: A few seconds before the beep, AV is wondering whether to eat ice cream or cereal. 
The beep sounds as she is saying to herself in her head, “I should eat both.” This time her 
inner voice sounds sad and is softly lilting— like a sad little girl— and yet AV does not 
feel sad at the moment. She has been sad all day though, crying a lot due to her friend’s 
sudden death and now impending funeral. (Inner Speech)
Interview: 2 
Date: 4/4/07 
Time: unrecorded 
Interviewers: SA & RH  
Number of Beeps: 5 
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 4/3/07
2.1: AV is watching a show about models on TV. At the moment o f the beep, she is 
focused on saying to herself in her head, “M elrose was going to lose,” and she is no 
longer paying attention to the TV. The tone o f her inner voice is sad, though she is not 
aware o f  feeling sad at that moment. (Inner Speech)
2.2: AV was just beginning to color in a small patch o f grass on a page o f  her coloring 
book at the moment o f  the beep. She was paying attention to the outline shape o f the 
grass pictured in the coloring book, and had some faint awareness o f  trying to color 
within the lines. (Just Doing)
2.3: AV just finished singing a song (to herself in her head??) by T Ping. At the moment 
o f the beep she is just beginning to think an unworded thought— or wondering— should I 
sing another song? The beep catches her at the outset o f  that thought. After the beep, and 
in response to that thought, AZ hears in her head Aeon singing “Smack that on the floor” 
along with the rhythm o f the song. It is as if  the hearing o f this is the answer to her 
wondering what song she should sing next: she should sing “ Smack That.” At the same 
time that AZ hears Aeon singing in her head, which is to say, slightly after the beep, she 
is aware o f hearing a Gwen Stefani song eome on the radio. (Unsym bolized Thinking)
2.4: One o f  A V ’s favorite characters on a TV show died (on the show??). AV turned off 
the TV, went into her room, turned o ff the lights and lay down on her bed. She stared at 
the ceiling while repeating out loud to herself, “I ’m sad. I ’m sad. I ’m sad. I ’m sad ...” At 
the moment o f  the beep, AV is saying the final, “I ’m sad” in the repetition (though it is 
possible that the beep aborted the repetitive process). The beep sounds during the word 
“sad.” Though AV is saying she is sad, she is not actually feeling sad at that moment. 
(Speaking Aloud to Self)
2.5: AV is saying aloud to her mom, “Mama, I know the address at which my friend’s 
funeral will be held.” She is speaking to her mom in Spanish, and at the moment o f  the 
beep AV is speaking the word “yo” (or “I”) at the beginning o f the sentence. Though the 
beep sounds, she finished speaking her sentence. She is not aware o f  anything other than 
speaking at the moment o f  the beep. (Just Talking)
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Interview: 3 
Date: 4/5/07 
Time: unrecorded 
Interviewers: SA & RH  
Number o f Beeps: 5 
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 4/4/07
3.1: AV is typing on the computer keyboard in the family room. At the moment o f the 
beep she is looking at the “D” key, specifically staring at the size and shape o f letter “D ” 
on the key. Prior to the beep, AZ had been typing steadily until she was about to press the 
“D” key. She paused as she noticed that the letter “D” on the keyboard she was using was 
much smaller than the letter “D ” on her brother’s keyboard. However, at the moment of 
the beep she is no longer aware o f  the comparison between “D ” keys; she is simply aware 
o f the size and shape o f the “D” key in front of her. (Sensory Awareness)
3.2: AV is searching for her wallet and she opens a drawer to see if  the wallet might be in 
there. The drawer is filled with a tangle o f computer/media cables and controls. At the 
moment o f  the beep AV is noticing the sheer amount o f “s tu ff ’ packed in the drawer. She 
is aware o f  all the stuff packed in the drawer as a whole; she is not focused on any o f the 
individual items in the drawer, nor is she thinking about her wallet at that particular 
moment. (Sensory Awareness)
3.3: AV is playing with a button on the table in front o f her. She is poking the tip o f her 
pen in and out o f  the holes, fitting it in to one hole, pulling it out, fitting it in to another, 
etc. At the mom ent o f the beep, AV is noticing the particular hole that the tip o f her pen 
is in. She is mostly aware o f the hole, not the pen, though the pen is in the hole at the 
moment. (Perceptual Awareness)
3.4; AV is working on a word find puzzle. Her task at this time is to find the word 
“neur”; her way o f  executing that task is to search for the letter “n ,” and if  she finds it, to 
determine whether the next letter is an “e.” Thus at the mom ent o f  the beep she is 
systematically scanning the horizontal rows (she said the 3"^  ^row) for a letter “n.” The 
letter “n” is in mind. It is hard to say how it’s in mind— there’s no image o f  the letter, 
she’s not saying the letter to herself, etc.— but the letter “n” is somehow present in her 
awareness at the mom ent o f  the beep. (Unsymbolized Thinking)
3.5: AV is watching The Suite Life o f  Zae & Cody on TV. On the show a lady is walking 
past a group o f  kids who are laughing at her. At the mom ent o f the beep, AV is staring at 
the big mole on the lady’s face while exclaiming to herself in her head, “That mole is b-i- 
i-i-g!” Her inner voice sounds exactly as it would had she spoken the words aloud. (Inner 
Speech; Perceptual Awareness)
Interview: 4 
Date: 4/6/07 
Time: unrecorded 
Interviewers: SA & RH
200
Number of Beeps: 5 
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 4/5/07
4.1: AV is on the computer, just beginning to log on to millsberry.com by typing in her 
username and password. Her username is her name, which begins with the letter “A.” At 
the moment o f the beep she is pressing the letter “A” on the keyboard while looking at 
the keyboard. She is not aware o f anything else. (Just Doing)
4.2: AV is watching “That’s so Raven” on TV. At the moment o f the beep she is 
wondering to herself in her head in words, “How should I tell my mom about my 
friend.. .”? At that moment all o f her attention is on her thought; AV is not at all paying 
attention to the TV show. A V ’s thought does not get completed though— the beep 
sounded around the word “friend,” interrupting her. The complete thought would have 
been, “How should I tell my mom about my friend, that there was no practice at my 
friend’s house.” Earlier in the day, AV told her mother that she needed to practice for the 
upcoming talent show at her friend’s house that afternoon. A V ’s mom rescheduled A V ’s 
appointment at the doctor’s office so that she could go the practice. Now the practice was 
cancelled and, at the moment o f the beep, AV is contemplating how she would tell her 
mother about this given the arrangements she had made. AV was not thinking any o f this 
background information at the moment o f  the beep, nor was she feeling 
w orried/anxious/eoncemed about telling her mother about the cancellation. She was 
simply wondering about how she would say it to her mother, in words in her own head at 
the moment o f the beep. (Inner Speech)
4.3: AV is at the doctor’s office and she has just found out that she needs to have a blood 
test. At the moment o f  the beep AV is saying aloud, “Dr. Powell, is the blood test, like, 
gonna hurt m e?” She speaks the question with curiosity (my word, thus likely a 
eontamination/not valid) but does not experience any sense o f euriosity/wanting to 
know/low grade desperation/worry/fear/anxiety. At the moment o f the beep, AV is 
simply wondering aloud to the doctor whether the blood test will hurt. (Maybe a big fat 
presupposition, but I have a very hard time believing that this last sentence is true, though 
it’s what was reported— even after some pretty strong nudging in the feeling direction.) 
(Talking Out Loud -  emotional significance)
4.4; AV is having her blood drawn for the first time ever. Her eyes are squeezed shut and 
the needle is just beginning to pierce the skin in the inside crease o f her right arm. A t the 
moment o f  the beep AV is commanding herself in a rapid, high-pitched, dramatic 
squeaky little inner voice, “I’m not going to cry!” Simultaneously she feels the sensation 
o f the needle entering her skin. I t’s not exactly pain; uncomfortable is the best way to 
describe the sensation. Next, she quickly reminds herself in her head in her normal 
speaking voice, “Rem ember AV, don’t put your hand too strong because then it’s gonna 
hurt more.” This utterance comes after the beep, just after the more desperate, “I ’m not 
going to cry!” (Inner Speech; Perceptual Awareness)
4.5: At the moment o f the beep AV is asking her older brother, “M areo, are yo u ...? ” The 
beep sounds right after she speaks the word “you,” and interferes with AV completing
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her question. She was going to ask, “Marco, are you sad?” Her younger brother had 
messed up some o f M arco’s computer games and AV wanted to know if  this had upset 
him. (Talking Out Loud)
Interview: 5 
Date: 4/9/07 
Time: unrecorded  
Interviewers: SA & RH  
Num ber o f Beeps: 5 
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 4/8/07
5.1: AV is playing with her virtual pet dog on Nintendo DS. She is dressing her dog by 
using the pencil tool to drag a shirt icon to the puppy icon. At the moment o f the beep AV 
is in the process o f dragging the shirt toward the puppy, about halfway there. Though AV 
is able to describe the shirt as “purple with white stripes,” she is not particularly aware o f 
the purpleness or stripedness— or anything else— that moment; she is just dragging one 
icon toward another. (Just Doing)
5.2: AV is watching TV, looking at a girl in a blue dress. At the moment o f the beep AV 
is looking at the bottom part o f the dress. She is not focused on any particular aspect o f 
the bottom o f the dress (blueness, rose pattern, shape, etc.) at that moment, though prior 
to the beep she had been thinking that the dress was pretty. (Perceptual Awareness)
5.3: AV is about to close her eyes, wondering to herself if  she should sleep. At the 
moment o f the beep, AV is asking herself in her head in her usual voice, “Should I 
sleep?” Specifically, the beep sounds as she says the word “I,” but it does not interrupt 
her saying the complete phrase to herself. (Note: During the interview we asked AV to 
imitate her inner voice exactly as it was at the moment o f  the beep. AV said aloud, “Am I 
sleeping?” and another phrase, but not “Should I sleep?” W hen queried about the word 
discrepancy, AV firmly maintained that the exact words were, “Should I sleep?” and that 
she had simply misspoken during the imitation. There seems to be something important 
here, but w hat’s going on remains unknown. I ’m curious about whether this phenomenon 
may be a spin o ff o f the bilingual issue. That inner speech is hard when you are speaking 
Spanish using English words.) (Inner Speech)
5.4: AV is eating her breakfast before going to school. At the mom ent o f the beep she is 
looking at a bite o f  pancakes on her fork, getting ready to eat it. She is not aware o f 
anything in particular, just looking at the bite o f pancakes. (Perceptual Awareness)
5.5: AV is at her friend’s house after school practicing for the talent show. At the 
moment o f the beep, AV is hurrying to line up before the music starts. She is not aware o f 
anything at that moment, she is just quickly lining up. Soon after the beep she becomes 
concerned about messing up the dance steps, but that is not in her experience at the 
moment o f the beep. (Just Doing)
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J T ’s Samples (See Chapter 9)
In terv iew : 1
D ate: 4/22/07
Tim e: 7:05pm
Interv iew ers: SA & RH
N u m b er of Beeps: 5
D ate(s) Beeps Collected: 4/21/07
1.1: JT is in his room at his dad’s house. He has just noticed a candy wrapper that looks 
out o f place. At the moment o f the beep he is picking up the candy wrapper and looking 
at it, and simultaneously seeing the entire room, noticing how filthy it is. Also at that 
moment, JT sees an image o f  his Dad close in front o f  him, in his face, so to speak 
looking a little angry (due to the messy room). JT sees just his D ad’s face, from the collar 
up; his Dad is looking straight at JT and saying something to the effect of, clean up your 
room, and don’t make me ask you again. Though JT sees his dad’s mouth moving, he 
doesn’t hear anything, nor apprehend the exact words his dad is saying to him— yet he 
knows with certainty the main message his dad is conveying. Additionally at that 
moment, in the back o f his mind JT is thinking, here we go again. This thought is not in 
words, but the idea is clear and present, though in the background o f  his experience. 
A lthough JT ’s dad is seen to be angry/perturbed, JT him self is not experiencing any 
emotion. (Perceptual Awareness; Image; Unsymbolized Thinking)
1.2: JT was just setting his notebook down after writing notes in reference to beep 1.1 
when the beeper sounded. Because o f  the quick beep, there was too much interference to 
capture his experience at that moment. (Task Issue)
1.3: At the moment o f  the beep JT was holding a coke to his mouth and drinking. He 
does not recall his inner experience at that moment. (An excellent answer, demonstrating 
that he comprehends the exact criteria o f  the DES task.) (Task Issue)
1.4: JT is looking at a box o f comics. At the moment o f the beep he is staring at one face 
o f the box, engrossed in the white color and, separately, at the brightness/vibrancy o f  the 
white. He is focused on one central area on the face o f  the box, but the 
whiteness/brightness seems to occupy his entire visual field. JT has been staring at the 
face o f the box for a few seconds, so the sound o f  the beep penetrates an ongoing process. 
(Sensory Awareness)
1.5: JT is looking at the cover o f the book Oliver Twist, which included a large portrait o f 
the young Oliver. At the moment o f the beep, his attention was divided between what we 
might call the sadness-in-OIiver’s-eyes theme and the eolor-of-the-pieture theme. 
Foremost in his experience, JT is looking at O liver’s eyes; he recognizes the eyes to be 
sad and in his own head is seeing three screens depicting different scenes that depict JT ’s 
way o f thinking about what O liver’s life was like, and what events might have caused 
O liver’s sadness. The screens in JT ’s head are at right angles to each other, with one 
screen directly in front o f him, much like the side and front walls o f  an office. The screen
2 0 3
directly in front o f JT, which is the scene JT thinks is most probably, depicts Oliver as a 
little boy in a dreary orphanage cafeteria begging for food, his hands cupped and 
outstretched. The image is similar to a still photograph with only the little boy in focus. 
The other two screens flank JT to the right and left at right angles to the front screen. 
These screens also depict sad scenes, one o f a dog dying and the other o f  a person dying. 
It is difficult for JT to recall which scene is on what side, but he knows they are there.
The second “them e” o f JT ’s experience at the moment o f  the beep involves JT noticing 
the worn, pixilated quality o f the printed image o f O liver’s face on the front o f the book. 
This was a sensory experience, a noting o f the lined-ness and pixilated colors o f the 
printing. (Perceptual Awareness; Images; Sensory Awareness)
Interview: 2
Date: 4/25/07
Time: 7:05pm
Number o f Beeps: 5
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 4/24/07
2.1: JT ’s family has guests visiting for dinner. They are talking in the living room but at 
the moment o f  the beep JT is thinking about eating hamburgers. He also smells the 
hamburgers cooking and, at the same time, he feels a cool breeze on his right cheek. At 
that moment, most o f  his awareness is on the smell o f the ham burgers, less is on the air 
on his cheek, and none is on the conversation happening. (Unsymbolized Thinking; 
Sensory Awareness; Sensory Awareness)
2.2: At the moment o f  the beep roughly 70% o f JT ’s awareness is on squeezing mustard 
out o f mustard bottle onto his hamburger. Specifically, he hears the sound o f  the mustard 
bottle pushing out air and bits o f  mustard while seeing the mustard on his burger. He is 
aware o f  the amount and location o f the mustard on his burger (some kind o f gauging 
process?). At the same time, in the background, JT hears pots and pans clanging in the 
kitchen. Roughly 30% o f his awareness is attending to the sound. (Sensory Awareness; 
Sensory Awareness)
2.3: JT has ju st taken a sip o f  water. At the moment o f the beep, he is experiencing a 
slight burning sensation/weird taste in the back o f  his throat. Simultaneously he hears 
him self saying that i t’s peculiar that water would cause that sensation. The sound seems 
to float through his mind in the background, but he is unsure o f  the exact words he hears. 
(Suspect?) (Perceptual Awareness; Inner Hearing)
2.4: At the mom ent o f  the beep, JT is looking at a can o f  D iet Coke and seeing the 
reflection o f the light bulb in the light fixture overhead in the shiny silver stripe o f the 
can’s design. Roughly 80% of his awareness is focused on seeing this reflected image, 
and the other 20% o f his awareness is allocated to the sensation o f his stomach being very 
full (from eating all those hamburgers). (Sensory Awareness; Sensory Awareness)
2.5: JT has just taken a bite o f a strawberry. At the mom ent o f  the beep he is feeling the 
sensation o f strawberry juice dripping out o f  the com er o f  his mouth while thinking that
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he should clean it up/wipe his face. His thought is not in words or images, but rather is an 
idea/knowing/concept o f  what he should probably do. Equally salient in his awareness at 
that moment is his recalling o f the story his sister is telling. JT is gradually detaching 
from what she is saying, being drawn away by the sensation o f the strawberry juice and 
through the realization that h e’s already heard what she is talking about. (Sensory 
Awareness; Unsymbolized Thinking; Unsymbolized Thinking)
Interview: 3
Date: 4/27/07
Time: 7:05pm
Number of Beeps: 5
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 4/26/07
3.1: JT has just walked into the bathroom and the door is closing behind him. At the 
moment o f the beep most o f  his awareness (70%) is on saying to him self in his head, “If  
it beeps in another 10 seconds it will be private.” The beep sounds as he is saying the 
word, “private.” His inner voice sounds exactly like his usual spoken voice, somewhat 
monotone and slightly dispassionate. A t the same time, a smaller portion (20%) o f JT ’s 
awareness is on hearing the door “on its way to closing.” Speeifieally, he is hearing the 
metal latch scrape across the outer edge o f the strike plate, the sound it makes before the 
door finally clicks into place. JT is perceptually interested in the closing o f the door, that 
is, he is listening for the door closing; he is not drawn into the sensory aspect(s) o f  the 
sound itself. (Inner Speech; Perceptual Awareness)
3.2: At the moment o f the beep JT is thinking about waking up early the next day in the 
form o f an image. Speeifieally, JT is imagining him self turning his head to the left until 
his digital clock comes into his visual field. He sees the red numbers, 5:30, on the clock. 
Everything in the room appears darkened and he can’t really see anything else in the 
room aside from the red numbers on the clock. At the same moment, JT has picked up a 
can o f  mints and hears the metallic sound o f  the mints rattling in the tin. At the moment 
o f the beep he is drawn to the metallic sound, not by the mints themselves. (Image; 
Sensory Awareness)
3.3: JT is thinking about the end o f  swim season sort o f retrospectively. At the moment o f 
the beep he is saying to himself, “Tomorrow is the last time I ’ll get to w ear a Speedo.”
At the same time, JT feels sad, and the sadness is in his head. The sadness is about swim 
season ending and JT experiences it as a separate accompanying phenomenon to his 
thought. Additionally, at the mom ent o f  this beep, a good deal (50%) o f JT ’s awareness is 
on noticing the messiness o f  his room. He sees the mess o f  everything in his room at once 
and he cannot see the floor for all the stuff on it. However, JT is not noticing anything in 
particular, nor explicitly thinking anything about the messiness at the moment. (Inner 
Speech; Feeling; Perceptual Awareness)
3.4: PRIVATE. (Body function.)
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3.5: A t the moment o f the beep, JT is aware o f his right eye burning. The sensation seems 
to be only on the white part o f his eye and though it is not painful, JT experiences it as an 
annoying sensation. Most o f his awareness (60%) is on this sensation but a smaller 
portion o f his awareness (30%) is also noticing the characteristics o f a patch o f the blue 
stucco wall in front o f him. The wall has been painted blue and JT is looking at the higher 
areas o f  texture, which are blue, but he is also noticing the lower areas o f texture are still 
white. He predominantly is drawn to the blueness o f the wall, but because o f the 
discrepancy in the white areas and blue areas, he is also aware o f  the stucco texture. 
Finally, roughly 10% o f JT ’s awareness is on his feeling “hot and stuffy.”
This is a physical sensation and he experiences it all over his body as a result o f the 
temperature in the room. (Sensory Awareness; Sensory Awareness; Sensory Awareness)
Interview: 4
Date: 4/29/07
Time: 7:05pm
Number o f Beeps: 5
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 4/29/07
4.1: JT is lying down on the couch and his dog is lying on top o f  him. A t the moment o f 
the beep, he feels the dog’s weight pressing down on his stomach and the pressure is 
slightly painful. At the same time JT is annoyed, which involves wanting to throw the 
dog o ff o f  him. This annoyance seems to be a feeling in his head, which somehow gets 
expressed in his arms. JT is sure that this annoyance is not an explicit thought, and he is 
sure that there is some sensation like throwing the dog o ff in his arms, but he is less sure 
o f the annoyance in his head. Also at the moment o f  the beep, JT knows that his mother is 
speaking to him; this knowing is somewhere between a thought and a hearing o f 
something like murmuring. He is not hearing her articulated words. This recognition o f 
her speaking is least prominent in his awareness. (Sensory Awareness; Feeling)
4.2: JT is doing push-ups on astro-turf. A t the moment o f  the beep he is asking him self in 
his head in his normal voice, “How many do you wanna do?” At the same time, JT is also 
aware (40%) o f a pretty painful, fire-like burning sensation in both palms o f his hands.
His hands have been burning like this since doing pull-ups on a metal bar earlier in his 
exercises. (Inner Speech; Sensory Awareness)
4.3: JT is in the ear with his mom at a drive-thru. A t the mom ent o f  the beep he is looking 
at the very dark blue lettering on the drive-thru window, wondering whether the lettering 
is blue or black. His thought is clear yet it does not manifest in words or images. At the 
same time JT ’s mom is talking to him. Although he is in some way taking in the meaning 
o f  what she is saying, that meaning is not impacting him. H e’s not “latched onto” what 
she’s saying; he’s not thinking about what she’s saying. (Unsymbolized Thinking; 
Sensory Awareness; Perceptual Awareness)
4.4: At the moment o f the beep JT is saying out loud, “That movie is going to be over 
soon.” At the same time, rather in parallel to the out-loud talking, he is thinking to 
him self something like, I need to watch something else ... what should I watch?
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Additionally, a very small amount o f his awareness (5%) is on hearing and seeing the TV 
at the m om ent o f  the beep. (Talking Out Loud to Self; Unsym bolized Thinking)
4.5: JT is seeing a bug fly around the room. At the moment o f the beep he sees the bug, a 
little black speck moving quickly, while wondering to him self w hether her should try to 
hit it or not. (Unsymbolized Thinking; Perceptual Awareness)
Interview: 5
Date: 5/1/07
Time: 7:05pm
Number o f Beeps: 5
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 5/30/07
5.1: JT is sitting in his room looking at the carpet. A t the moment o f the beep he is 
noticing the pouffy texture o f  the carpet. His entire visual field is filled with carpet and he 
is engrossed in the pouffy aspect o f  the carpet overall, rather than only in a small focused 
area. Roughly 90% o f JT ’s awareness is on the carpet and the remaining 10% is on 
hearing the grinding noise o f  the air conditioner in the background o f his awareness. 
(Sensory Awareness; Sensory Awareness)
5.2: At the moment o f  the beep JT is wholly engrossed in the act o f sneezing. The beep 
sounds just at the tail end o f the sneeze and at that moment JT is aware o f  the built-up 
pressure blowing out o f  him. He does not have any thoughts at that moment, he is totally 
focused on the act o f  sneezing. (Sensory Awareness)
5.3: JT is sitting on his bed with the bottom half o f his legs hanging over the wooden 
footboard. At the mom ent o f the beep he feels a painful burning sensation in the back o f 
his knees, where the footboard is pressing into him. At the same moment, JT is thinking 
that he should probably move his legs. The thought is not in words, it is just an idea that 
has not yet translated into a decision to act. Though the thought is in reference to the 
burning sensation in the back o f  his legs, it is somehow disconnected from the sensation, 
as if  the sensation and the thought are abstracted from one another. When they finally do 
eome together, a mom ent after the beep, JT takes action and moves his legs o ff o f  the 
footboard. Also at the moment o f  the beep, JT hears the crunch o f  the pretzel he is biting 
into. Only 20% o f his attention is on the sound. Another 5% o f his awareness is on the 
undifferentiated noise coming from the TV at that moment. The remaining 75% o f his 
awareness is on the burning pain behind his knees and his thinking about moving his legs. 
(Sensory Awareness; Unsymbolized Thinking; Sensory Awareness; Perceptual 
Awareness)
5.4: At the moment o f  the beep, JT is noticing the shininess o f  a candy wrapper lying on 
the floor. He is simultaneously thinking that it’s pretty shiny, though that thought is not in 
words. A t the same moment, JT is aware o f his upper lip burning right along the lip line, 
and he is aware that his nose is dripping. Just prior to the beep, JT felt the sensation o f 
cold mucus slowing running downward out o f his right nostril in a straight line toward his 
upper lip. This sensation is what caused him, a second later, to become aware o f the fact
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that his nose was dripping. (Sensory Awareness; Unsymbolized Thinking; Sensory 
Awareness; Perceptual Awareness)
5.5: JT is looking at the reflection o f a tree in a pane o f glass. Just before the beep, he 
realized that the tree was not in the same place it had been a moment before. At the 
moment of the beep, JT is looking at the reflection and asking him self something like, 
“Why would the tree be moving?” At that same moment, JT hears the TV in the 
background. He can discern that distinct words are being spoken, but he is not focusing 
enough on the sounds to know what those specific words are. (Inner Speech; Perceptual 
Awareness)
J f V ’s Samples (See Chapter 10)
Interview: 1 
Date: 6/13/07 
Time: 1:45pm  
Interviewers: SA; RH; JKL  
Number of Beeps: 8
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 6/12/07 & 6/13/07 (last two)
1.1: JW is playing solitaire on the computer. At the moment o f  the beep she is moving 
the King card down to fill an empty spot. She had been feeling mad because her mother 
and brother were fighting but at that moment she is not aware o f her anger, even though 
she believes that the anger process is still ongoing in her body. (Doing; Feeling Fact o f 
Body)
1.2: JW is talking on the phone to her friend Tiffany and they have just decided to 3-way 
call JW ’s boyfriend. JW is on hold while Tiffany places the call to JW ’s boyfriend. At the 
moment o f the beep JW is saying excitedly to herself in her head, “Okay/Ohmigod, I ’m 
gonna talk to my boyfriend...w hat should I say?” She also feels excited, which she 
experienees as having butterflies in her stomach. The butterfly sensation is intense and 
seems to be located in a rather small 2 x 2  inch area just above her belly button, about an 
inch inside o f  her. A t the moment o f  the beep JW ’s attention is split evenly between what 
she is saying and what she is feeling. (Inner Speech; Feeling w/ Bodily Features)
1.3: JW ’s mom is talking to her friend on the phone. The friend is going to be having a 
baby girl and JW ’s mom is brainstorming g irl’s names. At the moment o f  the beep JW 
blurts out loud to her mother, “W hat about A lisha?” M ost o f  JW ’s awareness (70%) is on 
what she is saying aloud but she is also aware o f feeling mild excitement (30%). This 
excitement manifests as butterflies in the 2 x 2  inch area ju st above her belly button (the 
same area as in Beep 1.2), but it is not a very intense sensation. (Speaking Aloud;
Feeling)
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1.4: JW  is leaving her house with her friend Cassidy. At the m om ent o f the beep JW ’s 
hand is on the doorknob and she is in the process o f walking through the door. She is not 
aware o f  anything. (Just Doing)
1.5: JW is on the phone with her friend Tiffany. At the moment o f  the beep she is talking 
to Tiffany (JW can’t remember exactly what she was saying, but knows that part o f  the 
conversation involved her figuring out if  she could stop by to see Tiffany’s newly dyed 
hair.) (Just Talking)
1.6: JW is half asleep while listening to music. At the moment o f the beep she is partially 
paying attention to the music (can’t recall what it was exactly) and partially asleep. 
(Coding: Just Doing)
1.7: JW is talking on the phone to her friend Tiffany when her brother tells her he needs 
to use the phone. At the moment o f the beep, JW is saying, “O kay” in response to her 
brother’s request. She is not paying attention to her conversation with Tiffany at that 
moment. (Just Talking)
1.8: JW is in the back seat o f the ear. At the moment o f the beep she is watching her 
brother, who had been sitting in the front seat, get out o f the ear to greet a passing friend. 
JW  is not aware o f  anything other than just watching. (Just W atching)
Interview: 2 
Date: 6/15/07 
Time: 1:30pm  
Interviewers: SA; RH; JKL  
Num ber o f Beeps: 6
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 6/14/07 (first three) & 6/15/07 (last three)
2.1: JW is watching the movie The Lion King, specifically the scene in which Simba 
discovers that his father, Moufasa, is dead. In the film Simba crawls under M oufasa’s 
paw as he mourns his loss. At the moment o f the beep JW is w atching that scene and 
cooing sadly to herself in her head, “Ooh, that’s so sad, he died...” At that same moment 
JW  is also feeling sad, which she experiences as being everywhere throughout her head 
and upper body. The feeling in her head is about the same as the feeling in her body (that 
is, it is a bodily, not a mental, feeling). Beyond that, JW cannot describe her feeling in 
any more detail. (Inner Speech; Feeling)
2.2: JW is watching the final scene o f the movie The Lion King. In this scene Simba has 
become king and is standing on high, surveying his kingdom with his young son at his 
side. At the moment o f the beep JW feels happy/proud for Simba, which she experiences 
in her head only. (Feeling)
2.3: JW at her friend’s swimming pool. At the moment o f  the beep she is ju st about to 
dive o ff o f the diving board and into the pool. She has leaned into the dive but her feet
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have not yet sprung off o f the board. She is not aware o f anything at that moment, she is 
simply engaged in the action o f diving. (Note: Use o f on-board speaker) (Just Doing)
2.4: JW and her mother are looking at the Burkholder Middle School homepage on the 
internet. At the moment o f the beep JW is reading the first line o f text to herself, 
comprehending the meaning o f what she is reading word by word. Somehow the words 
seem to be understood word by word, as if  each word enters her consciousness somehow 
attached to its meaning; these individual words are not spoken or heard, but appear 
sequentially as she reads. The font is small and she is not wearing her glasses so she 
struggles slightly to read the text. The beep interrupts her reading mid-sentence but at the 
moment before the beep interrupted her she was just reading. (Reading)
2.5: JW has just logged onto My Space and is looking at her homepage. At the moment 
o f the beep she is looking at the ‘new m ail’ icon, which is indicating that she does indeed 
have new mail, and saying to herself in her head in a monotoned voice, “Okay, now 
w hat’s gonna happen?” 1 recall this as being “Okay, w hat’s gonna happen now?” And 1 
also recall that she already knew that there was mail from that girl. However, I ’m not sure 
about either. Jackie and 1 did bum  the DVD, which is in your plastic tray in the lab. JW 
says this in reference to the fact that she’s been receiving mean messages from a girl who 
does not like her, though this is not explicitly in her awareness at the moment o f the beep. 
In her saying, “Okay, now w hat’s gonna happen?” she is wondering to herself if  the new 
messages in her inbox are from this girl and if  so what she’s written this time. (Inner 
Speech)
2.6: JW is waiting for the movie M onster’s Inc. to begin. The title has just appeared on 
the screen and at the moment o f the beep JW is looking at the screen but not registering 
what she is seeing. There is nothing in her awareness at that moment. (Just W atching TV)
Interview: 3
Date: 6/27/07
Time: 1:30pm
Interviewers: SA; RH; JKL
Number of Beeps: 6
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 6/26/07
3.1: I t’s morning and JW has just finished eating breakfast. At the moment o f the beep 
she is walking toward her room. She is not aware o f  any inner experience at that moment. 
(Just Walking)
3.2: JW is playing an Xbox 360 game with her brother. At the moment o f the beep she is 
pressing the nitrousY button, which gives a quick speed boost, while watching her car (?) 
begin to overtake her brother’s car on the screen. At the same time she is thinking that 
she’s got to beat him, but that thought is not in words or images, it’s just there in her 
awareness. Her inner experience at the moment o f the beep is m ost like a “collage” o f 
semi-automatically pressing the Y button, watching her ear overtake his, and thinking 
she’s got to beat him. That is, her inner experience is not differentiated into three separate
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experiences; rather those three experiences are intertwined in her inner experience at that 
moment. (Doing; Unsymbolized Thinking)
3.3: JW  is talking to her friend T on the phone. At the moment o f  the beep she is 
speaking to T, saying something like, “ .. .1 couldn’t go to the pool.” There is nothing else 
in her awareness at that moment. (Just Talking)
3.4: JW  is watching the film Finding Nemo (the part about the M om and 3000 baby fish 
being massacred?). At the moment o f the beep she is feeling sad. She is aware o f the sad 
feeling throughout her upper body (waist up) and head, but she cannot describe anything 
else about her experience o f the feeling except to say that w hat’s in her head seems to be 
the same as w hat’s in her body (that is, it is not a cognitive thing in her head and an 
affective thing in her body). Though most o f her awareness is on her experience o f 
feeling sad, some o f her attention is focused on the film. (Feeling)
3.5: JW  is preparing to play Spider Solitaire on the computer. At the moment o f the beep 
she is clicking on the Spider Solitaire icon listed on the Start menu. She is looking at the 
icon on the com puter screen while clicking the mouse, but she is not aware o f  any inner 
experience at that moment. (Just Doing)
3.6: JW  is looking at MySpace.com. She has just read a posting by her friend. A, on a 
bulletin and JW  would like to ask A a personal question (about that posting?). That is, 
just before the beep, JW had some sense o f the question she would like to ask; that sense 
was not completely articulated or differentiated. A t the moment o f  the beep, JW is not at 
all aware o f  what she’d like to ask A; she is simply proceeding toward A ’s My Space 
profile page, where she will be able to privately type her question to A. At the moment o f 
the beep, JW is looking at A ’s icon (which is next to A ’s bulletin posting) and clicking it. 
Though a mom ent before she had had the (yet verbally unformulated) personal question 
in mind, at the moment o f  the beep JW is not aware o f anything. (Just Doing, preceded by 
Unsymbolized Thinking)
Interview: 4 
Date: 7/25/07 
Time: 1:30pm  
Interviewers: SA & RH  
Num ber o f Beeps: 6
Date(s) Beeps Collected: probably 7/25/07
4.1: JW is eating breakfast, taking the last bite o f  eggs. At the m om ent o f the beep she 
tastes the egg, which is now in her mouth. She is not noticing anything particular about 
the taste (like saltiness or the texture o f the eggs). A moment before, JW  had been 
somehow aware that this is her last bite o f eggs, but at the mom ent o f  the beep that 
awareness is no longer present. (Perceptual Awareness)
4.2: JW  is on her way to the bathroom to run a shower. She is ju st about to walk through 
the bathroom  doorway at the moment o f the beep. A t that moment, JW sees her reflection
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in the m irror on the wall o f the bathroom directly through the doorway. She sees herself 
from the waist up, but she is not looking at/foeused on anything in particular in the 
reflection. (Perceptual Awareness)
4.3: JW is playing with her puppy. At the moment o f the beep she is noticing the spots on 
the puppy’s nose and head. JW had been feeling the fun-ness o f having a new puppy, and 
that state was probably still present in JW in some way, but not in JW ’s experience at that 
moment. (Perceptual Awareness; Feeling Fact o f Body)
4.4: JW is preparing food for her puppy. At the moment o f the beep she is placing the 
bottle o f formula in a pot o f boiling water to warm it up. She is not aware o f anything 
aside from just doing that task at the moment o f  the beep. (Just Doing)
4.5: JW is buckling a collar around her dog’s neck. At the moment o f the beep she is 
fitting the prong into a hole. JW is not aware o f  anything other than the task at hand. (Just 
Doing)
4.6: JW is pouring dry dog food into her dog’s bowl. At the moment o f the beep she is 
looking at the food in the bowl, noticing the bone-shaped-ness o f the pieces o f food. Most 
o f her awareness is on the shape o f  the food, but in the background a small part o f her 
feels pain on her right back ankle, where her brother’s puppy is biting her with it’s tiny 
new teeth. (Sensory Awareness (external); Perceptual Awareness (bodily))
Interview: 5 
Date: 7/30/07 
Time: 1:30pm
Interviewers: SA & RH & JKL  
Number o f Beeps: 6
Date(s) Beeps Collected: probably 7/29/07
5.1: JW is turning on her PlayStation 2. She is pressing the power button, on which there 
is a small red light. At the moment o f the beep JW is not aware o f anything other than 
what she is doing. (Just Doing)
5.2: JW  is in the kitchen preparing taquitoes. At the moment o f  the beep she is putting 
hot sauce on the taquitoes. She is not aware o f anything other than the doing o f  this task. 
(Just Doing)
5.3: JW  is looking at her puppy running toward her. She is paying attention to the 
puppy’s playful running and sudden stopping. JW  thinks that she was feeling happy/joy 
as she watched her puppy come toward her, but that that feeling was not in her awareness 
at the moment o f  the beep. (JW was also in the act o f  clim bing over the gate to get into 
the puppy’s room to play. She was struggling slightly to maneuver over the gate, but 
none o f  this was in her awareness at the moment o f the beep; all attention was on her 
puppy.) (Perceptual Awareness; Feeling Fact o f  Body)
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5.4: JW  is playing tug-of-war with her adult dog, Beautiful. JW is holding one end o f  the 
toy and Beautiful is tugging on the other end o f the toy. At the m om ent o f the beep the 
toy rips and JW is shocked/surprised. The shock/surprise seems to be between a thought 
and a feeling, but it is hard for JW to describe the experience beyond that. JW explained 
to us that she felt shocked/surprised because her dog, Beautiful, had not displayed that 
kind o f  aggression while she was pregnant. JW was shocked/surprised to see that her dog 
would rip a toy like that, though none o f this background information was in JW ’s 
awareness at the moment o f  the beep. (Feeling)
5.5: JW  is walking down the hallway toward her room. At the m om ent o f the beep she is 
turning the com er from the hallway into her room. She is not aware o f  anything at that 
moment. (Just Doing)
5.6: JW  is playing Streetball on her PlayStation 2. At the moment o f  the beep she is about 
to press the X button on the remote in order to pass the football to another player on her 
team. She is looking at the screen and while pressing o f the X button, and this comes 
automatically to her. She is paying attention to the game, but she is not paying speeific 
attention to an aspect o f  the game or to pressing the X button. (Just Doing)
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